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Abstract 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide statistical evidence on the value relevance 
of a set of selected performance measures, to measure the performance of companies 
according to the traditional accrual measures and value added measures, and finally, to 
assess their information content and incremental information content. The study covers 
a sample of 986 UK companies listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) with an 
active share during the period 1990 to 2012.
1
 This thesis also provides evidence on the 
long-term impact of adopting economic value added (EVA) by 89 US companies on a 
set of important firm decisions, namely, the investing, financing and operating 
decisions. The time horizon of this analysis spans the period 1960 -2012.  
The empirical evidence indicates that all the performance measures used in this thesis 
have a significant association with stock prices and returns. In addition, the results also 
reveal that when applying the price model, cash flows from operation (CFO) has the 
highest explanatory power among the variables considered. The remaining performance 
measures regarding their value relevance are in the following order: earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT), net income (NI), earnings before extra ordinary items (EBEI), cash value added 
(CVA) and EVA. Furthermore, the results show that EBITDA dominates other variables 
when the return model is used.  
With regard to the incremental information content, there is significant evidence of the 
existence of incremental information content between paired measures. The best 
combination was between CFO and EBITDA and the lowest exists when NI is paired 
with EBEI. Furthermore, this study provides empirical evidence on the incremental 
information content of EVA and NI components with regard to explaining the variation 
in the annual stock return. 
The final task involves the examination of the adoption of EVA as a performance 
incentive scheme and management tool. The results show that EVA firms outperform 
their matching firms and the market portfolio S&P500 index. In addition, it is found that 
adopting EVA significantly affects the adopting firm’s potential investing and financing 
and operating decisions. Several modifications to the model by Wallace (1997) are 
proposed. However, the results obtained regarding the long-term effects of EVA 
adoption are mixed regardless of the model applied. In particular, the new investment 
decision is the only one in the direction of Wallace (1997).  
                                                             
1 The vast majority of the firms were from the Main Market (only 11 firms were from the Alternative 
Investment Market). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The measurement of a firm’s performance is a crucial issue to its stakeholders, 
especially its shareholders, directors, managers and debtors. Changes in a firm’s 
performance can be detrimental to its health, its profitability and ultimately its survival. 
The concept of maximizing shareholder wealth has been one of the driving forces in the 
change in current management practice. This is the wealth that is traditionally gauged 
by either a standard accounting magnitude such as profits, earnings and cash flow from 
operations or various financial statement ratios (e.g. earnings per share, returns on 
assets, and investment and equity). Managers, shareholders and other interested parties 
then use this financial statement information to assess and predict current and future 
performance.  
Over the past decades, considerable attention has been paid to the relationship between 
accounting numbers and firm value. This attention to the relationship between 
theoretical firm value and the performance stream has attracted considerable researcher 
interest and resulted in a number of proprietary models being introduced. Ball and 
Brown’s research in 1968 was the first to discuss the information content of accounting 
numbers. They measured the association between annual earnings (cash flows from 
operations) and the abnormal return using the operating earnings as proxy for operating 
cash flows and they reported that earnings showed a higher correlation with abnormal 
stock return than cash flows. 
The work of Ball and Brown was replicated by sequences of empirical research using 
various proxies for annual earnings (i.e. Beaver, 1968; Beaver and Dukes 1972; and 
Pattel and Kaplan, 1977) to investigate the association between these performance 
measures and the variation in the stock price (return). Unfortunately, the results 
regarding the relevancy of the investigated measures are contradictory. This 
contradiction in the result obtained by different market-based accounting research and 
the criticisms which have arisen against the accruals (e.g. subjectivity and easily 
manipulated), and the main components of traditional measures, means that increasing 
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attention has been paid to new financial performance measures as substitutes for 
traditional accounting-based measures. 
However, after the cash flow statements gained the attention of the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB) more studies have been conducted to examine the 
incremental information content of cash flows over earnings (Finger, 1994; Clubb, 
1995; Barth et. al, 2001).  These studies concluded that cash flows have information 
content, but they reported mixed results regarding the incremental information content 
of cash flows over earnings. However, these studies did not attempt to investigate the 
role of aggregate accruals. 
As there are no conclusive results regarding the usefulness of earnings and cash flow 
items, neither the accrual earnings, nor the cash flow items, were perfect methods for 
measuring management performance as an approach to evaluating the whole firm 
(shareholder wealth) (Bowen et al., 1987; Charitou et al., 2001). Nevertheless the bulk 
of empirical evidence indicates that the superiority of cash flow measures versus 
earnings (as variously defined) has not been demonstrated. 
Management decisions – particularly the investment, financing, and operating decisions 
– affect shareholder value through their influence on such value drivers as value growth 
duration profit margin for the cash flows from operations or the cost of capital. The 
criterion has long persisted that in order for a company to create value and to generate 
wealth it must earn more than it costs (cost of capital employed) by way of debt and 
equity. The added value concept has been promoted strongly in performance 
measurement literature. This notion is historically referred to as the residual income 
(RI) method (a value added measure).  
A long glance at the late 80s and early 90s, the dates when EVA spread widely among 
firms, will enable the reader to attribute this diffusion to at least two factors. First, there 
are the criticisms the traditional accounting measures faced as a result of their 
subjectivity, depreciation methods, and inventory valuation (i.e., FIFO and LIFO 
techniques). As a consequence, these measures can be easily manipulated by managers 
and this will affect the profitability analysis. Second, financial markets went global and 
experienced huge expansion. At the same time US firms found themselves competing 
with foreign companies for a share of the market and faced tough competition from 
other firms especially the Japanese. These factors imply that previous performance 
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measures that shareholders used over a long period to guide and evaluate their 
investments are inefficient. This is a sufficient reason for shareholders and investors to 
contemplate other performance metrics, ones which may be objective and not 
manipulated. The best known example (at least from an EVA supporter’s viewpoint) is 
perhaps the developed version of the residual income method: the Economic Value 
Added or EVA model of Stern Stewart (1991). 
EVA, as a periodic performance measure, was introduced by Stern and Stewart to 
replace earnings and cash flows from operations as a measure of performance. Stewart 
(1994, p.75) argued that ‘EVA stands well out from the crowd as the single best 
measure of value creation on a continuous basis’. In addition to this he also remarks that 
‘EVA is almost 50% better than its closest accounting-based competitor (i.e. earnings), 
in explaining changes in shareholder wealth’ (p.75). EVA is defined as the profit earned 
by the firm less the cost of financing the firm’s capital. It is similar to RI but adjusted 
for net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and invested capital where needed. It is also 
referred to as net operating profits less a charge for the opportunity cost of invested 
capital (West and Worthington, 2000). 
Scholars have different points of view regarding the usefulness of economic value 
added (EVA) measures in explaining the variation of stock price performance. Thus as 
seen to date, the literature provides several studies questioning the claimed superiority 
of EVA to earnings and other performance metrics.  Biddle et al., (1997) claim that both 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), and the residual income (RI) have the higher 
adjusted    and outperform EVA in explaining variation in stock performances. 
Similarly, Lehn and Makhija (1997) argue that in spite of it having a higher correlation 
with stock return among the other performance measures, EVA and market value added 
(MVA) are not the most efficient metrics to evaluate a firm’s performance.  Cahan et 
al., (2002) contend that EVA is the best reward system as it better aligns the interests of 
the manager and the firm. Furthermore, Anastassis and Kyriazis, 2007 assumed that the 
value of EVA correlates better with market value (MV) than other accounting variables. 
Recently, Mehdi and Iman (2011) investigated the relative and incremental information 
content of EVA over traditional measures. They stated that stock return is highly 
associated with return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings per share 
(EPS), while EVA appears to have little information content beyond that which exists in 
other traditional accounting measures. Hence, the results do not support Stern and 
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Stewart’s claims that EVA is the only metric that best measures firms’ and manager 
performance. 
However, as a result of the criticisms the traditional and value added measures have 
faced, particularly the earnings and economic value added (EVA). And also in response 
to the arguments rose by Young (1999) towards the Stern and Stewart adjustment. The 
adjustment that mainly intends to produce a modified version of the EVA measure that 
probably has the ability to mitigate the drawbacks of accrual based measures and in its 
essence is similar to cash flows measure, researchers have begun to rethink new 
performance measures that can better capture the performance of firms and managers.  
In response, Ottosson and Wiessenrider (1996) proposed a new performance measure 
titled, cash value added (CVA)
2
 to replace the traditional accounting and value added 
measures, specifically the periodic measure EVA. They defined CVA as the difference 
between operating cash flows (OCF) and operating cash flows demand (OCFD). The 
first component basically represents the earnings before depreciation, interest and tax 
(EBDIT) adjusted for non-cash charges, working capital movements and non-strategic 
investments. The second component refers to investors’ capital cost, which is mainly 
the interest and dividends. 
However, an empirical question arises here. Which measure has the better association 
with the stock return/ price? Unfortunately, the empirical literature to date suggests that 
there is no single accounting based measure upon which one can rely to explain changes 
in shareholder wealth. 
The question that has received much concern in market-based accounting research is the 
relative information content of alternative performance measures (e. g. EVA, CVA, 
earnings, EBITDA, and cash flows). In evaluating various performance metrics, the 
criterion used must take into consideration the objective of a particular performance 
measure (Kothari, 2001). An important purpose of cash flow statements is that cash 
flow data are helpful in assessing the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash 
flows.  
                                                             
2
 This is a trademarked performance measure that was developed by the global management 
consultant ‘Boston Consulting Group (BCG)’ a U.S company founded in 1963 and which 
came to prominence in 1973. 
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The majority of prior empirical studies have used the association with share price or 
stock return as the criterion to evaluate the different performance measures. Implicitly, 
the main assumption of share price studies is that in an efficient market, share prices 
reflect information about expected future cash flows (future benefits). However, this 
assumption has been challenged by market "anomalies". For instance, the results of 
Sloan (1996) indicate that investors appear to focus on earnings and investors were 
incapable of considering the differential persistence of their cash flows and accruals 
components. Thus, there is the opportunity that the share-price studies’ results may be 
affected by the possibility that the market is concentrating on bottom line earnings (the 
market is not efficient). In this context, Bernard (1995) described the limitation of 
share-price studies: "Preclude from the outset the possibility that researchers could ever 
discover something that was not already known by the market" (p. 735). 
The value-relevance studies that investigate the empirical relation between stock market 
values, changes in values and different accounting numbers are important disciplines for 
accountant research. The price and return models are the most popular valuation 
methods in accounting literature (Barth et al., 2001). According to Christie (1987) both 
models are economically equivalent since they were derived from the same source 
which is the linear information model introduced by Ohlson (1995). This implies that 
the main inferences drawn from the two approaches should be the same- at least at the 
theoretical level. 
In practice, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) claimed that even the return model suffers 
fewer econometric problems than the price model where the estimations of earning 
response coefficients are more biased than those of the price model. Barth et al. (2001) 
found that when stock return is the dependent variable, earnings are better than cash 
flows but when actual future cash flows is the dependent variable, cash flows turn out to 
be better than earnings in explaining the variation in future cash flows. Thus, providing 
evidence on the value relevance of different performance measures using only the stock- 
return model is not enough to judge the usefulness of performance measures other than 
earnings.  There are many UK studies which had as their aim the comparison of various 
performance measures on the basis of their association with stock return. However, 
there has been no attempt to compare the different performance metrics on the basis of 
their association with annual stock prices. Therefore, this study will try to bridge this 
gap by investigating the association of different sets of performance measures with the 
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variation in stock price performances. These performance measures are net income 
available to common shareholders (NI), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), earnings before 
extraordinary items (EBEI), net cash flows from operations (CFO), cash value added 
(CVA) and economic value added (EVA).  
1.2 Motivation of the Study  
Each time researchers investigate the association between different performance 
measures and the stock price (return) they arrive at different points of view regarding 
the superiority and ability of these metrics in explaining the variations of stock price 
(return) performances. However, they fell through because they could not assign the 
optimal and perfect accounting measure that better gauges the performances of firms 
and executive management (Lehn and Makhija, 1997; Barton et al, 2010).  
Lee (1996, p. 32), for example, argues that ‘the search for a superior measure of firm 
valuation is a, if not the, key feature of contemporary empirical finance: For years, 
investors and corporate managers have been seeking a timely and reliable measurement 
of shareholders’ wealth. With such a measure, investors could spot over or underpriced 
stocks, lenders could gauge the security of their loans and managers could monitor the 
profitability of their factories, divisions and firms’. 
This relation between firm value and stock price return has been the focus of 
voluminous empirical research for the past three decades. A primary motivation for this 
research is to bridge an important gap in the UK literature relating to the information 
and incremental information content of a set of chosen accounting performance 
measures. While prior UK evidence (Board et al., 1989; Board and Day, 1989) is drawn 
from return studies in which stock return is the main criterion in evaluating the value 
relevance of accounting data, there are at present no UK stock price studies that 
measure the information and incremental information content of accounting measures 
by examining their ability to explain the variation in stock price performances. 
Econometrically, the two evolutionary methods, price and return evaluation methods, 
are different. Economically they are equivalent since they are derived from the same 
source which is the linear information model (Ohslon, 1995).  However, Rees (1999) 
explains in his paper that there are some difficulties that can be expected in the return 
model and these problems can be avoided by using the price models. 
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Another powerful motivation for this research is that it intends to be the first research 
that utilises UK data to examine the value relevance of the new residual income method: 
the cash value added (CVA), a title coined by the Boston consulting group, to provide 
evidence on its ability to outperform other performance measures, namely the economic 
value and traditional accounting metrics.   
1.3 Purpose of the Research 
The main objectives of the study are: 
 To empirically investigate the association between a comprehensive set of 
performance measures and the stock price (return) performances to indicate 
which of these measures are better at explaining the variation in stock 
performance and have the ability to evaluate the management performances and 
the whole company performances. These measures are the traditional accounting 
measures: net income (NI); earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA); and earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI). There 
is also the cash flows measure: cash flows from operation (CFO), the value 
added measures (residual income method) economic value added (EVA), and 
cash value added (CVA). This is achieved by employing a fixed effects model 
and running six regressions against the selected metrics. The dependent variable 
is the three month closing stock price following the reporting day and stock 
return respectively. The set of independent variables is constructed from the 
review of extant literature. 
 
 To empirically examine the incremental information content of the selected set 
of performance measures.  
 
 To extend previous studies by decomposing the primary measure, namely 
earnings and economic value added EVA, into their main components to test 
whether these components contribute more to the association of the prime 
measure with the stock (price) return. 
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 To utilise the event study methodology to examine the impact of adopting EVA 
as a compensation plan and management tool on the performance of US firms 
after the adoption date. The BHAR and CAAR are the aggregation methods 
used. This includes comparing the performance of event firms to that of both the 
matching firms and benchmark portfolio index, the S&P500.  
 
 To extend the work of Wallace (1997) by proposing three econometric models 
to investigate the long-terms effects of EVA adoption on US firms’ material 
decisions. These are the investing, financing and operating decisions which it is 
claimed would increase the value of the company.  
 
1.4  Contribution of the Study  
This research will contribute to prior UK studies in three major respects: 
I. Unlike previous research, it will employ UK data for the selected period and 
adopt a unified econometrics model to examine and test the association of a set 
of performance measures, being the focus of past literature, and the variation in 
annual stock price performances. From the research point of view, this will 
eliminate the controversies embedded in the findings of previous UK and US 
studies regarding the use of different samples and econometric models to 
conduct their research (Garrod et al., 2000). Furthermore, this research will 
extend its goal to test for the incremental information content of earnings and 
EVA main components and examine whether any of these components has a 
greater contribution to the association between the prime performance measures 
and annual price performance. 
II. As Rees (1999) explained in his paper, there are some difficulties to be 
expected in the return model and these problems can be avoided by using the 
price models. Hence, the stock price has become the most common value-
measure used in financial and accounting research. This research will use both 
the stock price and the return as dependent variables instead of using the stock 
return alone.  
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III. In response to the adjustments Stern and Stewart applied to NOPAT and the 
capital employed, the main figures need to compute EVA, which aims to 
produce a performance measure that is equivalent to cash flows and less subject 
to the distortions of accrual accounting (Young, 1999). This research will 
contribute and enhance the theoretical aspect of the research with a broad 
empirical study of UK literature by using cash value added (CVA) as an 
alternative performance measure (initially proposed by Ottosson and 
Weissenrieder, 1997) and investigate its association with annual stock price 
performance and test whether CVA contains more information content than 
other performance measures.   
IV. It will extend the work of Wallace (1997) by introducing three alternative 
models that the current research expect will more effectively capture the long 
term effects of adopting EVA as a compensation and management tool by 
different US firms.  
1.5 Scope of the Research 
The current research uses the empirical approach to fulfil its aims. The sources of data 
are DataStream, CRSP and Compustat. The data drawn from UK industrial companies 
will be used to run the empirical test. This study will cover the period from 1990 to 
2012. 
Furthermore, in order to empirically test the impacts of adopting the EVA compensation 
scheme on the treatment companies’ potential investment, a sample of 89 US firms over the 
period from 1960 to 2012 were selected. The sources of data are Compustat and CRSP. 
1.6 Research Structure 
Apart from this introductory chapter the thesis is organized into six main chapters: 
Chapter Two presents the literature review of different performance measures and their 
association with stock price (return) performances and introduces the literature review 
concerning the explanatory variables which will be examined in the current research and 
provide a historical look at the debates these measures have encountered. This chapter is 
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also devoted to the discussion of certain economic theories in terms of its relation to the 
topic under investigation. These are the compensation theory, the information content 
theory and the incremental information content theory. Finally, this research will 
discuss and review the literature which has already been conducted in terms of the 
association between traditional measures, cash flows and value added measures and 
variations in stock price (return) performances.    
Chapter Three discusses the research methodology commencing with the review of the 
research design which included identifying the hypothesis development process and 
then addressing the research questions which follow the review of the literature. 
Following this the models adopted in the research will be introduced. These are the 
price model and the return model. The final part looks at the hypotheses of the research.  
The research methodology chapter discusses the main research variables, including their 
definitions and calculation. 
The sample frame, the sample size, and the controlling variables are also discussed. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the procedures of measuring and ascertaining the 
reliability and relevancy of research variables. Finally, the chapter briefly discusses the 
statistical analyses tests that will be used in the research and which are explained in-
depth in the next chapter. 
Chapter Four develops tests for the hypotheses developed in Chapter Three and reports 
on the main body of results for the study. The value relevancy and incremental 
information content of performance measures will be evaluated by assessing their 
ability in explaining the variation in stock performances.  
The results for the fixed effects models are reported in this chapter. These results 
provide evidence on the relative ability of net income (NI) versus the cash flows and 
accrual components and the relative information content of Economic value added 
(EVA) versus cash flows, accruals and other components. 
Chapter Five describes the research design and the methodology that was used to 
examine the EVA adoption event. It provides a historical look at the event study 
literature and discusses and reviews the literature which has already been examined in 
terms of the implications on firm value of firms adopting EVA as a performance and 
management tool. The sample selection process and, the sample size are discussed as 
well. The models which will be used in the research are then introduced. The CAR and 
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the BHAR aggregation approaches are used to conduct the event study test. Furthermore 
it sheds light on the statistical properties of returns, abnormal returns and aggregate 
abnormal returns, BHAR and CAR, and the empirical results obtained. 
Chapter Six extends the empirical test begun in chapter five. It replicates the same 
model applied by Wallace (1997). Three modifications were proposed to extend the 
original work of Wallace. First it is modified by introducing the market return index 
(S&P500) as a control variable to replace the change in ownership in Wallace’s original 
model. Second, a model is proposed that uses levels rather than differences. Third, a 
modified model is proposed that uses abnormal measures of dependent and independent 
variables. It then describes the sources of data and the collection process in terms of the 
set of variables used. Empirically, it tests the effects of adopting EVA on firms’ 
potential decisions taken to maximize the shareholders wealth, namely the investment, 
financing and operating decisions.    
Chapter Seven provides the main findings of the research, draws conclusions, research 
contributions and implications, and indicates the research recommendations based on 
the findings and conclusions. In addition, the chapter highlights the research limitations 
and provides suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The delegation of management from investors to executive managers is one of the most 
important agency relationships in finance. Typically, the literature focuses on joint stock 
corporations with a large number of shareholders who delegate power to managers. 
These managers effectively control the company. Understandably, the appropriate 
compensation for these managers is an important topic of debate among practitioners 
and academics. On the other hand, there has been increasing pressure on managers to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth (Sharma, 2010). 
The evaluation of a company’s performance is considered one of the most important 
challenges to researchers (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). This issue is becoming 
increasingly important to shareholders, and has been the subject of heated debates. To 
foster shareholders’ interest, managers adopt strategies to increase the value of their 
organisation, which leads to maximising shareholder wealth through the optimum 
allocation of resources. In order to assess whether managers are performing well, 
researchers and practitioners need to use appropriate measurements. Scholars have 
developed specific criteria relating to the validity, relevance, accountability, and 
globalism of the performance measure(s) that are used to assess managers’ or 
companies’ performance (Rappaport, 1986). Unfortunately, there is no general 
agreement as to which criterion is most suitable and accurate as far as the evaluation of 
the managers’ performance is concerned.   
Rappaport argues that for any performance measure to succeed, certain fundamental 
criteria should be met; the first and most important criterion being its validity. The 
concern here is to show whether the inspected firms adopt the accepted accounting 
standards prescribed by the various standard setting bodies such as the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and its predecessor The International Accounting 
Standard Committee (IASC); and the extent to which they comply with them. Second, 
the performance measure should be verifiable. Hence, the adoption of any set of 
accounting standards will force accountants to follow the same procedures in 
accounting processes and that should lead to unbiased accounting numbers and support 
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the validity of the released accounting information used later by various parties to assess 
the firm. Third, the selected performance measure should preserve accountability. This 
means that managers and executives will be responsible for those activities and 
investment decisions they have control over. The fourth criterion is the globalisation of 
the performance measure.  The idea is that a firm does not work in isolation from other 
firms in the same industry or manufacturing segment. Consequently the performance 
measure should be able to maintain comparability between competitive firms within the 
same industry. Finally, the performance measure should be easily understandable by 
internal and external parties. It should be understood by the managers that the 
endorsement and selection of any performance measure means it will be used later to 
assess their performances (Bouckaret et al., 2010).   
Generally, any research design that aims to evaluate a firm’s performance should adopt 
a valuation model that provides a better link between the firm’s value and the firm’s 
specific characteristics. Of particular importance is the link between a firm’s value and 
accounting figures. Researchers have used a wide diversity of valuation models, ranging 
from the very simple to the most sophisticated (Ball and Brown, 1968; Patell and 
Kaplan, 1977; Dechow, 1994, and Biddle et al., 1997). The main valuation models can 
be classified into four groups as shown in Table 2.1: balance sheet based (book value of 
equity); income statement based; value creation methods; and options (Fernandez, 
2002). Obviously, there are practical considerations, such as the availability of 
information that may constrain the decision maker’s choice of performance 
measurement method. 
 
The balance sheet methods basically assumed that the value of a company lies in its 
balance sheet. These methods seek to determine the company’s value by estimating the 
value of its assets. Some of these methods are the book value method in which the value 
of the company is equivalent to its shareholder’ historical cost as presented in the 
balance sheet statement. This method suffers from the subjectivity shortage that is 
inherent in accounting procedures used to determine the value of balance sheet items 
(Ohlson, 1995). Thus, the adjusted book value method tries to overcome this shortage 
by evaluating the company’s assets and liabilities using the current market prices.   
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Table 2.1 Main Valuation Methods 
Balance sheet 
Income 
statement 
Mixed (Goodwill) 
Discounted Cash 
flows  
Value 
creation 
Options 
Book value Multiples Classic valuation 
Free cash 
flows 
EVA Black & Scholes 
Adjusted book value PER 
Union of 
European 
accounting 
Experts 
Equity cash 
flows 
Economi
c profit 
Investment 
option 
 Sales  Dividends CVA Expand projects 
Liquidation value 
P/EBITD
A 
Abbreviated 
income 
Capital cash 
flows 
 
Delay the 
investment 
Substantial value 
Other 
multiples 
Others APV CFROI Alternative uses 
Multiples: Multiplying production capacity (sales) by a ratio  
EVA: Economic value added 
PER: price-earnings ratio 
CVA: Cash value added 
P/EBITDA: Price per earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation and amortization 
APV: Adjusted present value 
CFROI: Cash flows return on investment 
 
Source: Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004), Fernandez, 2002. 
 
Unlike the adjusted book value the liquidation method represents the value of a 
company when its assets are sold in the market and all of its debts are paid off. Finally, 
the substantial value method represents the replacement value which is defined as the 
amount of money an identical firm needs to invest in order to establish a company that 
is similar to the company being valued.     
Similarly, the income statement methods are based solely on income statement figures 
(revenue, earnings, and other indicators) to evaluate companies. The common and 
simplest method of valuation is the value of earnings in which the company value is 
equal to the amount earned by multiplying net income (NI) by the price-earnings ratio 
(P/E ratio). Another method of evaluation is the value of dividend (the regular cash 
received by shareholder) in which the equity value is the net present value of the 
dividends share holder expect to obtain (Francis et al., 2000).  In addition to the price 
earnings ratio (PER), some of the frequently used multipliers are: price/sales ratio, 
price/EBITDA, and the value of the company/operating cash flows, the market situation 
is the main criterion to choose between these different multipliers.   
A third method of valuation is the goodwill approach which is the one that seeks to 
value the company’s intangible assets which often do not appear on the balance sheet 
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(Ohlson, 1995). However, this method can be classified as follows: (i) the classical 
method in which the company’s value is equal to its net assets plus the value of 
goodwill, (ii) abbreviated income method where the firm’s value is equal to the firm 
adjusted net worth plus the value of goodwill, and (iii) the Union of European 
accounting expert method (UEC) where the company’s total value is equal to its net 
assets plus the goodwill which, in turn, equals  the excess of the cost of an acquired firm 
over the net values set to assets acquired and liabilities assumed
3
. 
Another way to evaluate companies is the cash flow discounted-based method in which 
a firm’s value is determined by estimating future cash flows the company will generate 
in the future and then discounting at a proper discount rate that takes into account the 
risk and historic volatilities of future cash flows (Penman, 2001). According to this 
method a firm’s future cash flows can be obtained by different methods, starting with 
the free cash flow (FCF) which refers to the cash flow the company generates from 
operations without taking into account financial debt and capital expenditures. Closely 
related is the equity cash flow method (ECF) which is calculated by deducting the after 
tax interest and principle paid to the debtors from the FCF and adding new debt 
provided to the company. Thus, the capital cash flow method defines the future cash 
flow as the sum of debt cash flow plus equity cash flow (Penman).  
The fifth evaluation method, which is discussed in-depth in the current chapter, is the 
value creation method that takes into their consideration the cost of capital used to 
generate profit. These methods are: economic value added (EVA), cash value added 
(CVA). All of these measures will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Finally there is the real options method, the option that only exists when there are future 
possibilities for action. There are different types of option: expanding option when the 
company intended to expand its production facilities, and delay option depending on the 
market’s future growth. Usually the net present values (NPV) were used to evaluate 
these options. Basically, Black and Schole’s formula4 is the proper method to value the 
financial option in which the value of a call on a share, with an exercise price K and 
which can be exercised at  time t, is the present value of its price at  time t. The main 
assumption of this formula is that the option can be replicated (El Karoui
 
et al., 1998).  
                                                             
3 As mentioned in IFRS3. 
4 An equation to value call and put option, named after its developers, Fischer Black and Myron Sholes. 
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The measurement of a firm’s performance is a crucial issue to its stakeholders, 
especially its shareholders, directors, managers and debtors. Changes in a firm’s 
performance can be detrimental to its health, its profitability and ultimately its survival 
(Francis et al., 2003).  Thus, valuation methods are tools that help identify the sources 
of economic value creation and destruction within the specific company (Fernandez, 
2002). 
For many decades accounting earnings, the accrual performance measure, had been the 
most popular approach to evaluate management performance. This seems to have been 
superseded by evaluation models based on cash flow items (Board and Day, 1989). 
Earnings, a traditional performance measure, has come under increasing attack over the 
past few years because it relies heavily on historical cost concepts and ignores the cost 
capital (Mehdi and Iman, 2011), and as an alternative, performance measures that take 
into account the cost of capital and are used to generate value have received more 
attention (Garvey and Milbouran, 2000; Stewart, 1991). This has encouraged 
researchers to examine whether the residual income method and the value added method 
are superior to, and more reliable than, traditional methods (Dechow et al., 1999; Rajan, 
2000; Francis et al., 2003). This debate will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
This chapter begins by highlighting, in Section 2.2, the main theories that have been 
developed to explain the value relevance of accounting numbers. We also shed light on 
the appropriate characteristics of a good performance measure. Section 2.3 will discuss 
the main results of previous studies that have investigated the value relevance of 
different performance measures and the association between traditional and value based 
performance measures with annual stock price and return. Finally Section 2.4 
summarises the chapter.  
2.2     Theory of Performance Measures 
The use of optimal performance measures has received much attention in accounting 
and finance, but there is still no consensus regarding the appropriate specification. In the 
accounting literature, the relationship between a firm’s accounting numbers and its 
value is typically investigated using a number of different valuation models (Barth et 
al., 2001).  Price and return are the most widely used proxies for value nowadays. 
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2.2.1 Theory of Compensation 
Managers’ interests, in some situations, are different from those of the company’s 
shareholders. Furthermore, managers sometime conduct work operations and activities 
in a manner that benefits their own interests, especially when their remuneration scheme 
is linked to current earnings (short-run compensation schemes). One of the best ways of 
inducing top management to adopt shareholder orientation is through a compensation 
system tied to the shareholder value creation (Rappaport, 1986). Indeed, “the theory of 
market economy is, after all, based in the individuals promoting their self interest via 
market transaction to bring about an efficient allocation of resource” (Rappaport, p.3). 
The split between the firm’s ownership and the firm’s management gives rise to a 
variety of “principal-agent” relationship (Berle and Means, 1932). Theoretically, 
shareholders, as owners of the firm, have a claim on the firm’s generated income even if 
they do not run their firm by themselves. For example, investors or financiers 
(principals) hire managers (agents) to operate the firm on their behalf as they need 
managers (specialized human capital) to generate profit on their investments, and 
managers may need the investors’ funds since they may not have enough capital of their 
own to invest.  
 
Agency theory reflects the conflict of interest between varying contracting parties and 
resource holders. It is concerned with so-called agency conflicts of interest between 
firm managers as agents and shareholders (principals), and the conflict between debt-
holders and stockholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The voluminous agency theory 
literature has produced (theoretically and empirically) several dimensions in explaining 
the essence of agency conflicts and outlining a framework of the basic agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. The agency relationship according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976: p308) is “a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. However, if both the 
agent and the principal have different desires or interests and prefer different actions, 
the agency problem will occur as the agents will always act in the best of their own 
interest and not the interests of the principal. Because while the costs are borne by 
owners (lower profit) the benefits of profit are enjoyed by managers, managers might 
select decisions that would be more important from the owners’ point of view. 
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Furthermore, when an agency relationship exists, it also tends to give rise to agency 
costs, which, as any other costs, reflects the value loss to shareholders, arising from 
divergences of desires between shareholders and corporate managers. Overall, the 
agency cost’s main components are the monitoring costs, bonding costs, residual loss 
and any other expenses the firm has to incur in order to maintain an effective agency 
relationship to promote managers to act in favour of the shareholders' interests (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Theoretically, there are more than one fundamental ways the 
owners able to take in order to mitigate the agency problem. According to Jensen and 
Meckling, the principal can restrict divergences from his interest by establishing 
appropriate incentive schemes for the agent and paying monitoring costs designed to 
limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In other words, a firm (owners) has to control 
and monitor managers’ performance (behaviour) and reward them based upon the 
performance they achieved. However, these methods are effective only if the key 
actions taken by managers can be easily observed by shareholders; it is costly and a 
hard task for the shareholder to verify what the managers are actually doing or whether 
the managers have been behaved in proper way as assumed to be (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The key elements of agency theory lie on a set of mechanisms, called corporate 
governance, adopted by a firm to minimize the inherent problems of agency. Corporate 
governance has traditionally been associated with the agency problem and developed 
many corporate governance mechanisms which, in turn, determine the effectiveness 
with which the owner deals with the agency problem and encourages managers to act in 
the shareholders' best interests. These mechanisms involve constraints, incentives and 
punishments. The area of executive compensation has mainly laid on agency theory as it 
focuses on the situation where a single owner (or principal) designs the optimal 
incentive contract and offers it to the manager of his or her firm (his or her agent) on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). Alternatively, the literature of 
the agency theory offers a variety of solutions, such as monitoring by both the large 
shareholders and block-holders (Sloof and Praag, 2008), monitoring by debt holders 
(John et al., 2010), monitoring by managerial ownership (inside ownership), monitoring 
by the board of directors and their role in structuring the incentive compensations 
contract (Jensen, 1983 and Datar et al., 2001), shareholder rights and takeover of the 
firm, the regulation (Cooper, 2009), and auditor and institutional investors (Wright et 
al., 2002). 
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Compensation is considered one of the most material cost categories in most 
organisations. The efficiency with which this amount of compensation is allocated to 
different executive managers and targeted employees will enhance the firm 
performances and is likely to have a favourable impact on organisational behaviour 
(Gomez et al., 2010). The critical question that has raised much concern is how the use 
of compensation influences the behaviour of employees and decision makers, and what 
would the implications be for a firm’s performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Traditionally, compensation, as an academic topic has attracted the interest of both 
social psychology (motivation theories) and labour economics (labour market) (Gomez 
et al). 
The relationship between compensation and performance measures has been studied for 
a long time (Stewart, 1989). As a result of the way incentive schemes affect value 
creation within firms, many researchers (Stewart, 1991, 1994) target the heart of 
management motivation with performance evaluation and compensation schemes that 
are central to the value creation process. They contend that the most direct means of 
linking management’s interests with those of shareholders is to design a compensation 
system where the incentive portion is based on the market returns that shareholders 
realise. 
Closely related to the last point regarding a revised managerial compensation plan and 
an amended internal benchmark for corporate performance, are material assumptions for 
implementing Stern and Stewart’s compensation system. In this context, Lehn and 
Makhija (1997) enrich this debate by raising the question as to which performance 
measure best predicts the performance of executive officers (CEOs). They claim that 
even though EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover 
than traditional measures, EVA and MVA are not the relevant criteria.  
From a different point of view, Rogerson (1997) investigates the relationship between 
managerial investment incentives and the alternative allocation methods applied to the 
cost of investment over the operating periods during which the benefits from these 
investment decisions arise. Moreover, he contends that as managerial compensation 
schemes in most companies are based on some accounting measure of income, the 
allocation method that treats the cost of investment will have a number of effects on the 
compensation incentive. A question which has arisen previously, regarding the conflicts 
between managers’ and shareholders’ interests, is whether managers’ private incentives 
20 
 
(moral hazards) will lead them to choose those efficient investments that meet the 
shareholder perspective.   
Rogerson (1997) concludes that among the many alternative evaluation methods used to 
allocate the cost of investment, the preferred approach that best allocates the cost of 
investment and helps managers to choose the most efficient level of investment is the 
adoption of the developed version of the residual income method (RI), the economic 
value added EVA as a performance measure.  
The concept of pay-for-performance is widely accepted by board members, top 
management, compensation consultants, and stockholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1999). 
However, firms may achieve their goals but at the same time suffer from declining stock 
values which can be easily recognised as a mismatch between performance evaluation 
and the measurement standards employed in the planning system. This lack of 
association between shareholder returns and the compensation system has triggered 
heated debate as to whether the performance measures adopted by the existing 
compensation programmes motivate executives to adopt strategies that create economic 
value for the shareholder.  
In a related work, Gomez-Mejia et al., (2010) argue that when performance is used as a 
basis to distribute rewards, payment is provided for individual or group contributions to 
the firm’s value. “In general, a focus on performance to distribute rewards is most 
appropriate when the organization’s culture and national or regional cultures emphasise 
a performance ethos, competition among individuals and groups is encouraged” (p. 27). 
Consistent with the above premise, a number of empirical studies (Wallace, 1997, 1998: 
Kleiman 1999: Sharma and Kumar, 2010) investigated whether the inclusion of 
traditional performance measures or new value-based measures such as the residual 
income method (implicitly EVA) would add efficiency and reliability to the 
compensation systems adopted and tried to show how to combine stock prices with 
other performance measures (at least two) to produce an optimal compensation scheme. 
Closely related to the last point, EVA has been the focus of two empirical studies 
carried out by Wallace (1997, 1998). Wallace’s (1997) study is considered a major work 
that addressed the changes in profitability a firm achieves when adopting EVA.  He 
investigated whether the use of value added, EVA or residual income bonus plans led to 
the making of decisions consistent with the economic incentives embedded in those 
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plans. His findings are consistent with what Sharma and Kumar (2010) concluded 
which is that in regard to the operating decisions, executive managers of a firm adopting 
residual income method, mainly the EVA as a compensation and management tool, will 
make the decisions that would increase the assets disposition and decrease the new 
investment. As a result “Shareholders get what they pay for” (p.205).  
Wallace (1998) provides survey evidence on firms that have adopted EVA-based 
compensation systems. While he shows that such systems can change and enhance 
managerial behaviour in general, he does not afford any indication of the individual 
manager’s performance. 
Dissatisfaction with traditional measures has triggered a heated debate among 
researchers (Ittner and Larcker, 1998) as to whether EVA as an alternative to traditional 
measures or earnings will better capture the managerial contribution to the firm’s value 
and whether it has a significant association with the annual stock price. Academic 
researchers have put potential weighting on different tools to test this association; these 
tools are the correlation between these variables and annual stock return (Garvey and 
Milbouran, 2000) and the variances of performance measures to gauge their relative 
accuracy. 
Generally, corporate governance describes the mechanisms that help align the interests 
and actions of managers with shareholders’ interests and the performance-based 
compensation system and is a critically important mechanism of such governance 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Rappaport, 1986). Opinions about how to design the 
compensation contract differ widely among firms.  
In this context, Garvey and Milbouran (2000) introduce a relatively standard principal-
agent model as a different approach to address the historical debate between traditional 
and new performance measures. In this model the compensation scheme can be based 
on any set of two accounting–based performance measures and stock price rather than 
depending heavily on stock price alone as the optimal tool for compensation schemes. 
Doing this will shed light on the exact information content of each performance 
measure rather than on it is observable variability.  
To conduct the empirical tests, Garvey and Milbouran begin by computing the value-
added of firms that add EVA to their existing compensation plans that depend only on 
earnings and stock price to measure the performances. Following this the correlation 
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between these performance measures and stock return was examined. Accordingly, they 
claimed that the most useful measure of value-added is the percentage reduction in 
compensation variance when EVA is added to the wage contract. Garvey and Milbouran 
have estimated this reduction and the relative    for over 500 US companies for the 
period 1986-1987 finding that EVA adds little or no value (consistent with Biddle et al., 
1997).  He contends that a firm’s value is determined both by managers’ efforts and 
choices and by other elements beyond managers’ control (randomness). 
However, the model proposed by Garvey and Milbouran treat both EVA and earnings 
as alternative performance measures regardless of how they treat the cost of capital. 
Furthermore, Garvey and Milbouran introduce two unverifiable explanatory variables 
that are “non-contractible but which are observed by capital market investors and 
revealed indirectly through the stock price” (Garvey and Milbouran, 2000, p.217). 
Garvey and Milbouran conclude that the accounting measure of performance (earnings) 
continues to explain variances in compensation even when the stock return is included 
as an explanatory variable and firms do not use exactly the same weightings as the stock 
market in determining compensation. But what is important for companies is to know 
the circumstances under which EVA beats earnings. Garvey and Milbouran’s paper 
restrict attention to the use of EVA as a measure for compensation even though the 
emphasis is at odds with the evidence that states that most firms use EVA for business 
planning and financial management purposes rather than in incentive plans. Although 
the contribution of Garvey and Milbouran enriched academic research with work on 
new performance metrics, his findings have been criticised.  
In line with the argument put forward by Garvey and Milbouran, Rajan, (2000) argues 
that Garvey and Milbouran’s analysis mainly accommodates the assumption that the 
shareholders observe other variables that are not contractible. This refers to the 
sensitivity of the accounting metrics to changes in stock price. It is unclear how the 
model would work if these parameters were not observed by the market since this 
information is essential for specifying the weighting of the relevant contracting 
variables for the purposes of compensation. 
Correspondingly, Rajan criticises the way in which Garvey and Milbouran define his 
variables, where the fundamental distinguishing feature of EVA as a performance 
measure is the inclusion of capital cost against earnings to reflect the firm's cost of 
capital. Moreover, the earnings number itself is subject to various transformations in 
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order to make it more representative of economic earnings. For example, R&D costs 
might be capitalised in the EVA metric so as to capture the long-term nature of those 
investments (Stern, 1991), while such costs are considered a burden when computing 
earnings in accordance with GAAP. Garvey and Milbouran’s paper, however, makes no 
effort to capture any of these key institutional features. There is also no modelling of the 
process by which actions are transformed differentially into earnings numbers and EVA 
numbers.  
Earnings and EVA are simplistically viewed as equivalent linear signals of some 
underlying component of value, with differential noise terms attached to them. In that 
sense, this model is potentially guilty of a "naming fallacy": what the model calls EVA 
could instead be expressed equivalently as “comprehensive income” or “earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA)” or any other metric that is 
related to, yet distinct from, earnings. 
Moreover, Rajan argues that Garvey and Milbouran (2000) do not actually resolve the 
question he sets out to answer with regard to EVA versus earnings: that is ‘does it 
matter which is more highly correlated with stock returns?’ In addition, as Garvey and 
Milbouran assumed, it seems reasonable that a consultant implementing EVA in a firm 
would have access to sufficient data about the metrics to obviate the need for    
information. His message, then, appears most relevant for the (uninformed) researcher. 
While this is an important constituency, it is perhaps a smaller audience than the one the 
author had set out to target.  
In conclusion, from the highest level (executive managers) to the lowest level (unskilled 
hourly workers) in the pyramid, organisation members respond to how they are 
rewarded, and hence, the design of the compensation system influences strategic 
choices made by top executives as well as how those choices are eventually 
implemented throughout the entire firm. Coupled with the fact that pay is the most 
important single expense in most organisations, in the long run a firm’s performance 
depends on whether or not compensation is used effectively. 
2.2.2 Characteristics of the Performance Measures 
Shareholders want to know whether executive managers are using the entity’s resources 
efficiently in order to maximise their wealth. The separation between the interests of the 
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entity’s owners and the interests of shareholders, which are managed by professional 
managers, (or are expected to be), are considered one of the main reasons for creating 
performance measures. 
Furthermore, shareholders try to prevent managers from using the entity’s resources for 
the managers’ own benefit and this will be established from the point of view of 
shareholders, through the creation of a performance measure which is used later for 
establishing a compensation system. 
According to Rappaport (1986), the best compensation system is the one that aligns 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests. Unfortunately such alignment is difficult in the 
real world because conflict often exists between them.  
Lambert and Larcker (1985) list at least three main types of conflict between 
shareholders’ interests and managers’ interests. First, managers and shareholders have 
different attitudes toward risk. Managers, acting only as economic agents, have a lower 
tolerance of risk than have shareholders. A second source of this conflict is the 
difference in decision-making time-horizons of managers and shareholders. Sometimes 
executive managers are evaluated by the board over a shorter time period than that used 
by shareholders for evaluating the same investment decisions. This will encourage 
managers to place emphasis on short term earnings rather than assess the value creation 
potential over the full life of the investments. The third potential conflict stems from the 
fact that shareholders focus on generating profit without paying any attention to costs 
incurred while managers try to get a pecuniary advantage for the company’s benefit. 
The performance measure is considered the most fundamental requirement for both 
successful planning and performance evaluation, but before going through its 
characteristics in depth, one fact in particular should be raised here: there are many 
factors that affect the value of the whole company which are beyond the manager’s 
control (Rappaport, 1986). The manager is held responsible for only those activities that 
he /she can maintain control over. 
For any performance measures to succeed, certain fundamental criteria must be met. 
First and foremost is the validity of this measure, which means that in order to support 
the validity of different accounting measures managers should apply and adopt 
accounting standards and methods that make economic sense and which will lead to 
unbiased reflection on the manager’s performance. Second, the performance measure 
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should be verified and computed from one set of true and clear numbers and therefore 
not easily manipulated. Third, accountability, which is classified as the only activities 
that managers have control over, should be used to assess their performance. Fourth, the 
globalism of the performance measure: the company as a whole should be evaluated in 
order to assess the executive performance and should be compared with the 
performance of competitors within the same industry sector and similar accounting 
standards used by accountants in different countries to calculate the value of the 
performance measures. Furthermore, firms must cope with accounting standards that are 
enforced by different international accounting bodies (e.g. IASB) in order to maintain 
easy access to, and understanding of, its realised accounting and financial data by 
different users of financial statements, while at the firm level doing this will make it an 
easy task for executive managers to analyse the extent to which globalization of the 
region in which a firm operates affects the firms’ performance. Finally, the performance 
measure should be introduced in a manner that makes it easily understood by executives 
and top management and easily communicated to external parties, particularly the 
shareholders who can affect the election of the board of directors (Rappaport, 1986).    
Stated equivalently, the performance metrics, in order to gain more value relevance, 
should consider the following factors. First, a measure should be insensitive to the 
choice of accounting approach- there should be free choice of accounting methods. 
Regardless of the accounting treatment followed by the accountants in various countries 
the performance measure must have the ability to accurately measure the performances 
under investigation. Second, the performance metric should evaluate the firm’s current 
decision in the light of the expected future results. Third, it should carefully consider the 
inherent risk associated with the firm’s decision. Fourth, the performance metric should 
neither penalize nor reward the decision maker for factors over which he or she has no 
control. 
The focus at this point is on how accounting numbers will affect the stock price 
performances, and how these numbers can be used in establishing performance 
standards and also whether the firms adopting EVA as a compensation plan will 
enhance their operating, financing and investment decisions with regard to increasing 
the wealth of the shareholders.   
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2.2.3 The Information Content Theory 
Ball and Brown (1968, p.161) stated that “an observed revision of stock prices 
associated with the release of the income report would thus provide evidence that the 
information reflected in income numbers is useful.”  
It is not easy to disclose all the information about a company and its activities in the 
annual report. However, the IFRS (IASB) and stock markets regulations in adopting 
countries force firms to release sufficient information in its annual reports (now on a 
quarterly basis) to help external users of the financial statements, specifically the 
shareholders and creditors to help decide whether or not to invest in, or lend to, a firm 
(the general purpose financial report standard).  
The IFRS (IASB) are firmly of the view that financial reporting is not an end in itself 
but is intended to provide information that is useful for making business and economic 
decisions (Ahmed, 2004).  
Thus, financial reporting is intended to provide information to help investors, creditors 
and other parties to assess the stewardship of the entity’s management and the amounts, 
timing and uncertainty of prospective cash flows to the related enterprise.  The financial 
information released is considered to have information content if it is useful for 
economic decision making and it has some impact on the firm’s share price. Hence, 
unlike previous research, the current research will use the accounting figures needed to 
investigate the association of performance measures with stock price and stock returns 
as published in the financial lists rather than the use of proxies. The fact should be 
raised here that it is quite difficult to understand the information content of the 
accounting figures without considering the characteristics of the reliability and 
relevancy of this accounting information. Financial information is said to be relevant if 
it influences the economic decisions of users, which can be achieved by helping them to 
evaluate past, present, and future which it does if it has predictive or confirmatory 
value. Relevance and faithful representation are the key characteristics of useful 
financial information. The faithful representation should be neutral, free from error and 
complete.
5
  
                                                             
5 IASB, the Conceptual Framework of Financial Reporting, 2011 
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The information content is fundamentally linked to the efficient market hypothesis. 
Under this hypothesis, especially the semi-strong form (where share prices are expected 
to reflect all available accounting information including the present value of future cash 
flows), accounting numbers have information content if security prices respond to 
released data (Wolk et al., 2001). 
Formally, information content, valuation relevance, and value relevance are the three 
main approaches to have emerged in the last three decades for examining the effect of 
accounting information on financial markets. Lo and Thomas (2000) show that 
information content has remained constant while valuation relevance and value 
relevance have both declined with respect to return volatility, and non-linearity of the 
valuation models used (earnings composition model and the earnings expectation 
model). 
Historically, three primary approaches were used to investigate the implication of 
accounting disclosures for security prices; the first are the information content studies 
(Beaver, 1968). The second, based on Ball and Brown (1968), are the valuation 
relevance studies. Third, based on association testing between prices and accounting 
measures, are the value relevance studies. According to Beaver, an event 
(announcement or disclosure) has information content if the price changes in excess of 
the amount due to the passage of time (i.e., expected return) when such announcement 
is released. Beaver compares the value of    (the error term) in the announcement 
period to the value of this function in the non-announcement period. He concludes that 
the stock return variance is higher in the earnings announcement week. 
Regarding the value added relevance studies, and consistent with the market efficiency 
hypothesis, Ball and Brown (1968) assumed that capital markets are both efficient and 
unbiased in that if information is useful in forming the capital asset price, then the latter 
will immediately be adjusted by the market in the light of the released information 
without leaving any possibility for abnormal gain. Since in the real world the efficient 
market hypothesis does not operate and many other (weaker) forms such as semi-strong 
or weak forms may, the findings of this research are undermined.    
The focus of the valuation relevance approach (Ball and Brown, 1968) is on one or 
more specific accounting summary measures. In the Ball and Brown research, it was the 
earnings, and how these summary measures related to price changes. The summary 
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measures are said to be valuation relevant if the sign of this measure is positively related 
to the changes in the stock price. Following this researchers used the magnitude of the 
slope coefficient of a linear regression of returns on net income as a metric of the extent 
to which earnings are less or more relevant in explaining returns (Collins and Kothari, 
1989). 
The value relevance approach discusses the association between market value and 
accounting summary measures such as earnings and book value. Formally, this 
approach requires that not only should the summary measure be identified by 
researchers, but so should the valuation method that links this measure to prices. Under 
this assumption a summary measure (performance measure) is said to be value relevant 
if it connects to market values significantly enough (Holthausen and Watts, 2000).  
Thus, this thesis aims mainly to investigate the association between a set of 
performance measures and the stock price performances and to test whether any of the 
measures examined is able to explain variation in stock price. 
2.2.4 The Incremental Information Content 
As discussed in the information content section, financial information is said to have 
information content if it leads to a movement in share price, which means that the 
released financial information/figures will have the ability to affect the economic 
decision of the firm.  On the other hand, if we have two accounting summaries (two 
performance measures) both  with a relative information content and with one (X) 
containing more new information than the other (Y), we say that X  has incremental 
information content beyond that in Y. 
Bowen et al. (1986) assessed the incremental information content of additional firm 
disclosures made concurrently with annual earnings announcements. However, they did 
not investigate the incremental information content for accruals and cash flows. They 
therefore conducted further work in 1987, which extended the previous study by 
comparing the ability of the accrual measures (net income and working capital from 
operations (current assets – current liabilities)) and the cash flow measures (operating 
cash flow and cash flows after investment) to explain the variation in the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR). More specifically they used the following model:  
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In addition, they used the random walk model to determine the unexpected part in each 
variable except for operating cash flows where, instead, they used past working capital 
from operation. They were relying on their previous conclusion that working capital 
from operating (WCFO) is a better predictor of future cash flows than current cash 
flows itself. In agreement, Dechow (1994) states that, as the working capital accruals 
have the power to diminish the negative serial correlation in cash flows then changing 
in past working capital from operation will have the ability to anticipate future operating 
cash flows than current operating cash flows.  
Ball and Brown (1987) concluded that cash flows from operations (CFO) have 
incremental information content beyond that contained in earnings. Moreover, they 
contain incremental information relative to that in accrual measures (WCFO, Earnings). 
The results also reveal that the accrual measures jointly and separately have incremental 
information content beyond that contained in cash flow measures whereas working 
capital from operations has no incremental information beyond that contained in 
earnings. Along similar lines, Ali and Pope (1994) and Clubb (1994) reported evidence 
on the information content for cash flows. However the evidence on the incremental 
information content for operating cash flows was weak and not enough to support the 
usefulness of operating cash flows.    
Board and Day’s (1989) study is considered the first in the UK to examine the 
incremental information content of earnings components. Board and Day compared the 
respective abilities of net income, working capital from operations and net cash flows to 
explain the variations in stock return over the period 1961-1977. They declared that net 
income and working capital from operations separately hold more information content 
than net cash flows. They also extended their investigation to the incremental 
information content for these variables. The results pointed out that with regard to the 
incremental information content, net cash flow was the poorest of the measures 
examined. 
Arnold et al. (1991) held a different point of view reporting evidence on the information 
content for cash flows, which was at odds with prior UK results. On a similar note, Ali 
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and Pope (1994) and Club (1995) reported evidence on the information content for cash 
flows. However the evidence on the incremental information content for operating cash 
flows was weak and not enough to support their usefulness.  
In a closely related study, Ali (1994) extended the work of Bowen et al. (1987) by using 
non-linear regression in addition to the linear regression used in prior studies. Based on 
US data for the period 1974-88, he examined the incremental information content of 
earnings, operating cash flows and working capital from operations. He even replicated 
the same model used by Bowen et al., although the unexpected cash flows after 
investment (UCAI) were excluded. Moreover, he used the change in the variables as 
measures of the unexpected part (random walk model).  
The results of the linear model were consistent with Bowen et al. except for the 
following: (1) regarding the incremental information content, working capital from 
operations out-performed earnings, and (2) cash flows from operations had no 
incremental information content relative to earnings or to working capital from 
operations. Ali (1994) suggested that the differences in the results were due to the 
differences in the sample and the period of the study. In the non-linear model, he 
divided the sample into two groups according to level of change in the absolute value 
for earnings. The first group (high-change in earnings) contain the observations whose 
absolute values lie above the median. The second group contained all the observations 
whose absolute values lie below the median. The same method was used to divide the 
sample according to the change in cash flows and to the change in working capital from 
operations.  
The results of Ali (1994) indicated that the incremental information content of earnings 
(working capital from operation) was not a function of the change in earnings (working 
capital from operations).  Cash flows from operations have incremental information 
content only in years with low change in operation cash flows. Ali also concluded that 
the non-linear model more effectively specified the association between stock return 
and the variables of the study.  
In his seminal study, Wilson (1986) investigated the incremental information content 
for earnings, fund flows (either cash flows or working capital from operations) and 
accruals. His results show that fund flows have incremental information content beyond 
that which exists in earnings. In addition, current accruals (short term accruals) have 
incremental information content over that contained in cash flows whereas the long 
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terms accruals (non-current accruals) show no value added over that which exists in 
working capital from operations. Livant and Zarown (1990) pointed out that 
decomposing earnings into operating cash flows and accruals does not improve the 
relationship with stock return. In the UK most studies used stock return as a proxy for 
future cash flows.  
In this context, Biddle et al. (1995) distinguished between the two concepts. They 
contend that incremental information enquires whether one performance measure 
provides more information content beyond that provided by another. On the other hand, 
relative information enquires which performance measure has greater information 
content and applies when intending to choose among alternatives or when ranking by 
information content is required.   
It is worth mentioning here that all prior UK and US studies reported different results 
regarding the incremental information content for cash flows and the components of 
accruals. This confusion in the results may be due to a number of reasons. Garrod et al. 
(2000) attribute these confusions to differences in the definition of cash flows used in 
different studies; to the diversity in the models used; to the variety in the time periods of 
the study; and to the effect of contextual factors. The contextual factors include 
differences between the economies of the countries where the studies have taken place. 
In other words, we can expect different results from the same model if we change the 
target market of the study. For instance, Board et al. (1989) used the same model for 
both UK and US data and produced different results regarding the value relevance of 
long-term accruals. Table 2.2 present a sample of US and UK studies that used 
traditional and cash flow measures to explain the variation in stock return performances.  
In view of the above discussion, this thesis will use UK data and price models in order 
to examine the incremental information content of all the prime performance measures 
over a specific period of time and extends its aims to test whether decomposing 
earnings and EVA to their main components will contribute more to the association of 
these prime measures in explaining changes in annual stock price. 
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Table 2.2 Studies use earnings and cash flows to explain 
Share –price (return) relationship 
Author (s) Market Period 
Variables 
examined 
Conclusion 
Wilson, 1986 & 
1987 
US 
1981-
82 
OCF, 
WCO,CA & 
NCA 
Accruals and OCF have incremental 
information content beyond earnings. 
CA has incremental information 
content beyond OCF. WCO does not 
have incremental information content 
beyond E. 
Bowen, Burgstahler 
and Delay.1987 
US 
1972-
81 
E, WCO, 
OCF & CAI 
Cash flow data and accruals have 
incremental information content 
beyond each other. However, WCO 
has no incremental information content 
beyond E. 
Dechow, 1994 US 
1969-
89 
E & OCF 
The value relevance of OCF decrease 
as the magnitude of both aggregate 
accruals and operating cash cycle 
increase. Short – term accruals have 
information content while long –term 
accruals do not have information 
content.  
Ali, 1994 US 
1974-
88 
E, WCO & 
OCF 
The results of the linear model reveal 
that WCO has incremental information 
content beyond that already exist in E, 
OCF does not have information 
content beyond that already existing in 
either E and WCO. The results of non 
– linear analysis reveal similar results. 
Ali and Pope, 1995 UK 
1984-
90 
E, WCO & 
OCF 
OCF has incremental information 
content beyond that already existing in 
E and WCO. 
Clubb, 1995 UK 
1955-
84 
E & OCF 
OCF has incremental information 
content beyond that already existing in 
E. 
Garrod and Hadi, 
1999 
UK 
1971-
91 
E, 
components 
of CFS 
according to 
FRS1 
Earnings have incremental information 
power beyond all cash flows variables, 
while cash flow variables did not 
reveal any incremental content beyond 
earnings.  
Note: E is earnings. WCO is working capital of operation. OCF is cash flows from 
operations. CA is current asset. NCA is none-current asset. CAI is cash flows after 
investment. CFS is cash flows statement. 
Source: Compiled by researcher. 
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2.3  Previous Studies 
 
The relationship between accounting numbers (particularly earnings and cash flow) and 
firm performance (measured by stock price or stock return) is one of the areas that have 
been most exhaustively examined in previous research. In general these empirical 
studies (Beaver, 1968; Dechow, 1994) have adopted different approaches to 
investigating the questions raised about the relativity and superiority of different 
performance measures. The following section will present a detailed description of the 
debate surrounding them. 
 
2.3.1 General Overview of Performance Measures 
 
Accounting numbers represent a fertile area for the research that investigates the 
empirical relationship between firm value and particular accounting numbers for the 
purpose of assessing or providing a basis to assess a firm’s performance. It is well 
known that the relevance of earnings (the after-tax profit available for stockholders) has 
been investigated intensively since the issue was first raised by Beaver (1968). 
Furthermore, many comparative accounting value relevance studies have focused on the 
comparison between accounting earnings and cash flow (e.g. Dechow, 1994; Aharony et 
al., 2003). The following are some popular performance measures used in different 
articles to interpret the variation in annual stock price / return as a measure of a firm’s 
value. 
In this context, Ball and Brown (1968) investigated the association between earnings 
and annual stock return, and they extended their study to test the incremental 
information content of accruals, cash flows, working capital from operations, operations 
cash flow, and cash flow measures. Furthermore they used the operating cash flows as a 
proxy for annual earnings.  
There have also been a number of studies concerned with the predictive ability of 
earnings. Bowen et al. (1986) investigated the relationship between earnings and cash 
flows, and used the following traditional definition of cash flows: net income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus depreciation; and net income plus 
depreciation, amortisation, and working capital from operations.  
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Along the same lines, Biddle et al. (1997) investigated whether the Economic Value 
Added (EVA) has incremental information content beyond that of earnings. They then 
extended their research to test whether EVA and the residual income (RI) method, and 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) outperformed other performance measures 
(earnings and operating cash flow) in explaining variation on annual stock return. EVA 
is defined as the profit earned by the firm less the cost of financing the firm’s capital. It 
is similar to RI but adjusted for net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and invested 
capital where needed. It is also referred to as net operating profits less a charge for the 
opportunity cost of invested capital (West and Worthington, 2000). 
In a related study, Francis et al., (2003) investigate the incremental information content 
of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA), which refers 
to an amount in which all interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation entries in the 
income statement are reversed out from the bottom-line net income, and cash flows 
from operations (CFO) which refer to the cash a company generates from its operation 
activity presented in the cash flow statement. 
The above mentioned performance measures will be discussed in depth in the following 
sections. 
2.3.1.1  Reconciliation of Performance Measures 
As we have already noted, researchers have held different points of view regarding the 
usefulness of earnings (accruals) and of cash flow items in explaining the variation in 
stock price and there is no consensus on any one performance measure. This, together 
with the criticisms of the previous performance measures (earnings, operating cash 
flow, and residual income method) forced researchers to look for other measures that 
amend the distortion of accruals measures and bring them closer to cash flow through 
making certain necessary adjustments for the main items of the income statement, 
specifically the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT). 
In order to conduct this adjustment, analysts move upwards through the income 
statement, starting with EBITDA which refers to an amount in which all interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization entries in the income statement are reversed out from the 
bottom-line net income. EBITDA purports to measure cash earnings, cancelling the 
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effects of accrual accounting, tax-jurisdiction, and the effects of different capital 
structures.  
                                  (1) 
Where NOPAT is net operating profit after tax, DEP is depreciation and ATInt is after 
tax interest. This construction of EBITDA differs from the operating cash flow in a cash 
flow statement primarily by excluding payments for taxes or interest as well as changes 
in working capital. EBITDA also differs from free cash flow (FCF) because it excludes 
cash spent to acquire, to replace or to update physical assets such as buildings and 
machinery (CAPEX). 
In addition, free cash flows (FCF) refer to the cash available for distribution among all 
the securities holders of an organization (equity holders, debt holders, preferred stock 
holders, convertible security holders) which is equal to earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) adjusted to accruals and changes in accruals and working capital. Thus, FCF is 
equal to: 
FCF = EBIT (1-Tax Rate) + Depreciation & Amortization  
- Change in working capital – capital expenditure         (2) 
The first branch of this equation simply refers to net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) 
which is the profit derived from a company’s operations after tax but before financing 
costs and non-cash-book-keeping entries(Ross et al., 2010). In other words it is equal to 
EBITDA less depreciation (DEP) and after tax interest (ATInt). Fundamentally, the first 
branch represents the total pool of profits available to provide a cash return for those 
who provide capital to the firm. The second branch of the equation is the invested 
capital (IC) which represents the firm’s investment through the given period including 
variation of working capital. Hence we can redefine FCF as (Penman, 2001): 
  FCF = NOPAT – ACCRUALS – IC     (3) 
   or FCF = NOPAT – Increase in capital     (4) 
Similarly, Penman (2001) defined FCF as: 
                                                (5) 
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From the previous definition, we note that by deducting the invested capital from 
NOPAT we get FCF, but what happens if we deduct the cost of invested capital instead 
of invested capital? The result is the residual income (RI) which is used to measure the 
performance of management as a value added method so (Biddle et al., 1997): 
  RI = NOPAT – (      ×WACC)                                               (6)           
where WACC is the weighted average cost of capital. This basic formula in fact 
represents the value created in excess of the required return to the company's 
shareholders, which can be referred to simply as economic value added (EVA), that is  
the profit earned by the firm less the cost of financing the firm’s capital (Stewart, 1991).  
  EVA = (EBITDA – DEP – ATInt) – IC × WACC6    (7) 
where EBITDA-Depreciation and amortization is equal to earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) and the EBIT × (1-tax) is equal to net operating income after tax (NOPAT). 
 This amount can be determined, among other ways, by making adjustments to GAAP 
accounting, including deducting the opportunity cost of equity capital (Stern and 
Stewart, 1991; Fernandez, 2002). Where EVA can be calculated after making certain 
important adjustments to NOPAT and the invested capital (IC), these adjustments are: 
Operating Income 
  + Interest Income 
  ± Equity income (Loss)
7
 
  + Other investment income 
-Income Tax 
 
= Net Operating Profit after Tax (NOPAT) 
 
Short term debt 
+Long-term debt (Including bond) 
+Other long-term liability (Deferred taxes and provision) 
+Shareholder’s equity (Including minority interest) 
 
= Invested capital (IC) 
 
EVA= NOPAT – (     × WACC)      (8) 
                                                             
6 Theoretically, the EVA equation is identical to the RI equation. Basically it is obtained after some 
adjustment to NOPAT and the invested capital, debt and equity. 
7 Equity income refers to income generated by existing assets (real estate, stocks). It usually refers to 
dividend income which is a type of revenue available to shareholders that derives from the company’s 
profit and is paid on a per-share basis. 
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Stern and Stewart (1991), the founders of EVA, argue that this method of performance 
suffers from accruals distortions which mainly stem from the depreciation method 
applied by different companies. Hence extra adjustments to EVA will bring it as close 
as possible to the cash flow method (Young, 1998), where the cash value added (CVA) 
metric (which is equal to the EVA adjusted for depreciation (DEP) and economic 
depreciation (ED)), represents the best answer for this claim, and is defined as: 
  CVA = EVA + DEP – ED       (9) 
The economic depreciation represents the loss in the productive capacity of a physical 
asset. It is the annuity depreciation expense (different from accounting depreciation 
component as reported in the accounting reports) which, when capitalised at the cost of 
capital (WACC), the assets’ value will accrue at the end of their useful life. This term 
will create uniformity between firms and eliminate the effects of the depreciation 
method that vary between entities. Using the NOPAT formula CVA can be verified to 
be (Petravicius, 2008)
8
: 
                                            (10) 
where RCF is the residual cash flows, NOPAT is the net operating profit after tax, DEP 
is depreciation and amortization, ED is the economic depreciation and equal to 
= 
       
              
   where RC is Gross fixed assets, or  equal to  (ROE –   )        where 
     is debt book value,        is equity’s book value and WACC is the weighted 
average cost of capital. However, because of the difficulty we face while tracing the 
useful life of different firms assets that are needed to calculate the economic 
depreciation (ED), this research will use the simplified version of CVA, where CVA is 
equal to cash flows from operations minus the cash flows demand, the dividends and 
interest: 
                                                                                (11) 
However, the inherent concern within the accounting community over the relationship 
between market value and accounting numbers has led to the proposal of different 
measures for assessing and evaluating the performance of companies as a whole, such 
as value based measures (VBM) and other residual income methods (Ball and Brown, 
                                                             
8 As defined by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) or Frederik Weissenrieder Consulting. 
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1968; Patell and Kaplan, 1977; Stern and Stewart, 1991). The most commonly used 
measures are the economic value added (EVA) framework founded by Stern and 
Stewart Co., and the cash value added (CVA) introduced by the Boston Consulting 
Group and Holt Value Associates (Malmi and Ikaheimo, 2003).  
2.3.2 Accrual versus Cash flow measures 
The majority of evaluation methods use income statement figures to build and compute 
different forms of performance measures that help shareholders to evaluate those 
companies in which they have invested and to measure the performance of managers 
required to use this investment to maximise shareholders’ wealth.   
Since 1968 an extensive amount of research has been conducted into the information 
content of earnings’ components. Ball and Brown (1968) analysed a sample of firms 
over the period 1944 – 1966 to test the information content of accounting numbers 
(annual earnings) and investigate its association with abnormal returns. The approach 
they adopted for this research relied on the assumption that the income of different firms 
within a specific market has tended to move broadly together. The early findings of Ball 
and Brown (1967) stated that 35 to 40 per cent of the variability in the level of an 
average firm’s earnings per share (EPS) could be associated with economy-wide effects, 
especially when income was defined as tax-adjusted return on capital employed.  
They constructed two alternative models of what the market expected income to be and 
then investigated the market’s reactions when its expectations proved false. A simple 
linear regression was used to test the proposed association in which changes in firm i 
income regressed against the change in the average income of firms in the market. This 
showed that the information contained in the annual income number was useful in that it 
is related to stock prices.  
Ball and Brown’s research was the first to discuss the information content of accounting 
numbers and has been replicated many times by different scholars (Beaver and Dukes, 
1972; Bowen et al. 1986; Board and Day, 1989). They measured the association 
between annual earnings (operating cash flows) and the abnormal return using the 
operating earnings as proxy for operating cash flows and they reported that earnings 
showed a higher correlation with abnormal stock return than cash flows. 
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However, the assumption of Ball and Brown is similar to that of CAPM (the capital 
market is both efficient and unbiased). Hence, the assets price will rapidly adjust with 
the release of information without leaving any chance of abnormal gain. This is actually 
considered a criticism of their research, because in the real world the perfectly efficient 
market may not exist although weaker forms of efficiency (semi-strong and weak form) 
may hold in reality.  
By using a different proxy for operating cash flows the seminal study of Beaver and 
Dukes (1972) concluded that unexpected earnings, which they defined as earnings plus 
depreciation, depletion and amortisation charge, and the change in deferred tax account, 
were more highly associated with abnormal returns than unexpected operating cash 
flows. In a related study, Patell and Kaplan (1977) examined the information content of 
cash flows beyond that already existing in earnings. They calculated cash flows as 
earnings after extraordinary items plus depreciation and deferred tax minus unremitted 
earnings attributable to foreign consolidated industries plus other adjustments. They 
pointed out that operating cash flows provided no information beyond that which 
existed in earnings. As will be noted in earlier studies the operating cash flows showed 
no information content beyond that which existed in earnings which may be due to the 
naive method used in calculating the operating cash flows.  
Correspondingly, Bowen et al. (1986) examined the relationship between accounting 
earnings and cash flows for a sample of US data over the period 1971-1981. They used 
the following traditional definitions of cash flows: net income before extra-ordinary 
items and discontinued operations plus depreciation (NIBEI), net income plus 
depreciation and amortisation (NIDPR), and working capital from operations (WCFO). 
In addition, they employed three recently devised measures for cash flow: cash flow 
from operations (CFO), cash flow after investment (CFAI), and change in cash and 
short-term marketable securities (C).  
Their aims were to answer the following questions: 
1. Are the traditional cash flow measures used in prior studies highly 
correlated with alternative measures of cash flows that have really 
been advocated by academics and practitioners? 
2. Are accrual accounting earnings and cash flow measures highly correlated? 
3. Do earnings or cash flow variables best predict cash flows? 
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An empirical study by Bowen et al., (1986) concludes the following:  
1. Measures of cash flows (NIBEI, WCFO) are poor proxies for cash flow.  
2. Traditional measures of cash flows are more highly correlated with accrual earnings 
than alternative measures (CFO, CFAI, and C).  
3. The correlation between traditional measures and more recent measures is lower than 
the correlation between traditional measures and accrual earnings. 
4. The traditional measures of cash flow, WCFO and NIDPR, were better predictors of 
future cash flow from operations than cash flows from operations themselves and from 
net income before extraordinary items.  
Their results were in contrast with the FASB 95
9
 assertion that earnings are better 
predictors for future cash flows than current cash flows. 
The evaluation of the company’s performance is considered one of the greatest 
challenges researchers have ever met. For many decades accounting earnings were the 
most popular approach for evaluating management performance until the initiation of 
the evaluation model that was based on cash flow items (Board and Day, 1989).  
Board and Day (1989) examined the comparative ability of net income, working capital 
from operations and net cash flow to explain the variation in stock return over the 
period 1961-1977. They pointed out that net income and working capital from 
operations have, separately, more information content than net cash flows. They also 
investigated the incremental information content for these variables. Their results 
indicate that net cash flows have the poorest incremental information content. 
Based on UK data over the period 1985–1993, Charitou et al. (2001) investigated the 
value relevance of operating cash flow and earnings under three contextual variables: (i) 
earnings permanence, (ii) earnings growth, and (iii) firm size. The results revealed that 
earnings had incremental information content over cash flow while operating cash flows 
revealed incremental information content beyond earnings when pooled data were used. 
The results also conveyed that prior operating cash flow was significantly positively 
associated with stock return and indicated that firm size and market to book ratio (risk 
                                                             
9 Summary of statement No.95, Statement of cash flows (1987) updated to IAS7 Statement of cash flows. 
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proxies) improved the explanatory power of the model they adopted to conduct their 
research.  
Similarly, Francis et al. (2003) examined the relative and incremental information 
content of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), cash 
flow from operations (CFO) and earnings (EARN). Their sample covers 16 industrial 
companies in the period 1990-2000. The Standard and Poor Index (S&P) published 
reports were used to identify the most applicable performance metrics within different 
industries and also to determine those industries to which the non-GAAP performance 
metrics (i.e. not calculable from numbers reported in the audited financial statements).  
The methodology applied by Francis et al. was to classify the industries according to the 
claimed preferred performance metric applicable within the chosen industry, then assess 
its ability in samples of industry where the non-GAAP performance metric is the 
preferred metric in explaining the variability on stock return. Hence, the tested 
hypothesis was whether the preferred GAAP metric outperformed the non-preferred 
GAAP metrics in explaining returns.   
The main contribution of the research by Francis et al. is the introduction of the non-
GAAP performance metric (non-earning, non-cash metric) and the assessment of the 
usefulness of industry-specific performance measures in predicting either or both 
earnings and revenues. 
In summary, Francis et al. indicate that earnings significantly outperform both EBITDA 
and CFO across industries using these preferred performance metrics. The findings also 
show that EBITDA significantly outperforms CFO for the pooled and industry sample, 
whereas Francis et al. show that EBITDA does not outperform EARN for any industry 
even though it is considered the preferred metric within the chosen industry. This 
finding holds within the industry level.  
Turning to incremental power, the findings of Francis et al. reveal that all the GAAP 
metrics show incremental power in the presence of other non-GAAP metrics within the 
pooled data analysis, whereas the annual regression results show that EARN has highly 
significant incremental explanatory power in comparison to both EBITDA and CFO for 
each pooled and year regression. The research by Francis et al. provides consistent 
evidence that each preferred metric has significant incremental explanatory power in its 
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preferred sample (Board and Day, 1989; Ali, 1994; Wilson, 1986, 1987; Chen and 
Dodd, 1997: Forker and Powell, 2008). 
Similarly, the findings of Francis et al. show that EARN has high explanatory power in 
describing variation in stock return and outperforms the non-GAAP metric. The same is 
found using EBITDA and CFO. The results also indicate that all the GAAP metrics 
have incremental explanatory power compared to those that exist within non-GAAP 
metrics (except for the homebuilding industry where the finding is that non GAAP 
metrics add little incremental power to explain return). One interesting finding by 
Rayburn (1986) is that the information contained in accrual components is what 
explains and justifies the incremental information content of earnings beyond that 
already existing in cash flow measures. 
Because there are no conclusive results for the usefulness of earnings and cash flow 
items, neither the accrual earnings, nor the cash flow items, was a  perfect method for 
measuring management performance as an approach to evaluating the whole firm 
(shareholder wealth) (Bowen et al., 1987; Charitou et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the bulk 
of empirical evidence indicates that the superiority of cash flow measures vis-à-vis 
earnings (as variously defined) has not been demonstrated. 
2.3.3 Value-Based Measures and Residual Income Method 
The adage has long persisted that in order for a company to generate value and to create 
wealth it must earn more than it costs by way of debt and equity. The added value 
concept has been promoted strongly in performance measurement literature. This notion 
is historically referred to as the residual income (RI) method (a value–based measure). 
A periodic performance measure was introduced by Stern and Stewart (1991) to replace 
earnings and cash flow from operations as a measure of performance. They called it 
Economic Value Added (EVA). Stewart (1994, p.75) argues that ‘EVA stands well out 
from the crowd as the single best measures of value creation on a continuous basis’.  He 
also remarked that ‘EVA is almost 50% better than its closest accounting-based 
competitor (i.e. earnings) in explaining changes in shareholder wealth’ (p.75). 
From a different point of view, Ball and Brown, (1968) and Patell and Kaplan, (1977) 
highlight their contention that there is no single optimal accounting measure that 
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accurately explains the variability in shareholders’ wealth. A mass of empirical research 
has been conducted to test the validity of the residual income model as an alternative to 
the discounted cash flow model in equity evaluation, which specifies the relationship 
between equity values and accounting variables such as earnings and book value 
(Ohlson, 1995). Ohlson models a firms’ value as a linear function of earnings, book 
value, and other unspecified information (Fundamental Value,   ) that plays an 
important role in linear information dynamics and proposes consensus analyst forecasts 
as a proxy for   .  
However, some empirical research claims that even the traditional dividend discounting 
model is the basis of the Ohlson model. The residual income model breaks new ground 
on two fronts (Dechow, 1999). First, it has the ability to predict and explain stock prices 
more effectively than the models based on discounting short-term forecasts of dividends 
and cash flows. Second, it provides a more complete valuation approach than popular 
alternatives because of the inclusion of non-GAAP metrics (Francis et al., 1997; 
Frankel and Lee, 1998).  
However, analyst forecasts depend in part on the information contained in current 
earnings and book value. Analyst forecasts, therefore, not only reflect information about 
future earnings beyond that conveyed by earnings and book value (the definition of   ), 
but also reflect, among other things, the ‘stale’ information concurrently conveyed by 
the accounting fundamentals (Dechow et al., 1999). 
Unfortunately, this empirical research ignores something essential to Ohlson’s model, 
which is information dynamics. However, the results of both valuation models and 
dividend discounted models appear identical regardless of whether earnings are 
capitalised or forecast, ‘but make no appeal to book value or residual income’ (Dechow 
et al., 1999, p. 2). 
Correspondingly, Dechow et al. used the annual financial statement for the period 1976-
1995 to evaluate the empirical implications of Ohlson’s model. Unlike previous 
research the information dynamics that link current information to future residual 
income were incorporated. They stated that the Ohlson model was a restricted version of 
the standard dividends discounted model that comprised three basic assumptions. First, 
when the expected dividends are discounted to their present value the amount yielded is 
equivalent to the price of shares. Second, the clean surplus accounting relationship is 
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maintained.  The third assumption addresses the character of the relationship existing 
between the present value of future dividends and the current information. 
In their analysis Dechow et al. focus on the improvements provided by Ohlson’s model 
over these simpler and more restrictive models, by imposing additional restrictions to 
the dividends discount model. This restriction represents the ignorance of the other 
information factors when analysing earnings forecasts. Dechow et al. contend that the 
‘Ohlson model assumes that expectations of future abnormal earnings are based solely 
on information in current abnormal earnings and that abnormal earnings are purely 
transitory. Consequently, expected future abnormal earnings are zero and price is equal 
to book value. This restricted version assumed that accounting earnings are used to 
measure value creation' (p. 9). 
After the empirical assessment of the residual income valuation model and the 
imposition of the information dynamics that describe the formation of abnormal 
earnings expectations, Dechow et al. conclude that models that simply capitalise 
earnings forecasts in perpetuity outperform information dynamics models in explaining 
stock prices. Furthermore,  subsequent research showed that the superiority of the 
simple capitalisation model over the information dynamics model stems from the fact 
that investors are generally presumed to ‘overweight information in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and under-weight information in current earnings and book value ’ (Dechow et 
al., 1999, p.32).  
2.3.3.1 The Validity of the Performance Measure’s Components 
 
Garrod et al. (2000) used the basic Edward-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model to measure the 
value relevance of earnings’ components. By adopting a cross-sectional analysis for UK 
data over the period 1992-1996 they concluded that the disaggregation of earnings into 
its prime components (i.e. cash flows and short and long term accruals) significantly 
increased the explanatory power of the model. However, this increase in significance 
mainly resulted from decomposing earnings into operating earnings and operating assets 
rather than from decomposing earnings into its components i.e. cash flows and accruals.  
They also investigated whether the value relevance for cash flows and earnings’ 
components was affected by the magnitude and the sign of the three following 
contextual variables: (i) operating cash flows (ii) earnings and (iii) short term accruals. 
The methodology they used are as follows. First, they divided the total sample into two 
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sub-samples according to the sign of the contextual variables. Then the positive sample 
was divided into four groups according to the magnitude of the variable, the first group 
containing the lowest values from the contextual variable and the fourth group 
containing the highest.  
The results of Garrod et al. (2000) supported the above conclusions that cash flows have 
information content and that the cash flow model has the highest explanatory power for 
the variation in price per share. They reported also that there was no value difference 
between accruals and operating cash flows. However, long-term accruals were valued 
differently in extreme cases where the contextual variables were negative or too 
positive. Short term accruals were rarely valued differently.  From the above results 
Garrod et al. drew the conclusion that ‘the isolation of accruals from cash flows only 
takes on valuation significance in conditions which are unusual and unlikely to persist’ 
(p.15). 
Biddle et al. (1997) investigated whether EVA dominated and had incremental 
information content beyond that of accrual earnings and also extended their 
investigation to test whether any of EVA’s components had a higher association with 
stock return and firm value. 
Biddle et al. used a sample of 219 firms over the period 1984-1993 to test whether the 
EVA and RI outperformed the mandated performance measures, earnings and operating 
cash flow in explaining contemporaneous annual stock returns. These firms fell into two 
main categories, those which adopted EVA as a performance measure and those which 
did not. Moreover, they also tested whether the components unique to EVA and/or RI 
contributed more to explain contemporaneous stock return beyond that explained by 
CFO and earnings. They began their investigation by describing how the variables of 
this study are linked to each other through a reconciliation process starting with 
earnings before extraordinary items (EBIT) and ending with EVA.  
The findings of Biddle et al. (1997) were that all the variables (EVA, RI, CFO, and 
EBIT) were significant at a conventional level, and that both EBIT and RI have the 
higher adjusted    and outperformed EVA. Unlike Stern and Stewart (1991), this study 
could not support the claim that EVA had greater information content than earnings. For 
the incremental information, the results (based on F-statistic tests) indicated that both 
CFO and Accrual had the highest incremental information content in explaining market-
adjusted returns, while the components of EVA (ATI, CC, Accrual ADJ) appeared to 
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make little contribution to the incremental information content. When combined with 
the relative information content findings above, these results suggested that, ‘while 
EVA components offer some incremental information content beyond earnings 
components, their contributions to the information content of EVA are not sufficient for 
EVA to provide greater relative information content than earnings’ (p.20). 
In particular, the focus of Biddle et al. (1997) was on developing a statistical test for the 
comparison of explanatory power, and the availability of data was the main criterion 
used to select the sample for study in the proposed test. From the research perspective, 
this raises concerns over subjectivity and prevents the results of Biddle et al. from being 
globally compared to other research findings.   
Furthermore, Forker and Powell (2008) criticised the findings of Biddle et al. They state 
that Biddle et al.’s research design is ‘however, subject to the limitation that 
shareholders’ return (an equity metric) is regressed on contemporaneous measures of 
performance that are measured at the entity (operating) level of the firm. Restricting the 
analysis to a single period contemporaneous association with firm values and returns 
does not address the problem that one-period measures of residual income are not 
necessarily associated with the shareholder changes in wealth reflected in security 
returns. Also, an association between one-period returns and a charge for the cost of 
capital is potentially mitigated by the charge having little variation across a sample of 
large firms’ (p.6). 
In a similar vein, West and Worthington’s (2000) study based on 110 Australian 
companies over the period 1992 through to 1998, examined the association of EVA, 
earnings, net cash flows, and residual income with annual stock return. In addition they 
extended their research to test whether EVA had incremental information content and 
outperformed conventional accounting-based measures. In their response to Stewart’s 
(1991) claim that EVA is the best performance measure regarding its ability to capture 
the true economic profit of a firm and to the recommendation of Biddle et al. , West and 
Worthington examined which of the components of EVA and earnings were more likely 
to contribute to, or subtract from, the information content.     
West and Worthington used the same methodology as Biddle et al. , starting by 
describing the linkages between the different competing measures of firms’ 
performances, except that, unlike the latter’s empirical research, they used the pooled-
time series, cross–sectional least squares regression to conduct their studies. 
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West and Worthington’s research indicates that (as with the Biddle et al. study) all the 
performance measures have a significant association with adjusted annual stock return 
variation, where earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) were the most reliable 
predictor, whereas EVA is the least reliable predictor of the four accounting measures. 
For the incremental information content the results show that the most logical pairing of 
information variables in explaining market return is EBEI and EVA. 
The second phase of West and Worthington’s study is to examine the components of 
EVA; the results convey that all the components are significant but that accrual (ACC) 
has a greater explanatory power than the other variables in explaining variation in stock 
return.  
Conversely Worthington and West (2004) form different conclusions regarding the 
superiority of EVA, based on Australian data. They contend that EVA is highly 
associated with stock return and outperforms all other performance measures, namely 
residual income, earnings and net cash flows.   
2.3.3.2 Performance Measurement of Productive Activity 
For any company to succeed in an increasingly competitive market, it has to know the 
cost of its entire economic chain (productive activity) in order to maximise the 
shareholders’ wealth. To do so a company should have the ability to manage the 
economic cost of its entire production chain rather than its cost alone, so what it needs 
to do is create value not control cost. To accomplish this aim a company needs 
sufficient data on the total-factor productivity where EVA is designated as its best 
measure (Drucker, 1995). Moreover, the transformation from traditional costing into the 
activity-based costing system (ABC), within the complex high technology industry 
sector encourages the adoption of EVA together with benchmarking to measure and 
compare the performance of different companies to determine that of the best 
performance within the sector (Drucker).   
Essentially, what makes EVA superior to the other, traditional performance measures 
(e.g. earnings, performance ratio), is its ability to incorporate the cost of invested capital 
(IC) when measuring the value added or created by the company (Stern and Stewart, 
1991; Fernandez, 2000) and also its ability to measure in effect the productivity of all 
producing factors in a complex manufacturing unit (Drucker, 1995). In addition it has 
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the ability to indicate why a certain product or service does not add value; it shows what 
the executive manager needs to find out and it identifies whether any remedial action is 
needed in order for certain products and services to generate value.  
The ccost of capital is thus the most important aspect of EVA. Under traditional 
methods most companies appear to be profitable whereas in reality they are not (Stern 
and Stewart, 1991). In a related note Drucker (1995) observes that “Until a business 
returns a profit that is greater than its cost of capital, it operates at a loss. Never mind 
that it pays taxes as if it had a genuine profit. The enterprise still returns less to the 
economy than it devours in resources. It does not cover its full costs unless the reported 
profit exceeds the cost of capital. Until then, it does not create wealth; it destroys it” 
(p.59). 
2.3.3.3 Value –Based Measures versus Traditional Accounting Measures 
As a new concept of performance measurement EVA has aroused much concern, 
especially in the advanced economies. In spite of its being widespread as a performance 
measure, its implementation and validity has generated intense debate (Anastassis, 
2007; Forker and Powell, 2008).  
Historically, predictability and variability were used as the main criteria to gauge the 
quality of earnings and, hence their usefulness to investor decisions. In this context, 
Forker and Powell (2008) used these two criteria to test empirically the quality of EVA 
relative to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings, residual income, 
cash flows, and other mandated metrics in the USA and the UK. Unlike Biddle et al. 
(1997), Forker and Powel (p.1) were using a proxy ‘for accounting quality by applying 
the long window- methodology to obtain hindsight valuation errors based on the 
difference between ex ante actual market value and discounted ex post metrics as a 
proxy for accounting quality’. 
Forker and Powell’s focus in particular was on the value relevance embedded in the 
recognition of the cost of capital, a factor noticeably absent from the issues under 
consideration by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in its quest to 
improve financial reporting quality. Forker and Powell claim that, theoretically, EVA 
outperforms earnings because it meets the requirements of the residual income method 
as it strictly adopts the practice of clean surplus accounting that takes into account all 
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factors impacting on shareholder wealth when measuring income and because it 
recognises the cost of equity capital (valuation of equity). 
Forker and Powell (2008) conducted their test for valuation errors using three steps:  
first by reporting the main cross-sectional valuation errors and the differences between 
main paired valuation errors for each long-window; then by reporting the variability of 
the individual valuation errors for all econometric measures; and lastly by providing the 
actual cross-sectional errors and differences in errors across all windows and terminal 
dates. Two sets of data were used to conduct this test: the USA data-set containing 
1,000 firms for the 16 year period 1986 – 2001; and the UK data-set containing 500 
firms for the 12 year period 1990 –2001. 
The rule they applied here was that ‘the smaller the mean and variability statistics for 
valuation errors the higher its accounting quality and decision usefulness in forecasting 
future value’ (Forker and Powell, 2008. p.18). In addition, the t-test and Wilcoxon 
signed test were used to examine the significance of different measures. Their results 
showed that the best performance measure for all windows was the residual income 
before exceptional and extraordinary items [RI (1), RI (2)].
10
 It is clear that the 
exclusion of the cost of capital from conventional earnings is a direct source of error in 
estimating intrinsic value.   
However, in their study of the association between market returns and alternative 
performance metrics, Forker and Powell find that residual-based metrics outperform the 
GAAP-base metrics from which the non-cash cost of equity capital is excluded. In 
terms of performance metrics’ forecasting powers the residual-based metrics have the 
ability to outperform operating cash-flow-based metrics. Moreover, Forker and Powell’s 
results show that the differences between EVA and residual-based measures are small, a 
finding inconsistent with that of Francis et al. (2000). Further, unlike Biddle et al. 
(1997), the key results reported that the residual income method (RI) and earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) have the higher adjusted    and outperform EVA. 
However, the main paradigm of firms is to create and maximise shareholder wealth. 
This is the wealth that is evaluated in terms of different performance measures and it 
may be measured in terms of returns received on investment which could be in the form 
                                                             
10 Forker and Powell define RI (1): residual income before exceptional and extra-ordinary items with 
Stern and Stewart end of period capital employed.  RI (2): residual income after exceptional and extra 
ordinary-items with Stern and Stewart end of period capital employed. 
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of dividends, capital appreciation or both. But the crucial question here is what single 
performance measure should be used by different interested parties to evaluate a firm. 
Closely related to the last point, Anastassis and Kyriazis (2007)  investigate the 
explanatory power and the incremental information content of EVA against those of 
traditional performance measures such as net income and operating income. They 
contend that, unlike the traditional measures, EVA takes into consideration the cost of 
the capital invested to generate profit, (recognising that a company is going to create 
value only when, besides its various operating costs, it covers the cost of its invested 
capital). Considering this, the only difference between EVA and Residual Income 
method (RI) is the adjustment that Stewart (1991) suggests for the calculation of 
invested capital and net operating profit (NOPAT). Supporters of the EVA performance 
measure suggest more than one hundred adjustments for the NOPAT and the IC. The 
most common and important adjustments are those for good will, operating lease, 
research and development expenses, provisions and deferred taxes (Young, 1999). 
Greek data for the period 1996–2003, (a time that witnessed the transformation of the 
Greek stock market from an emerging and relatively weak form, to the developed and 
more efficient one after year 2000) were used by Anastassis and Kyriazis to investigate 
whether EVA would outperform other traditional performance measures. Furthermore, 
they replicated the model introduced by Biddle et al. (1997) to test for the relative 
information content of EVA. 
Anastassis and Kyriazis used both panel regression and Cox pool regression (a test for 
non-nested regression) to test for the relative information content and incremental 
information content. The results reveal that with respect to abnormal stock returns 
operating income (OI) has the highest explanatory power (  ), followed by net income 
(NI) and then residual income (RI) whereas the explanatory power of EVA appears to 
be the least. Regarding the incremental information content result their findings convey 
that both EVA and OI are equivalent, and outperformed by both NI and RI. In addition, 
the Wald test reveals that, for the EVA components, ‘both the capital charge (which is 
also included in RI) and the Stern and Stewart (1991) adjustment do not have any value 
relevant information additional to that which is already incorporated in the traditional 
accounting variables’ (Anastassis and Kyriazis, 2007. p.15).  
Contrary to previous regression results (abnormal return as dependent variable), EVA 
outperforms all the other profitability measures when the regressions run against the 
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market value (MV). This is actually compatible with the theory behind EVA (time value 
assumption), which states that the discounted value of all the EVAs the company 
assumes it will achieve in the future, is equal to the current MV. Therefore, as assumed, 
the value of EVA is better correlated with market value (MV) than accounting variables 
(Anastassis and Kyriazis, 2007)   
However, according to the Cox test, in spite of EVA having the highest    (this 
difference does not appear to be statistically significant), the finding of Anastasia and 
Kyriazis ‘fails to provide adequate support for Stewart’s (1991) claim that EVA tracks 
changes in MV better than any other performance measure, since it appears that the 
other earnings measures are equally competent of explaining the variation in MV’ 
(p.23). 
The results of Anastassis and Kyriazis’s model (2007) for the first difference (one year 
lag) show statistically insignificant differences in the information content of RI, OI and 
EVA. For the incremental content of EVA components the results indicate that NI is the 
only one providing statistical significance whereas the changes in both operating 
income adjustments and Stern and Stewart (1991) adjustments are of no importance to 
the market. The Wald test also supports the evidence that ‘the first difference of 
operating income adjustment, capital charge (CAPCH) and Stern Stewart adjustments 
(ACCADJ) does not add any useful information to that already incorporated in the 
change in net income (NI)’ (Anastassis and Kyriazis,2007, p. 18). 
Along the same lines, Riahi (1993) investigated the relative and incremental 
information content of certain variables (value added, earnings, and cash flows) using 
the US data. In surveying the relative information content he concluded that value added 
is a significant explanatory factor in stock return and, moreover, it has more power of 
explanation in relation to general return of stocks. In surveying incremental information 
content Riahi (1993) introduces the combination of value added and net profit as the 
best explanation of stock return. 
The association of earnings with stock return (price) and firm values has been the focus 
of many accounting research studies (Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver and Ducks, 1972) 
for the past five decades, and many of these empirical studies have investigated the 
information and incremental information content of earnings (accruals) beyond that 
which already exists among different performance and evaluation methods. Further, 
much of this research supported the finding that earnings outperform all other 
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performance measures that derive from discounted cash flow and residual income 
(Pattel and Kaplan, 1977). Some have suggested that, in order to improve their 
explanatory power, earnings should be deconstructed into their main components to 
show whether these provide more information content than earnings itself (Bao and 
Bao, 1998). 
The study carried out by Bao and Bao (1998) investigated the association between 
performance and value added and concluded that the latter was positively associated 
with firm value in certain industries. EVA as a surrogate for abnormal economic 
earnings has recently received much attention as another performance measure and 
many researchers (Anastassis and Kyriazis, 2007; Forker and Powell, 2008) considered 
it the best performance measure. It has even been predicted by different researchers 
(Lehan and Makhija, 1997; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Erasmus, 2008) that EVA will 
supersede earnings and earnings per share as the proper financial measures but this 
claim has faced much controversy and the view that even if EVA has some merit it is 
not as promising as its creators have claimed (Biddle et al., 1997). 
Bao and Bao (1998) employ three types of analysis to examine the usefulness of 
abnormal economic earnings and value added. These comprise a firm’s value analysis 
(market value of equity) in which a firm’s value regress “against earnings and other 
GAAP–related variables, levels studies regress prices/returns on earnings while changes 
study regress prices/returns on changes in earnings” (p.5).  Samples of 166 firms for the 
two year period 1992 - 1993 were used to conduct the research.  
The results of the firm value analyses reveal that for the year 1992, only EVA is 
significant in explaining firm value, while the earnings add little value when paired with 
value added. Furthermore, the sign of abnormal economic earnings coefficient always 
comes against the forecasts (negative all the time). The results were the same for the 
year 1993. For the incremental information analyses the results show that, consistent 
with Riahi-Belkaoui (1993), value added has higher relative and incremental content 
than earnings.  
The results of Bao and Bao specify that for the level analysis shown, even though EVA 
has the correct sign, it is not a statistically significant variable and has a lower power of 
explanation than the other variables amongst which value added appears the most 
highly significant. Furthermore, the change analysis results convey that while EVA 
remains significant with higher explanatory power and the correct anticipated sign of 
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correlation (positive), the earnings and abnormal economic earnings are insignificant, 
with a different sign of correlation than forecast. 
When using the initial price of stock as a deflator the results reveal that contrary to the 
level analysis finding all the explanatory variables of Bao and Bao’s study are 
statistically significant. Consistently, EVA has greater explanatory power in comparison 
to those of earnings and abnormal economic earnings.  
Bao and Bao (1998) therefore conclude that “economic value added is not as promising 
as Stern and Stewart have claimed, the usefulness of EVA as abnormal economic 
earnings surrogate, therefore, is an empirical issue” (p.5).  
More recently, Mehdi and Iman (2011) investigated the relativity and incremental 
information content of EVA over traditional measures. They used the data from the 
Iranian stock market for the period 2001 to 2008 to investigate the association between 
EVA, traditional measures and the stock return. The results do not support Stern and 
Stewart’s claims and reveal that stock return is highly associated with return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings per share (EPS), while EVA appears to 
have little information content beyond that which exists in other traditional accounting 
measures. 
However, an empirical question arises here. Which measure has the better association 
with stock return? Most interestingly, previous studies that have mainly used US data 
consistently show superior relative value relevance (or information content) for value 
added over income (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1993; Bao and Bao, 1998). ‘Because these studies 
were limited to the few US companies which report the employee compensation data 
needed to compute value added, it is possible that these results are influenced by self-
selection bias’ (Darcy, 2006, p.3).  
2.3.3.4 Modification of EVA as A Performance Measure 
Shareholder pressure on firms to maximise their wealth and to incentivise executive 
managers to align their interests accurately with those of shareholders increased and 
reached unprecedented levels (Rappaport, 1986; Young, 1997; Lovata and Costigan, 
2002). Thus, managers’ compensation contracts should be designed to include the most 
appropriate measure for evaluating their performance, and not necessarily the 
historically dominant stock price measure. Furthermore, the stock price may not be an 
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efficient and proper contracting parameter because it is generally driven by many 
factors beyond the control of the firm's managers (Bacidore et al. 1997).  
Moreover, any selected performance measures to be used in managerial compensation 
schemes must be highly correlated with changes in shareholder wealth and should not 
be subject to all the essential randomness of an entity’s stock price (Bacidore et al.). As 
Bacidore et al. 1997 have stated, ‘This dichotomy is the fundamental tension a good 
performance measure must resolve’ (p.11). He also claimed that EVA as proposed by 
Stewart (1991) would best resolve this tension as it has the creativity to secure better 
linkage of the firm’s accounting data with its stock market performance. 
Bacidore et al. present an empirical analysis to examine both the ability of EVA to 
measure the abnormal return changes and the correlation between EVA and abnormal 
return. Moreover, they claim that the most suitable performance measure should have 
the ability to measure how the strategy of management can influence shareholder value. 
This influence is measured by the risk-adjusted return on invested capital. Finally, the 
performance measure should clarify how well the firm has generated operating profits, 
given the amount of capital invested to produce those profits (Bacidore et al., 1997). 
According to Bacidore et al. (1997), EVA is calculated as the net operating profit 
(NOPAT) adjusted for the increase in bad debt and LIFO reserve; plus any increase in 
net capitalised R&D; plus amortisation of goodwill; plus other operating income; minus 
operating cash taxes; and minus the adjusted book value of net capital at the beginning 
of the period (NA).  
Bacidore et al. used a sample of 600 firms selected from the Stern and Stewart 
performance 1000 database for the period 1982 through to 1992 to examine the 
association between EVA and the abnormal stock return. After running the regression of 
abnormal returns against the EVA as explanatory measures, the results showed that both 
EVA is significantly associated with abnormal return. But, after the inclusion of lags as 
explanatory variables to the regression, in order to test whether past realisation of EVA 
has a significant effect on abnormal returns, the results convey that EVA is significantly 
positively related to abnormal return whereas the lag EVA is significantly negatively 
related to abnormal return. 
Contrary to the claim of Bacidore et al. (1997) that REVA as a performance measure is 
superior to EVA, Ferguson and Lestikow (1998) stated that EVA in reality is superior 
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to, and more widely spread, than REVA since its introduction by Stewart and Stern. The 
key distinction between these two measures was that capital charge was based on the 
firm’s market value instead of its net assets value. Thus, the main assumption of 
Bacidore et al. is that an appropriate measure of operating performance must correlate 
highly with abnormal stock return. This assumption seems plausible to Ferguson and 
Lestikow (1998) who claim that management decisions that alter shareholder wealth 
also cause a corresponding abnormal stock return. The theory suggests, however, that 
no appropriate single-period measure of operating performance should be highly 
correlated with abnormal stock return. 
Accordingly, the main criticism of the work by Bacidore et al., is that the use of 
abnormal stock return as a basis for rewarding management is likely to be inconsistent 
with shareholder wealth maximisation. To this end, Ferguson and Lestikow (1998) used 
the traditional dividend discount model to prove that EVA is more consistent than 
REVA with finance theory and wealth maximisation. 
2.3.3.5 Individuals Focus of Value -Based Measures 
Most of the empirical research on economic value added focuses on the firm as a unit of 
analysis whereas none of these studies focuses on individual managers or examines how 
each individual will perform under different performance measures. 
In terms of the assessment of the top management performance, Lehn and Makhija 
(1997) (through the use of a sample of 452 entities during the period 1985-1994) 
empirically examine the ability of EVA as a new performance measure, together with 
return on sales (ROS), ROA, ROE, and market value added (MVA) to explain not only 
the variation in stock return, but also the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for 
poor performance. They claim that EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable 
indicator of CEO turnover than profitability ratio measures (i.e. ROS, ROE). Lehn and 
Makhija conclude that in spite of it having the higher correlation among the other 
performance measures, EVA and MVA are not the most efficient criteria. 
In their study of how managers perform under an EVA bonus scheme, Cahan et al. 
(2002), examined whether the managers who are compensated using EVA-based bonus 
plans outperform the managers who are compensated on traditional accounting-based 
bonus plans. This system, they claim, can change managerial behaviour at the firm 
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level. However, they do not provide any evidence on the performance of the individual 
manager. Cahan et al. (2002) contend that ‘one reason to expect better performance for 
managers on EVA bonus plans is that an EVA-based reward system better aligns the 
interests of the manager and the firm’ (p.8). 
Based on the findings of Wallace (1998), there is evidence to suggest that EVA is hard 
to understand and implement. Cahan et al. (2002) used a sample of 117 managers in 
major international New Zealand Companies which included 52 on EVA bonus 
schemes and 65 on traditional schemes.  
Basically Cahan et al. were interested in the coefficient interactive term between the 
budget type and the understanding of EVA, and expected it to be positive and 
significant which means that the relationship between bonus type and performance 
depends on the understanding of EVA. Moreover, they contend that managers with a 
high understanding of EVA produce a higher performance when their firms adopt an 
EVA–based bonus plan.  
The result of Cahan after running the regression on the full model shows that ‘the high 
EVA understanding has a quite dramatic positive effect on the performance of managers 
on EVA reward systems while high EVA understanding actually has a slight negative 
effect on managers on traditional reward systems’ (Cahan et al., 2002, p.19). Cahan et 
al. attributed the negative effect of the latter to cognitive imbalance. Furthermore, when 
accounting–based performance systems are used to evaluate those managers who best 
understand EVA, their performance may experience cognitive conflict, and 
consequently, may decline (Cahan et al.,).  
For the reduced model adopted by Cahan et al. (interactive term excluded) the results 
show that managers with EVA bonus plans and high EVA understanding outperformed 
other managers in those areas in which manager have high EVA understanding and 
traditional reward system. To sum up, the findings of Cahan et al. illustrate that there is 
an interactive effect on overall performance between bonus plan types and the 
understanding of EVA and demonstrate that, given differences in the delegation of 
decision rights and strategic focus, EVA bonus plans might not be optimal in all areas 
of operation. Finally, controversy to Stern and Stewart’s claim that EVA is easy to 
understand by different managers’ level (high understanding) Cahan et al. (2002) state 
that EVA understanding is not always high. 
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2.3.3.6 Cash Value Added (CVA) as a Performance Measure 
Scholars have different points of view regarding the usefulness of traditional accounting 
(earnings and accruals) and cash flow measures in explaining the variation of stock 
price performance. However, the criticisms that the traditional and value added 
measures have faced and the arguments raised by Young (1999) regarding the Stern and 
Stewart adjustment (i.e. that the main aim of this adjustments is to produce a modified 
version of the EVA that undermines the drawbacks of accrual based measures by 
developing new performance measures that have the properties of cash flows (cash 
value added metric)), all encourage researchers to develop new performance measures 
that can better measure the performance of firms and managers.  
In response to the above controversy, Ottosson and Wiessenrider (1996) proposed a new 
performance measure entitled cash value added (CVA)
11
 - the surplus of cash flows - to 
replace the traditional accounting and value added measures, specifically the periodic 
measure EVA.    
In this context, Ottosson and Wiessenrider argue that the focus of moderate 
management, unlike traditional management accounting, should be on the strategic 
investment (that creates value) and they should not waste valuable time on controlling 
and evaluating non-strategic investment decisions. In addition, they claim that ‘the 
fundamental difference between accounting and CVA method is that the CVA method 
holds that managers are responsible for the evaluation of the CVA information’ 
(Ottosson and Wiessenrider, p.7).  
According to Ottosson and Weissenrieder, the CVA is simply defined as the difference 
between operating cash flow (OCF) and operating cash flow demand (OCFD). The first 
part basically represents the earnings before depreciation, interest and tax (EBDIT) 
adjusted for non-cash charges, working capital movements and non-strategic 
investments; the secondary investment supports the main investment decision taken to 
increase the wealth of shareholders. The second part refers to investors’ capital cost, 
mainly the interest and dividends (see figure 2.1). Furthermore, the OCFD ‘represents 
                                                             
11
 This is a trademarked performance measure that was developed by the global management consultant 
‘Boston Consulting Group (BCG)’ a U.S company founded in 1963 and which came to prominence in 
1973. 
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the cash flow needed to meet the investors’ financial requirements on the company’s 
strategic investments’ (Ottosson and Wiessenrider, 1996, p.5). 
 
Figure (2.1) Calculation of CVA 
 
Based on Ottosson and Weissenrieder (1996) 
The concept of CVA is similar to economic value added but takes into consideration 
only cash generation as opposed to economic wealth generation. This measure provides 
investors with an idea of the ability of a company to generate cash from one period to 
another. Generally speaking, the higher the CVA the better it is for the company and for 
investors. In addition Malimi and Ikaheimo (2003) stated that these metrics, the EVA 
and the CVA, should be used to evaluate the performance from senior management and 
divisional operating heads all the way down, in some cases, to personnel on the lower 
level. Mashaykhi (2009) defines CVA as the activities performed by the company and 
its employees to create value and increase the wealth of the entity and Petravicius 
(2008) refers to CVA as the cash remaining after deducting the cost of invested capital 
(IC × WACC) from the adjusted operating cash flows. This residual cash will be used to 
generate investment to an entity. CVA as a performance measure has received increased 
attention, especially in the European and Asian financial markets, ever since it was first 
proposed by the Boston Consulting Group.  
Fernandez (2002) investigated whether EVA, economic profit (EP), and cash value 
added (CVA) have the ability to measure value creation by different firms. He 
employed General Electric Company (GE) data for the period 1991 through to 2000 to 
•EBDIT adjusted for 
•Non cash charges 
•Working capital movements 
•Non-strategic investment 
OCF 
•Interest 
•Dividends 
OCFD 
•Cash 
value 
added 
CVA 
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run his regression model while Petravicius (2008) investigated how new performance 
measures such as Market Value Added (MVA), Economic Value Added (EVA), Cash 
Value Added (CVA), and Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI) will support the 
effectiveness of traditional accounting numbers. Collectively, their results indicate that 
new performance measures, the value added measure, are superior to the traditional 
measures in evaluating the performance of executive managers and the company as 
whole. This is attributed to the inclusion of the cost of invested capital when calculating 
the value added measures. 
Furthermore, Fernandez (2002) claims that cash value added (CVA) has an advantage 
over EVA because the results of his research indicate that CVA, over the period of 
study, makes more sense than EVA especially in those periods when the General 
Electric Company (GE) appears to destroy value rather than create it. This claim arose 
because the GE company began generating negative cash value added (CVA) in time of 
destroying value while the economic value (EVA) generated remained positive all time. 
He also claimed that CVA is more appropriate than book earnings for evaluating 
executive performance. 
Along the same lines, Mashaykhi (2009) used Iranian data from 408 companies listed 
on the Tehran stock exchange for the period  1998 to 2003 to investigate the relevance 
and the incremental information content of cash value added (CVA) and value added 
(VA) beyond that which already exists in earnings (E) and cash flow from operating 
(CFO). The OLS technique is used to test the relationship between the variables of this 
study and the annual stock price.  
Mashaykhi’s regression results indicate a significant relationship between value added 
and a stock return. However, the cross-sectional regression shows an unstable 
coefficient over time. For the purposes of the cash value added measure the results show 
an insignificant relationship between cash value added (CVA) and annual stock return 
on both pooled and cross-sectional data and the explanatory power is quite low. The 
findings also show that earnings have the highest explanatory power among these 
variables.  
 The results reveal that accrual measures have more information content beyond that 
already contained in operating cash flow followed by value added and cash value added 
respectively. The adjusted    for the value added is greater than    when cash value 
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added combines value added as an explanatory variable. Contrary to the above findings 
the results indicate that the cash value added has incremental information content over 
value added in 1998 and 1999. In addition, the results indicate that earnings have 
incremental content beyond operating cash flow, but not vice versa. 
Moreover, when all the variables are combined into one multi-regression model, the 
result shows that for different periods through the cross-sectional level both value added 
data and traditional data have incremental information content beyond each other, 
whereas for the pooled data, value added data and traditional data have incremental 
information content beyond each other (Mashaykhi, 2009). 
Urbanczyk et al. (2005) used data from five large Polish companies for the period 1997 
through to 2002 to investigate whether value added performance measures (EVA, CVA) 
have the ability to outperform traditional accounting measures. They defined CVA as 
the value a company creates over its cost of capital. They also considered CVA as a 
developed version of Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI)
12
 which represents the 
real cost of equity and gross investment that is defined as a gross cash flow a firm 
creates over the invested capital. Urbanczyk et al. state that CVA is considered an 
improved alternative to EVA because the latter ignores the impact of depreciation on 
cash availability, while CVA includes the effects of depreciation on NOPAT and 
invested capital, thus CVA is: 
                                    (10) 
Where ROGA is the return on gross asset which is equal to gross operating profit after 
tax divided by gross asset, WACC is the weighted average cost of capital, and Gross 
Asset, asset plus depreciation, is the value of an asset before depreciation. 
The results of Urbanczyk et al., show that all the selected Polish companies generate a 
negative EVA and CVA which implies that they all generated net losses and destroyed 
their shareholder wealth, whereas when applying the book value and traditional 
performance measures these companies appear more profitable. Urbanczyk et al. 
attributed the negative value of CVA and EVA to the privatisation process that was 
taking place among Polish companies. Furthermore, they state that these companies 
needed a long time to generate value after privatisation and the difficulty of calculating 
                                                             
12 CFROI was developed by the Swedish Company Boston Consulting Group as a performance measure 
which is equivalent to NOPAT after adjusting for depreciation.  
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the cost of capital, and depending mainly on book value to estimate the weighted 
average cost of capital, undermines their findings. 
2.3.3.6.1   CVA versus EVA 
Regardless of its matching and timing problems, CVA is considered the best alternative 
to EVA for evaluating management performance and as a step in the process to evaluate 
the whole firm and it seems to get its strength from the weakness of EVA (Escalona, 
2003). 
Fama and French (1996) argue that the cost of capital, one of the main figures in 
calculating the EVA, is computed by using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
However, methodologically, EVA has structural difficulties in both the efficient and the 
non–efficient capital markets, and its method has been criticised by both behavioural 
and traditional approaches. The main criticism is that the CAPM is valid under the 
assumption of strong and semi–strong efficient markets; but these two forms of 
efficiency have not been evidenced by empirical research. Therefore, the EVA method 
is considered to be an inefficient approach for evaluating and computing the cost of 
capital. 
If markets were efficient in the real world, all asset returns would be located on the 
capital market line (CML). Among the main assumptions of CML is that the prices of 
assets would be calculated in accordance with their intrinsic values. Another important 
assumption is that the net present value will equal zero as the required rate of return is 
equal to the internal rate of return (IRR). In this case EVA should be equal to zero 
because in its simpler case it measures the differences between required rate of return 
and internal rate of return. Therefore, EVA attempts numerical measurement in efficient 
markets which do not exist in accordance with the definition, and consequently the 
EVA is a financial fiction in the logic of efficient markets, and does not satisfy the 
criteria as being a preferable evaluation model under these assumptions. 
EVA, developed by Stern Stewart, is the difference between the firm’s after-tax return 
on capital and its cost of capital. Stewart
13
 (1991) defined EVA as residual return that 
subtracts the cost of invested capital from net operating profit after tax. EVA is equal to 
                                                             
13
 Stewart III, G. B., 1991. The Quest for Value. Harper Business, New York. 
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the economic book value of the capital at the beginning of the year and the difference 
between its return on capital and cost of capital. 
EVA (Economic Value Added) is a model based on a company's accounting. Its 
mechanism is therefore similar to accounting (Weissenrieder, 1997): 
Sales 
- Operating Expenses 
- Tax 
= Operating Profit 
-Financial requirements   
= EVA 
The conclusion here is that the estimation of cost of capital is a great challenge as far as 
EVA calculation for a company is concerned. Thus EVA is an undesirable method for 
computing the cost of capital and we should not use it as a method of valuation. 
Therefore the basic cost of capital computation, i.e. CAPM, has been rejected due to the 
existence of a weak relationship between return and the systematic risk coefficient (β) 
(Fama and French, 1996). But at the same time it does not mean that CVA is the perfect 
method for evaluating the firm. Again EVA has a weak theoretical grounding and, just 
like other accounting numbers, it is all too easy to manipulate.  
Companies adopt EVA because it is easily understood by different levels of employees. 
It can be implemented in the way most accounting systems can, the accounting reality, 
whereas the implementation of CVA is an interactive process between the employee 
active in the financial realities (top management, shareholder’s representatives) and the 
ones active in the business reality (technicians, controllers). Thus, “the implementation 
of CVA might therefore be perceived as being more difficult than implementing EVA 
because it requires more attention from the organization. This attention is however the 
attention necessary (and wanted) in order to reach the level of change in the 
organization towards Shareholder Value” (Weissenrieder, 1997, p. 10). 
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2.4 Summary 
The literature review discussed in this chapter shows that a large number of empirical 
studies have investigated the association that exists between accounting performance 
measures and stock return (Ball and Brown, 1968; Patell and Kaplan, 1977; Dechow 
1994). Such work, from the viewpoint of market efficiency, ‘is useful since if a high 
correlation exists between accounting-based information and market returns, then the 
variable under consideration would provide an accurate indication of the firm’s value, 
and therefore increasing firm value or identifying market under-pricings could be made 
solely on that basis’ (West and Worthington, 2001, p.12).  
Previously, the focus of empirical study has been on traditional accounting measures, 
earnings and accruals, but in subsequent research value added measures have received 
much attention (Beaver and Duck, 1972; Bowen et al., 1986). Furthermore, extra effort 
has been directed toward examining the significance of the components of prime 
performance measures, such as capital charges, accruals adjustment, and accounting 
adjustments (Biddle et al., 1997). 
It is worth noting here that the UK and US studies discussed in this chapter reported 
different results regarding the information and incremental information content of the 
different main performance measures (and their components). These mixed results may 
have several explanations. Garrod et al. (2000) suggested a number of factors: (i) 
differences in the definition of cash flow used in different studies, with different figures 
being used as proxies for cash flows on some occasions; (ii) differences in the 
econometric models used; and (iii) differences in the time periods examined in the 
studies and the effect of contextual factors (e.g. national economic conditions). In other 
words, we may get different results from the same model if we change the target market 
of the study. For instance, Board et al. (1989) used the same model for both UK and US 
data and found conflicting results regarding the value relevance of long-term accruals.  
Responding to the controversies that exist in the field of performance literature and to 
the criticism that Biddle et al. (1997) raised against EVA as the best alternative to the 
traditional and other value added measures this research will uses UK data to introduce 
evidence on the role of traditional accounting, cash flows, and value added measures in 
explaining variations in stock prices. The methodology of this research is stimulated by 
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prior US and UK studies
14
 that provide a theoretical framework and empirical analysis 
of the role of different performance measures, earnings and EVA components in 
explaining annual price changes.  
 
                                                             
14
 This study mainly benefits from the studies of Barth et al., and Biddle et al., who provide evidence of 
the incremental information content for the main accruals and EVA components.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology  
 
3.1    Introduction 
This chapter describes the main features of the research design approach adopted in this 
study. It also provides a summary of the main methodological steps the researcher 
intends to adopt. It presents and discusses the major methodological tools and concepts 
employed as a means to achieve the objectives of the present research. In particular, two 
major aims are worth noting. The first aim is to review the various performance 
measures adopted in the literature. The second aim is to develop and present the main 
hypotheses of this study. 
This research will be based on a cross- sectional design to assess the association 
between a set of performance measures and the annual stock price performance. 
Performance measures will be classified into three categories: traditional accounting 
measures, cash flow measures, and value added measures. These categories include: net 
income (NI); earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA); 
earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI); cash flows from operations (CFO); 
economic value added (EVA); and cash value added (CVA). 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 will discuss the main research 
questions. The development of the main hypotheses of this study and the building of the 
study’s models are discussed in sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Sections 3.3 and 3.3.1 
provide a definition of the variables of the study and the deflator factors. Section 3.4 
sheds light on the characteristics used to select the sample, and finally section 3.5 
summarizes this chapter.  
3.2   Development of Hypotheses 
As far as our objectives are concerned, there are two main approaches to research 
depending upon the objectives that the researcher is seeking to achieve. The following 
are the two approaches used: positivism (quantitative or deductive approach) and the 
phenomenological (qualitative or inductive approach) (Hussey, 1997). 
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Positivism is defined as ‘an epistemological position that advocates the application of 
the nature science to the study of social reality and beyond’ (Bryman, 2007, p.16). On 
the other hand the phenomenological approach focuses on the study of the nature and 
meaning of phenomena (as they appear to us either experimentally or consciously) 
(Finlay, 2008)
.
 
Table (3.1) illustrates the differences between the inductive (phenomenological 
approach) and the deductive approaches (positivism). It shows their distinctive 
characteristics and the circumstances of their employment. 
Table 3.1: Distinctive features of the deductive and inductive approaches 
Deductive approach Inductive approach 
 Moving from theory to data 
 A close understanding of the research 
context 
 The need to explain causal 
relationship between variables 
 A more flexible structure to permit 
changes of research emphasis as the 
research progresses 
 Based on quantitative data  Based on qualitative data 
 Researcher independent of what is 
being researched 
 Concerned with generating theories 
 Concerned with hypothesis testing 
 A realisation that the researcher is part 
of the research 
 Generalises from sample to 
population 
 Uses small samples 
 Uses large samples  Reliability is low but validity is high 
 Reliability is high but validity is 
low 
 
        Source: Saunders, 2007; Kumar, 2005. 
The inductive approach has many appealing features. For example, it offers a more 
flexible structure and does not require large amounts of data. However, it is not suitable 
for the present study for many reasons. First, the present study does not intend to 
generate a theory, a task that the inductive approach is well designed to do. Second, in 
accounting and finance, the data is almost exclusively quantitative and the sample sizes 
are generally large, including huge quantities of company data.  
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Thus, given that this study is based on accounting data, and given that we are primarily 
concerned with testing specific hypotheses and answering specific research questions, 
the deductive approach seems more appropriate. 
Therefore, to ensure conformity with the objectives of the present research the 
quantitative approach will be employed. According to Kumar (2005) each method, tool 
and technique has its unique strengths and weaknesses. In other words, there is an 
expected trade-off between the various methodological choices regarding research 
question setting, hypotheses development, data collection, and data analysis.  
By using the deductive approach, which is based on addressing the research question 
followed by the research hypotheses, Hussey (1997) and Kumar (2005) emphasised the 
important role of hypotheses for ensuring clarity. Hence, I begin by addressing the 
research questions that are consistent with the objectives of the research and stating the 
questions as hypotheses. According to the deductive approach the hypotheses will 
identify the independent variable(s) and the dependent variable (Hussey). 
As will be shown, the dependent variable is the three month closing share price 
following the reporting date; we allow three months for the accounting information to 
be reflected in the stock’s price15, while the independent variables are identified as 
follows: net income (NI), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), earnings before non- recurring items (EBEI), cash flows from operations 
activities (CFO), economic value added (EVA), and cash value added (CVA). 
As was noted in Chapter 2 estimating the appropriate performance measure is the 
concern of the market-based accounting researchers. Some researchers (Moehrle et al., 
2001; Charitou et al., 2001) claim that traditional accounting measures have the ability 
to outperform any other performance measures in explaining variation in stock prices. 
On the other hand, opponents of value based measures (VBM) (Stern and Stewart, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2003) claim that measures that take into 
account the cost of capital when evaluating the performance of companies/managers, 
such as residual income method (RI), economic value added (EVA), and cash value 
added (CVA) are better to explain stock return variances and outperform traditional 
accounting (e.g. earnings, EBITDA, NOPAT) in explaining variation in the stock price. 
                                                             
15 This approach was used by Fama and French (1992). The purpose of this strategy is to avoid look-
ahead bias.  
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Moreover, other empirical studies  claim that value added measures, that take into 
account the cost of capital invested, are better than other performance measures and 
have incremental information content beyond that which exists within traditional 
performance measure cash flows in predicting future cash flows (West and Worth, 
2000;  Anastassis and Kyriazis, 2007).  
Consistent with the objectives of the research and referring to the literature review on 
performance measures as explanatory variables of the variation in annual stock prices, 
and after selecting six performance measures, this research will attempt to address the 
following questions:  
1. Among the three performance measures (traditional measure; 
cash flow measure; and value added measure), which one 
provides the best explanation of variation in stock price 
performance? 
2. Does the decomposition of earnings into cash flows and accruals 
components have incremental information content beyond 
aggregate earnings? 
3. Does the decomposition of EVA into its main components have 
incremental information content beyond aggregate EVA? 
4. Does a given performance measure provide more information 
content beyond that provided by other performance measures? 
5. Does the adoption of EVA as a compensation and management 
tool enhance the overall performance of firms and encourage 
manager to adopt decisions that are supposed to lead to 
shareholders’ wealth maximization. 
 
To provide answers to these questions, four hypotheses are developed in this section. 
These hypotheses will be organized under the following headings: traditional measures 
versus cash flows and value added measures, earnings versus earnings’ components 
(cash flows and disaggregate accruals) and EVA versus EVA’s components. Chapters 5 
and 6 will provide a detailed answer to question 5. 
Before beginning the models’ construction processes, we will start by demonstrating 
how both the price and return models are arrived at. The linear information model 
(LIM) introduced by Ohlson (1995) is the model used to derive the popular type of the 
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value-relevance model. I start by introducing the residual income valuation method 
which has three main assumptions. First, a firm’s value is defined by the dividend 
discount model as the present value of future expected dividends. That is, 
      
 
   
  
    
      
    
   
where    is the price of the firm’s equity at time t,           represents the expected 
value of the dividends that a firm is expected to pay at time     conditional on time t 
information, and r is the discount rate, assumed to be constant. Second, the assumption 
of clean surplus relation (CSR) is: 
                
 
where the firm’s book value at time t is      ,    is period t earnings, and    is the 
dividend paid at time t.  The third assumption is that the firm’s equity grows at a rate 
less than r (Lo and Lys, 1999), that is:     
                               
Combining the dividend discount model with clean surplus relation yields: 
  
         
 
   
   
             
      
       
    
      
   
 
Under the regularity assumption {                            } the last term of 
the equation is equal to zero, the abnormal earning (or residual income) is defined 
as    
              after substitution for abnormal return the Residual income 
valuation model (RIV) will be: 
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To estimate the price evaluation method the RIV model will combine the linear 
information model (LIM) introduced by Ohlson (1995) that suggests the time-series 
behaviour of abnormal earnings is as follows: 
 
    
     
                            
                                           
where    is any information other than abnormal earnings,   is the persistence 
parameter of abnormal earnings and assumed to lie in the range 0 ≤ ω < 1, γ is the 
persistence parameter of other information predicted to lie in the range 0 ≤ γ < 1, and  
       are the error terms. The combination of the RIV and LIM model will generate the 
following valuation model: 
 
           
                                        (OM1)                           
where     
 
     
 and     
   
              
 
 
Replacing    
   with          gives an alternative formula: 
 
                                  (OM2) 
where        and         . 
 
In the literature, equations OM1 and OM2 are known as price level equations and 
theoretically they are considered as the source for many researchers that investigate the 
relation between stock prices, book value of equity, and earnings. These price level 
equations are often translated into a simpler econometric model (Easton 1999, p. 402; 
Easton and Sommers 2000, p.34: Barth and Clinch, 2009, p. 20). 
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However, it is clear that this model is misspecified as the dividend present in the right 
hand side of the equation OM2 is omitted. Consequently even if we assumed that the 
unobserved     is replaced by the error term, the above empirical model is likely to yield 
spurious results. 
Ohlson (1995) used the above price level equation OM2 to derive an equation 
portraying the return as a function of shocks to earnings and other information. He 
provides the theoretical basis for the return model by taking the first difference in 
equation OM2 and dividing both sides of the equation by the beginning-of-period price 
that gives: 
          
   
    
   
    
    
   
     
    
   
    
    
 
where       
            
    
,              , and              . This equation is 
viewed as the theoretical basis for the following return model (Lo and Lys, 1999; Ota, 
2003):     
          
   
    
    
    
    
    
The above model is simply an approximation, with an omitted relevant variable 
(dividends). This model was used, for example, by Biddle et al. (1997) and Bao and 
Bao (1998). 
3.2.1 Traditional Measures versus Cash Flows and Value Added 
Measures 
As indicated in the debate raised by the literature review regarding optimal performance 
measures, there is no consensus as to which of the evaluation models better fits the 
firm’s value (Barton et al., 2010). A number of empirical studies stated that the cash 
flow measures (operating cash flows, cash value added) are better summary measures of 
expected future firm’s performance16 than earnings. This is because stock prices and 
other firm’s performances can be linked to the expected future cash flows but earnings 
could be noisy (e.g. Ali and Pope, 1995; Clubb, 1995). However, the earnings 
                                                             
16 A firm's ability to generate future cash flow affects the value of its securities. 
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proponents suggest that stock prices and other firm’s performance measures are better 
explained by current earnings than current operating cash flows (e.g. Moehrle et al., 
2001; Charitou et al., 2001).  Other studies conclude that a combination of current cash 
flow data and accruals data outperform earnings alone and cash flows alone in 
predicting future cash flows (e.g. Barth et al., 2001). In contrast, Ottosson and 
Wiessenrider (1996) introduce CVA as a new performance measure to replace accruals 
and other cash flow measures. 
The accounting earnings approach has faced severe criticism from many scholars 
because it could easily be manipulated by both accountants and managers (Stern and 
Stewart, 1991).  Moreover, earnings reflect events that happened in the past and it is 
difficult to judge whether its components will be permanent or recur in the future. This 
shortcoming appears to cry out for proposals for new performance measures. Hence, 
researchers and practitioners have proposed new methods to evaluate the management 
performance such as residual income method (RIM)
17
, economic value added (EVA)
18
 
and operating income (OP) to interpret the stock price. Similarly, the residual and value 
added methods have met with much debate from traditional method supporters. The 
traditionalists claim that the cash flows and value added methods suffer from matching 
and timing problems. One of the main aims of this thesis is to investigate the association 
between the most important performance measures (discussed in chapter two) and the 
annual stock price performance. 
We will also discuss  cash value added (CVA) as a value added performance measure 
and will carry out a test to assess whether  CVA has any association with annual stock 
prices and whether it has any incremental information content beyond the other criteria 
used to measure firms’ and managers’ performance.  
As is well known, performance measurement is not always an easy task. The efficient 
market hypothesis states that markets are unpredictable and that current prices fully 
reflect all available information. A straightforward consequence of this is that 
(historical) accounting measures have no added informational value. Another argument 
is that prices are forward looking, in the sense that prices reflect what investors expect 
to earn from their investments in the future. Thus, insofar as accounting information 
cannot predict the future accounting or economic performance of a firm, all accounting 
                                                             
17 RIM involves discounting estimated future residual income over the entire life of the firm. 
18 EVA is the difference between the firm’s after-tax return on capital and its cost of capital. 
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measures are likely to miss unobservable factors that are essential for predicting future 
firm performance. Finally, as we have seen earlier, scholars are divided as to whether a 
single accounting measure beats other measures in explaining stock prices. In summary, 
the current wisdom is that it is unlikely to find a single accounting measure that 
outperforms all alternative measures.  
Based on the above, the following null hypotheses are proposed: 
H
01
: There is no significant statistical relationship between each of the 
following three classes of accounting measures (traditional 
accounting performance measures, cash flow measures and value 
added measures) and annual stock prices. 
H
02
: Value added measures and cash flow measures provide no 
incremental information content other than that already contained in 
traditional accounting measures.  
In order to test for the information content hypothesis, a simple OLS regression model 
is used to examine the validity and the relevance of different performance measures. 
These measures are divided into three groups, namely traditional accounting measures, 
cash flow measures, measures and value added measures. 
The price model and the return model are considered the most pervasive valuation 
models (Barth et al., 2001). Theoretically, both price and return models are 
economically equivalent since they are derived from the same source, which is the 
Ohlson linear information model (Ota, 2001).  
Researchers in accounting must often choose between return models in which returns 
are regressed on a scaled earnings variable, namely earnings and earnings changes, and 
price models, in which stock prices are regressed on earnings per share and book value. 
The inherent problem in the price models is often referred to as ‘scale effects,19 and 
those in the return models are termed ‘accounting recognition lag,20 and ‘transitory 
                                                             
19 A scale effect is a spurious relation in the price model regression that can be used by failing to control 
scale that presumably exists among firms. 
20 Value- relevant events observed by the market in the current period and reflected in the current returns 
may not be recorded in the current earnings because of the accounting principles such as conservatism, 
objectivity, and reliability.     
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earnings
21
 (Ota, 2003). However, we recognize that there is a trade-off. Returns are 
stationary and are more likely to give less problematic estimations. The problem with 
returns, however, is that they may not be economically meaningful. Returns are payoffs 
to one unit of wealth and we therefore cannot differentiate between highly priced stock 
and low priced stock.   
Following on from this last point, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) claim that ‘while 
return and price models are economically equivalent (…) return models are 
econometrically less problematic. Estimates of earnings response coefficients are more 
biased when the return model is used as against the price and differenced–price models’ 
(p.2). Moreover, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) claim that even though a return model 
is preferred in general, the price models are ‘better specified in that the estimated slope 
coefficients from price models, but not return models, are unbiased’ (p.1). Furthermore, 
their results state that even the price model suffers more from econometric problems 
than return models; the price models' earnings’ response coefficients are less biased. Ota 
(2001) stated that although returns studies and levels studies are not econometrically 
equivalent they are economically equivalent since they are derived from the same 
source, which is the Ohlson (1995) linear information model. Furthermore, Rees (1999) 
explains in his paper that there are some difficulties that can be expected in the return 
model and these problems can be avoided by using the price models. 
Previous studies have used mainly annual returns as a dependent variable (e.g. Biddle et 
al., 1997: Barth et al., 2001; West and Worthington, 2000; Ismail, 2006). This research 
will fill this gap and contribute to the debate by adopting both price and return models 
in which price and return will be used as a dependent variable in the multivariate 
regression model to examine the relevancy of investigated performance measures.  
3.2.1.1 The Information Content Model 
Following the descriptive analysis of previous literature this research progresses to the 
next step which is the building of econometric models that will be used to test the 
hypothesis of the current study. This is based on Biddle’s et al. (1997) model that 
examines the association between selected performance measures and annual stock 
returns.  
                                                             
21 Earnings contain transitory components such as special and extraordinary items. 
75 
 
Using a sample of 219 firms over the period 1984-1993, Biddle et al. (1997) test 
whether EVA and residual income (RI) outperform earnings and operating cash flows in 
explaining annual stock returns. They also try to test whether the components unique to 
EVA and/or RI help explain contemporaneous stock returns beyond that explained by 
operating cash flow (CFO) and earnings. 
In order to test for the information content of the suggested performance measures, 
Biddle et al. (1997) use the slope coefficient approach to examine the statistical 
significance of their study variables in the following OLS regression: 
         
    
      
         (3.1) 
where    is the abnormal or unexpected returns for the time period t,    and     are the 
intercept and the slope coefficient of the regression model respectively,             
is the independent variable which represents the unexpected realization for a given 
performance metric x (e.g., CFO, EBEI, RI or EVA), all the independent variables are 
scaled by the market value of the firms’ equity at the beginning of the period; and    is 
the error term. 
Biddle et al. extended their original model 1 by introducing the one-lag version (lagged 
measure of accounting performance) for explanatory variables, which is considered ‘a 
more convenient form that allows the slope coefficient    to be  observed directly rather 
than being derived from separate coefficients on levels and change models’ (Biddle et 
al., 1997, p.9).  
         
    
      
    
      
      
                   (3.2) 
Biddle et al. use    to assess the relative information content. They build six pairwise 
comparisons among the accounting performance measure and the test is constructed as a 
comparison of     of these pairwised sets.    
The findings of Biddle et al. (1997) reveal that all the variables (EVA, RI, CFO, and 
EBIT) are significant (in explaining returns) at conventional levels and both EBIT and 
RI have the higher adjusted    among other explanatory independent variables and 
outperformed EVA in explaining variation in stock return. Thus, this study does not 
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support the Stern and Stewart (1991) claim that EVA has greater information content 
than earnings.  
Along  the same lines, in a study based on a sample of 110 Australian companies over 
the period  1992 to 1998, West and Worthington (2000) examined the association of 
EVA, earnings, net cash flows, and residual income with annual stock return and 
extended their research to test whether EVA has incremental information content and 
outperformed conventional accounting-based measures. They adopt the same 
methodology as Biddle et al. (1997) and examine the linkage between the competing 
different measures of firm performance. However, unlike previous empirical research 
they use the pooled time series and cross-sectional least squares regression to conduct 
their research. They introduce the following model to test for the relative and 
incremental information content of the competing measures: 
                                                       (3.3) 
where       the dependent variable, is the three months compound annual stock 
returns following the fiscal year end. The three months following the firm’s fiscal year 
end is chosen to allow time for information contained in the annual report to be 
impounded in market prices,    is the intercept,       is the economic value added, 
       is earning before non-recurring items,       is operating cash flows,      is 
residual income, and     is the error term. All the variables included in this model are 
expressed per share.    
The findings of West and Worthington (2000) indicate that, as with Biddle’s et al study, 
all the performance measures have a significant association with the adjusted annual 
stock return variation. It also indicates that EVA has the lowest association with the 
variation in the adjusted stock return whereas EBEI outperforms the rest of the 
accounting measures in explaining the variation. 
Mashaykhi (2009) in an analysis of 408 Iranian companies’ data for the period  1998 to 
2003 investigated the relevance and the incremental information content of cash value 
added (CVA) and value added (VA) beyond that already existing on earnings (E) and 
cash flow from operating (OPC). She used the OLS regression to test her study’s 
hypothesis. 
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In the literature, value added is defined as the activities that are performed by the 
company and its employees to create value and increase the wealth of the entity 
shareholders. Thus, the value added is equal to sales less the cost of bought goods and 
services (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1993). Accordingly this definition leads to two methods to 
calculate the value added (VA): the descriptive (subtractive) and additive method: 
The Descriptive Method:           VA = S – M      
The Additive Method:               VA = W +I+ DP+ DD+ T+ RE  
where S represents sales revenue; M, materials and services purchased from outside the 
firm; W, wages; I, interest; DP, depreciation; DD, dividends; T is tax expense and RE, 
retained earnings. 
The above two methods illustrate that accrual items are included in the calculation of 
value added. Hence, the new accounting concept introduced is called cash value added 
(CVA) which represents the value added that was received or paid in cash.  
CVA is computed by the same method used for the computation of value added: 
The Subtractive Method:           CVA = CS – CM 
The Additive Method:               CVA = WP +IP+ DDP+ TP+ OCF 
where CS represents cash sales; CM, cash payment against material and service; WP, 
wages paid; IP, interest paid; DDP, dividends paid; TP, tax payments; and OCF, 
operating cash flow.  
Biddle et al. (1995) state that there are two types of information contained in accounting 
numbers: the incremental information content and the relative information content. The 
relative information content describes the degree to which a specific measure has 
greater information content than other measures and applies when intending to choose 
among alternatives or when ranking by information content is required. Whereas the 
incremental criterion asks whether a specific measure has more information content 
than that already existing in other measures and applies when intending to assess 
measures with regard to other measure incremental information content. This research 
will apply the same methodology to test whether any of the investigated performance 
measures has more information content than already exists in other performance 
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measures. In other words the incremental and relative information content of X, Y (any 
two performance measures) can be depicted by: 
Relative information content:  
Information content of X       Information content of Y   
Incremental information content: 
Information content of X, Y ≥ Information content of X 
Information content of   ,     ≥ Information content of Y 
where X and Y refer to any paired performance measures of the set introduced by me, 
that is: net income (NI), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), earnings before non-recurring items (EBEI), cash flows from operations 
activities (CFO), economic value added (EVA), and cash value added (CVA). 
Hejazi and Maleki (2007) used the cash value added (CVA) concept as it was defined 
by the Boston Consulting Group where they considered CVA as an adjustment of cash 
flow return on investment (CFROI), and in order to generate value, companies should 
increase Cash Flow Return on Investment and grow the Gross Investment base. Hence, 
the following method will be used to calculate CVA: 
                                  
where CVA is cash value added. CFROI = (Gross Cash Flow- Economic Depreciation)/ 
Gross Investment. WACC is the weighted cost of capital. Gross Investment = Net 
Current Assets + Historical initial cost. 
Finally, owing to the scarcity of information available regarding CVA in Tehran’s stock 
market (TSM), CVA added will be calculated according to: 
                                      
After running the above regression (Hejazi and Maleki, 2007) concluded that both CVA 
and P/E have a positive and significant relation to annual stock return at the 0.05 level 
of significance. The significance relation also holds when the two variables are paired 
together within one regression model. The findings of this research reveal that CVA is 
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better at explaining changes in stock returns than P/E, and it indicates that CVA has the 
higher incremental information content. For the purposes of the current research CVA is 
defined as: 
             
where CVA is cash value added, OCF is the cash flows from operations, and OCFD is 
operating cash flow demand  equal to dividends and interest. 
Similarly, Mashaykhi (2009) adopts the aforementioned distinction between relative 
and incremental information content and used a linear valuation model in expressing the 
relationship between change in price and earnings (E), operating cash flow (OCF), cash 
value added (CVA) and value added (VA) where she introduced the following models: 
               
    
   
                          (3.4) 
where    is the return adjusted for cash dividends, stock dividends, and new stock 
offerings  (the adjusted market return), the coefficient of determination,      is the 
change in independent variables (e.g., E, OCF, CVA , and VA),     (  VA,   CVA, 
  E, and   OCF) is the technique used by Mashaykhi to test for the relative and 
incremental information content of her study variables. The tool she used to rank the 
investigated performance measures in regard to their relative information content is the 
adjusted-   . Thus, the higher the adjusted-    is the higher the information content. 
For the incremental information content purpose, the rule is that if the inclusion of a 
new performance measure increases the old     then the performance measure is said to 
have more (incremental) information content beyond that already existing in the old 
one. However, it should be pointed out here that it is well known that adding more 
explanatory variables always results in an increase in   . Therefore, a more appropriate 
measure would be the adjusted     which takes into account the number of additional 
regressors. 
Finally, Mashaykhi (2009) concludes that there is a significant relationship between 
value added and annual stock returns where the cross–sectional regression shows 
unstable coefficient overtime. For the cash value added the result shows an insignificant 
relationship between cash value added (CVA) and annual stock returns on both pooled 
and cross–sectional data. Moreover, the explanatory power is quite low. 
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In the same vein, Ismail (2006) uses panel data regressions in order to investigate 
whether the EVA is superior to other performance measures in explaining variation in 
stock returns. Unlike the previous study (restricted to US data) the UK data over the 
period 1990 to 1997 were used to conduct this research (Ismail, 2006). However, unlike 
Biddle et al. (1997) Ismail used both the fixed effects model (FEM)
22
 and the changes 
model (in which the lagged variable of performance measure is included) to conduct his 
research. In testing performance measures the interest is generally on the cross sectional 
behavior rather than the time series behavior. In other word, the current research is 
interested in why a firm is ‘on average’ better than another in terms of a given 
performance measure. Thus the following regression models were used to test for the 
information content of EVA and the various performance measures:    
              
   
      
        ….. The fixed effects model  (3.5) 
             
         
      
                                (3.6) 
The findings of Ismail (2006) are consistent with Biddle et al. in that the net operating 
profit after tax (NOPAT) and net income (NI) outperform both EVA and RI in 
explaining variation in stock returns. Moreover, the first difference regression model 
(the independent variable      
          
      
 ) results confirmed that EVA does not 
outperform earnings. 
However, one common feature of the aforementioned evaluating models is that they 
only consider the valuation components of Ohlson’s model and ignore the most 
important variable namely the book value. Ohlson simply suggested that the book value 
(BV) reflects the available value- relevant information of equity. Consequently we 
extend the work of Biddle by adding the book value as an explanatory variable to our 
valuation model that is: 
                                    (3.7) 
where      is the market value of company i in t time,     is any performance measure 
and      is the error term and all the variables deflated the initial period share price. The 
market value is simply defined as the amount we obtained from multiplying the 
                                                             
22 The fixed effects model allows the intercept to vary across firms (but not across time), 
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outstanding share by the market closing price, hence when deflating the variables by the 
initial share price the dependent variable, the market value, will equal the price (P). 
Regarding the information content hypothesis (   ) and based on the methodology 
adopted by Biddle et al. (1997), West and Worthington (2000) and Ismail (2006) the 
following regression model will be used to assess the information content of the 
explanatory variables of the current study: 
                                       (Model 1) 
The assessment is executed by conducting six separate regressions for each performance 
measure, where      represents the book value,     represents any accounting 
performance measure (NI, EBITDA, EBEI, CFO, EVA, and CVA), t is the time period, 
   is the coefficient of the performance metric,     is the three month closing share price 
following the reporting date,  (NI) is net income, (EBITDA) is earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization, (EBEI) is earnings before non-recurring items, 
(CFO) is cash flow from operating,      is the beginning period market price, (EVA) is 
economic value added, (CVA) is cash value added, and    is the error term. All 
variables are deflated by the number of outstanding ordinary shares at the end of period 
(t).   
3.2.1.2 The Incremental Information Content Model 
The incremental information content which exists between competing measures of 
firms’ performances, has received a great deal of attention in the literature (Wilson, 
1986; Ball and Brown, 1987; Board and Day, 1989; Ali, 1994; Biddle et al., 1995). 
Biddle et al. (1997) replicated the methodology used by Bowen et al. (1987) to assess 
the incremental information by examining the statistical significance of regression slope 
coefficients. 
To conduct their test, Biddle et al. adopted the one lagged regression model that 
generalizes to any two selected accounting performance measures X and Y that is: 
         
  
      
    
    
      
    
  
      
    
    
      
         (3.7) 
where    is the dependent variable which represents any measure of returns such as 
abnormal returns,   ,    and     ,      are any two performance metrics and their one 
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year lag value respectively,    is the constant and   , …    are the regression 
coefficients and    is the error term. All variables are deflated by the beginning year 
market value      .  
The incremental information content of different performance measures is assessed by 
examining the statistical significance of the regression equation generalized to any two 
pairwise accountings measures, where F- test and a comparison between    of the joint 
measures and the    of the single measure will be the indicator of any incremental 
information content. Thus, the regression model that applied in the current study to test 
for the incremental information content is: 
                                                              (Model 2) 
where      represent the book value,      is the beginning period market price,    and 
   represent a pairwise combination from the set of performance measures: NI, 
EBITDA, EBEI, CFO, RI, EVA, and CVA. Rejection of the null that      is taken as 
evidence in favour of the incremental information content of Y relative to X. 
3.2.2 Earnings versus Earnings’ Components  
Earnings as a performance measure are a better exponent of variation in annual stock 
price performances than cash flow measures. The main difference between cash flows 
and accrual earnings is the accrual adjustments can be seen numerically (Dechow, 
1994): 
Accrual earnings = Cash flows + Accrual adjustments. 
Thus any difference between cash flows and earnings is due to accruals, which is 
exposed to management manipulation. Management’s discretion makes accruals 
unreliable and not a perfect predictor of a firm’s performance. On the other hand, the 
accrual process is necessary to comply with revenue recognition and matching 
principles. The former requires companies to recognize the revenue when it has 
performed all, or a substantial part of it, whether received or not (Dechow et al., 1995). 
The matching principle requires firms to report all the expenses associated with 
revenues in the same period whether paid or not. Hence, the accrual process is a trade-
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off between reliability and relevance (Dechow, 1994, 1989; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). 
Cash flow measures avoid management manipulation but at the same time suffer from 
matching and timing problems. However, other accounting conventions have restricted 
management manipulation such as objectivity, verifiability and the use of historical cost 
(Dechow, 1994; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, earnings suffer less from 
management manipulation while cash flows still suffer from its inherent matching and 
timing problems.  
As shown in Chapter 2, there is no agreement on the performance of various accounting 
measures.  While some studies show that earnings are the best predictor for future cash 
flows (Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1998; Borad and Day, 1989; Ali and Pope, 1995; 
Clubb, 1995), others provide evidence on the incremental information content for cash 
flows (Bowen et al., 1986 and 1987; Barth et al., 2001). 
Following Dechow (1994), Charitou and Clubb (1999) used UK data over the period 
1985 to 1992 to examine the relationship between security returns, cash flows and 
earnings. They assessed this relation using different intervals: one year, two years and 
four years. They developed Dechow’s method by examining the incremental 
information content of accounting earnings and cash flow measures. In addition, they 
added new variables in their study. Using univariate models, they examined the 
information content for earnings, operating cash flows, change in cash, and equity cash 
earnings. Their results show that earnings had the highest propensity to explain the 
variation in stock return. They also found that the operating cash flows and change in 
cash had information content in explaining the variation in stock returns while the 
equity cash earnings revealed a weak relation with stock returns. Moreover, their results 
indicate that the adjusted    increased as they extended the measurement interval which 
is consistent with Dechow (1994). 
Dechow et al. (1998) stated that ‘Since the difference between earnings and cash flows 
is accruals, earnings’ forecasting power beyond cash flows is attributable to accruals’ 
(p. 152). Mcleay et al. (1997) analysed UK data and reported that the components of 
accruals, namely the short and long term, have incremental information content beyond 
that already existing in aggregate earnings. Therefore, the decomposition of earnings 
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into aggregate accruals and cash flows will unmask the information content in aggregate 
accruals. This can be expressed in the following hypothesis: 
   : Earnings components have no statistically significant effect 
on annual stock price performance. 
This hypothesis is tested by looking at the restriction:                 
      in model 3 below where earnings are equal to cash flows plus accruals (Barth et 
al., 2001): 
  Earnings = CF+ Accrual 
                                       = CF + ∆AR + ∆INV- ∆AP- DEP-AMORT + OTHER 
Biddle et al. (1997) in a study of the usefulness of EVA in the US context suggest that 
“an avenue for future research suggested by the findings of this study is to examine 
more closely which components of EVA and earnings contribute to, or subtract from, 
information content” (p. 333). In addition Barth et al. (200l) state that earnings can be 
disaggregated into the following major components: change in accounts receivable 
(∆AR), change in accounts payable (∆AP), change in inventory (∆INV), depreciation 
(DEP), amortization (AMORT) and other accruals (OTHER). This study will adopt the 
following regression model that examines the information content of earnings 
components: 
                                                  
                              
                                          
where      is the book value at the beginning of the operating year, CF is the cash flow 
and other accruals = Earnings – (CF+ ∆AR + ∆INV- ∆AP- DEP-AMORT). This 
decomposition is an attractive feature of earnings to reveal the source of changes in 
stock return. 
3.2.3 EVA versus EVA’s Components 
As far as EVA versus EVA’s components are concerned, Biddle et al. (1997) extend 
their research to investigate whether the economic value added (EVA) outperforms, and 
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has incremental information content beyond that of accrual earnings. They also extend 
their investigation to test whether any of EVA’s components has a higher association 
with stock return and a firm’s value.  
To address this incremental information content issue, Biddle et al. decompose EVA 
into its main components and evaluate the contribution of each component toward 
explaining variation in stock returns. They begin their test by describing the linkage 
between the main variables of their study: cash flow from operations (CFO), earning 
before non-recurring items (EBEI), residual income (RI), and economic value added 
(EVA). They then decompose EVA into its main components. The following diagram 
depicts this relation. 
 Figure 3.1: Components of Economic value added (EVA) 
EVA = CFO   +  Accrual   +                 +         
  
 
        
  Earnings (EBEI)       
            
  Operating profit (NOPAT)     
            
  Residual income (RI)   
            
  Economic value added (EVA) 
Source: Biddle et al. (1997) 
As far as the incremental information is concerned, the results of Biddle et al. (1997) 
show that the F-statistics suggest that CFO and Accrual far and away make the largest 
incremental contributions to explaining market-adjusted returns, while after tax interest 
(ATI), capital charge (CapChg) and Accounting adjustment (AcctAdj) exhibit much 
smaller incremental contributions. The accounting adjustments (AcctAdj) refer to the 
adjustment suggest to NOPAT and IC (invested capital) by Stern & Stewart in order to 
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calculate the EVA. The main and common introduced adjustments are: the effects of 
research and development expenses capitalisation, the effects of LIFO reserves, the 
deferred taxes, the provision effects and the good will amortization (Young, 1999). 
When combined with the relative information content findings, Biddle et al. suggest 
that while EVA components offer some incremental information content beyond 
earnings components, their contributions to the information content of EVA are not 
sufficient for EVA to provide greater relative information content than earnings. 
Building on the above, the following hypothesis is developed to test whether any of 
EVA’s components contribute significantly to the association between EVA and stock 
price performance. 
   : EVA components have no statistically significant effect on 
stock price performance.  
This hypothesis is tested by looking at the restriction:                
     in ‘model 4’ bellow where EVA is: 
                                     
The incremental information content comparisons assess whether one measure provides 
value-relevant data beyond that provided by another measure and whether they apply 
when assessing the information content of a supplemental disclosure or the information 
of a component measure (Bowen et al., 1987). 
In their response to Stewart’s (1991) claim that EVA is the best performance measure 
regarding its ability to capture the true economic profit of a firm and following  the 
recommendation of Biddle et al. (1997), West and Worthington examined which of the 
components of EVA and earnings were more likely to contribute to, or subtract from, 
the information content.   
The second phase of West and Worthington’s study (the first phase was discussed in 
Section 3.1.1.1) was to examine the components of EVA. Their results convey that all 
the variables are significant where operating accruals (ACC) have greater explanatory 
power among other variables. Further, the component in EVA that explains most 
variation in stock returns is accrual. West and Worthington use the following model to 
test for the incremental content between EVA’s components:  
                                                         (3.8) 
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where      is the compound annual return, CC is the cost of capital (Invested capital 
at time t-1 (IC) × the firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), ATI is the 
interest after tax, ACC is the operating accruals (EBEI- NCF), ADJ is the accounting 
adjustments and NCF is the net cash flows. For the incremental information content the 
results show that the most logical pairing of information variables in explaining market 
return is composed of EBEI and EVA. 
To test for the incremental information content of EVA components and to evaluate 
which components of EVA, if any, contribute to the association between EVA and stock 
price performance, the Biddle et al. model is replicated. Biddle et al. (1997) 
decomposed EVA into four major components: cash flows from operations (CFO), after 
tax interest (ATI), operating accruals (ACC), capital charge (CC), and accounting 
adjustments (       ). Hence, the regression model is: 
                                                                 
(Model 4)                                                                                              
Unlike Biddle et al. (1997) the current study will use a panel data fixed effects model to 
examine the association between EVA’s components and the stock price performance.  
Various papers have analyzed the conceptual advantages and disadvantages of price and 
return models. Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) claim that return models theoretically 
outperform price models in the absence of well-developed theories of valuation. Lev 
and Ohlson (1982) consider the two methods as complementary, whereas Landsman 
and Magliolo (1988) argue that for specific applications price models are superior to 
return models. Christie (1987) concludes that while return and price models are 
economically the same, return models are econometrically less problematic.  
Despite the criticism the price models have faced, they persist. The empirical result of 
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) confirm that the price models’ earnings’ response 
coefficients are less biased. However, return models have less serious econometric 
difficulties than price models. In some research contexts the combined use of both price 
and return models may be useful and seem to be the best models to follow. In terms of 
the results and methods used by Christie (1987), Kothari and Zimmerman, and Ota 
(2003), the data from the UK stock market is used to compare the results obtained from 
adopting price and return models as a tool to examine the information and incremental 
information content of a set of different performance measures. The return models are: 
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         (Model 5) 
        
  
      
   
  
      
               (Model 6) 
where    is the stock return,    ,    are any two performance measures, and all the 
independent variables are deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year            
3.3    Hypothesis testing 
The comparison between the ability of the four models in explaining the variation in 
annual stock price and stock return is the basic approach to test the hypotheses of the 
study. The models’ goodness of fit is considered the main criterion to distinguish 
between any differences in explaining variation in annual stock prices. The increase in 
adjusted    is implied that the added variables have information content and vice versa. 
In addition, the significance of the variables’ coefficient is taken into consideration to 
formulate a judgment on variables’ usefulness.   
3.4    Variable Measurement and Definition 
In order to examine the ability of a set of performance measures in explaining changes 
in stock price (return) performances, the variables used in the models of this research 
are extracted from income statements and cash flow statements. These variables are 
taken from the financial database, DataStream, FAME, and OSIRIS.   
The dependent variable in all the models in this study is P, which is the three-month 
share closing price following the reporting day. The annual return and abnormal return 
have been extensively used to study the information content of different performance 
measures (Biddle et al., 1997; West and Worthington, 2000; Ismail, 2006). In response 
to the claims raised by Rees (1999), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) and Christie 
(1987) regarding the potential limitations of the return model, this research tries to 
contribute to the existing UK literature by adopting the price model and the return 
model to test for the information content and incremental information content of 
performance measures.  
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The explanatory variable (  ) is the realization of certain performance measures over 
the same period t, these independent variables are defined as follows
23
:  
 NI or E: net income or earnings available to ordinary shareholders (WC01751). 
 EBITDA: earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization 
(WC18198). 
 EBEI: earnings before extraordinary items (WC01551). 
 CFO: net cash provided by operating activities (WC04860). 
 EBIT: earnings before interest and tax (WC18191). 
 EVA: economic value added calculated as: 
         –        × WACC (the firm’s cost of capital) 
 CVA: cash value added is calculated as: CFO – OCFD (operating cash flows 
demand - dividends and interest (WC01251)). 
 ∆AP: the annual change in annual accounts payable that shows the increase and 
decrease in creditors during the year (WC03040). 
 ∆INV: the annual change in inventories (WC02101). 
 ∆AR: the annual change in accounts receivable (WC02051). 
 DEP: annual depreciation on tangible assets (WC01148). 
 OTHER: represents other accruals. It is defined as follows: 
NI– (OCF+∆AR+∆INV-∆AP-DEP) 
 Accrual: operating accruals defined as: EBEI – CFO 
 ATI: the interest after tax computed as: interest expense (WC01251) × (1- Tax 
rate) (WC08346). 
 CC: is calculated as:      (invested capital) × WACC  
 IC: invested capital (capital employed) which is equal to the sum of the common 
shareholders’ equity (WC03501) and long-term debt (WC03251).  
 NOPAT: is the net operating profit after tax calculated as net operating profit 
(WC01250) × (1-Tax rate). 
In order to calculate the economic value added (EVA), the cost of equity (  ), the cost of 
debt (  ) and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) should be estimated first. 
The cost of equity is calculated using the capital pricing model (CAPM) where the cost 
of equity is equal to: 
                                                             
23 Code between brackets represent the variables mnemonic ID used by DataStream database to trace 
variables among different time horizons.  
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Where    refers to the rate of the return expected by the shareholder,    is the rate of 
return for risk- free security,   24 represents risk of individual security and        is 
the market premium. The weighted average of the cost of capital is then calculated by 
adopting the following formula: 
WACC = ( E/V ×   ) + (D/V ×   )× (1-   )  
 
where E is equity, V is market value,     is cost of equity, D is debt,    is the cost of debt 
which is calculated by dividing the interest and expenses the company incurred to 
obtain loans by the total debt and    is the tax rate. 
For the purpose of the current research and to conduct the empirical analysis employed 
here, earnings are defined as net income- the net income that is available to the common 
shareholder. Specifically, this includes extraordinary items and income from 
discontinued operations. This definition is inconsistent with the definition employed in 
most US studies (e. g. Barth, et al., 2001). The question which may create some concern 
is whether or not the general findings of such studies are unduly sensitive to earnings 
definitions?  
Dechow (1994) studied this issue and investigated the impact of one-off changes on the 
relationship between earnings changes and stock returns. She found that the inclusion of 
such one-off changes reduces the association, and therefore it makes sense for 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations to be excluded from any earnings 
definition employed here. However, it should also be noted that while Dechow finds 
that variations in earnings definitions may have some impact on the strength of the 
association it does not affect the direction (i.e. the sign) of the relationship. Hence, 
positive associations are reported across all test periods. 
In a similar vein, the UK study by Charitou, et al. (2001) examines the issue of the 
earnings definition with regard to its association with stock returns. They defined 
earnings as net income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and special 
and non-operating items. Their main analysis employs a measure of operating earnings 
from the Global Vantage database. However, they go on to note that “This earnings 
                                                             
24 I used the 60 days stock price method to calculate the missing companies’ Betas. 
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variable differs slightly from that used by ... [US researcher]. We re-ran several 
regressions using an earnings before extraordinary items variable broadly comparable to 
that used by ... [US researcher] and found no qualitative differences in our results” (p. 
590). 
In conclusion, Dechow (1994) and Charitou, et al. (2001) contend that minor 
differences in earnings definitions do not materially affect the direction of associations 
or the overall conclusions drawn from such studies. 
3.4.1 Controlling Variables 
It is useful to deflate some (or all) of the explanatory variables in the levels and returns 
model by a measure of size such as outstanding shares, sales, market or book value 
(Biddle et al.,1997; Dechow, 1999; Ismail, 2006). The stated objective of such deflation 
typically is to control for size in the error term.    
Most econometric issues are those raised as a result of dependencies between the 
residuals (the error ε) in a regression equation and the included explanatory variables 
since they lead to biased and inconsistent estimators. Other difficulties such as 
Heteroscedasticity are efficiency issues. In this regard, problems related to the choice of 
deflator represent obvious evidence of unresolved econometrics problems in both levels 
(valuation) and return studies.   
The correct deflator in the return model is the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the period. The advantages of solving the deflator problem in the return study are that 
the mismeasurement of expectations and the interpretation problems associated with 
different deflators are eliminated (Christie, 1987). Christie (1987, p. 233) stated that 
“there is no natural deflator in level models, but deflation by anything other than a 
function of independent variables can generate specification errors’’. 
Following prior research, all the independent variables of the current study are deflated 
by the number of outstanding shares at the end of the operating year when share price is 
the dependent variable (Garrod et al., 2000) and deflated by the market values at the 
beginning of the period when the return model is adopted (Christie, 1987). The numbers 
of outstanding ordinary shares are obtained from the balance sheet statement as 
presented in the DataStream database.  
92 
 
3.5    Sample selection 
The study sample consists of all non-financial UK companies listed on the London 
stock exchange (LSE) with available data for the period 1991-2011 (see Appendix No, 
1). The exclusion of financial companies is due to the variation between the components 
of financial statements between financial and industrial firms. This exclusion is in line 
with all prior market-based-research studies. Rees (1997) claims that this is 
conventional as the relationship between accounting numbers and value is thought to be 
very different for financial entities compared to industrial and other financial firms.  The 
data is not restricted to any firm size or fiscal year end date. Restricting the sample to 
the December year end makes the sample biased towards larger firms (Strong and 
Walker, 1993).   
The empirical analysis of the current research uses both accounting and financial market 
information. I collect data from three sources. First, I use the firms’ annual report where 
the financial statement is prepared and issued according to the international accounting 
standards (IAS). Thus, using the financial statement and the random selection of firms 
will fulfil and enhance the reliability and validity criteria of our sample. Second, the 
DataStream financial database is used to collect annual accounting information on this 
research variable. Third, I have used the London Share Price Database (LSPD) to 
collect data on monthly share prices and returns. Inclusion of entities in the sample 
required satisfying underlying criteria. First, the annual accounting should be available 
in the DataStream database for the selected period. Second, stock prices and returns 
have to be available in LSPD. Finally, firms should have a positive book value (BV). 
The exclusion of firms with negative a book value is due to the fact that firms with 
negative BV have different approaches for valuation than those with a positive BV. 
Overall, the negative BV will affect the value of the coefficient in the model used, thus, 
the results will be biased in those firms. A third point could be that a negative BV 
means that the firm is in distress, thus, the results will be affected by distress risk.  
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3.6    Summary 
This chapter has described the research design and the methodology used to achieve the 
research objectives. It has outlined the research design starting with performance 
measurement practices in terms of classification, implementing the value-based model, 
and how to measure the performance. There is a discussion of the research design of the 
explanatory variables in terms of the research questions and how to define and measure 
these measures. 
The chapter has formulated the research hypotheses and the theoretical framework of 
the research developed according to the literature and the research objectives. The 
purpose of this research is to examine traditional and recently developed performance 
measures and to compare these measures with the market’s assessment of market 
performance, general talk, the stock’s price and return.  
The main research instruments have been discussed, including their conceptual 
advantages and disadvantages and two main valuation methods were used in this 
research to test UK data, namely, the price and return models. The price methods in 
which equity’s price are regressed against a set of performance measures. In terms of 
the return model, the different performance measures are regressed against stock return. 
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Chapter 4 
The Value Relevance of Performance Measures 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to report on the main body of results for the study. The 
value relevance and incremental information content of performance measures will be 
evaluated by assessing their ability to explain the variation in stocks performances. 
Because of the superiority of net income (NI) among the traditional measures and the 
heated debate around economic value added (EVA) this study will also examine the 
relative explanatory power of both the EVA and NI components. Previous chapters 
highlighted the theoretical background and provided the hypothesis for the current 
research. This chapter will empirically test the hypothesis that was earlier developed in 
chapter 3 on methodology. 
The results I obtained show evidence that in the case of the UK the traditional 
performance measures dominate and outperform value added measures. Similarly, cash 
flows from operations (CFO), amortisation (AMORT), depreciation (DEP), changes in 
accounts receivable (∆AR), changes in account payables (∆AP), changes in inventory 
(∆Inv) and the other accruals (OTHER), the components of NI have provided more 
information than NI alone. In addition to the results showing that net cash flows from 
operations activity (CFO), accruals (ACCR), after tax interest (ATINT) and the capital 
charge (CAPCHG), the EVA components contained more information than the EVA 
itself. 
The current chapter is divided into six main sections organised as follows: Section 4.2 
describes the statistics. Section 4.3 provides empirical evidence on the relative 
information content of performance measures. Section 4.4 provides evidence on the 
incremental information content of performance measures and subsections 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2 provide the results for the incremental information of NI and EVA components 
respectively. Section 4.5 provides the empirical results of the return model. Finally, the 
last section summarises the chapter.  
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4.2    Descriptive Statistics 
In order to mitigate Heteroscedasticity and induce stationarity in the data, all 
independent variables are deflated by the outstanding share price at the beginning of 
each accounting period. Descriptive statistics of these deflated variables are provided in 
Table 4.2.1. Earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) and NI have the lowest 
standard deviation among the seven performance measures. This is partially consistent 
with Biddle et al. (1997) who claim that the lowest standard deviation of EBEI is 
inconsistent with the “smoothing effects of accruals” (p.313). Market value (MV) and 
book value (BV) have the highest standard deviation and mean (4.75 and 2.76 
respectively). BV has the largest mean among the independent variables followed by 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT). CFO has a higher mean and standard deviation than NI. 
This is consistent with Dechow et al. (1998). The last two columns of Panel A show a 
further characterisation of the data: the skewness and kurtosis of the different 
performance metrics. After an examination of  the results we notice that most of the 
variables are skewed to the right (positive skewness) apart from cash value added 
(CVA) and EVA which are skewed to the left. This is due to the long-run profitability 
concept of CVA and EVA. Because these two measures involve the cost of capital they 
are often negative when earnings are positive. In other words CVA and EVA reflect the 
fact that firms can be value destroying, in which case the observations of EVA and 
CVA take negative values. With regard to Kurtosis the results show that all measures 
have a peaked distribution reflecting the fact that some firms have extreme 
performances during the sample period.  
Pair-wise correlation between variables is provided in Table 4.2.2. It is noticeable that 
all the variables have a positive and significant correlation. BV and EBITDA have the 
highest correlation with market value followed by EBIT and NI. CVA has the lowest 
correlation with MV. The result also indicates a perfect correlation with r equal to one 
between NI and EBEI. This is attributed to the fact that for most of the UK there have 
been  no significant extraordinary items for many years which means NI is equal, or 
almost equal, to EBEI  because the extraordinary items are too small to have a 
discernible effect. More importantly, the economic profit measures, CVA and EVA, 
have the lowest correlation with MV among the seven performance metrics. This is 
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inconsistent with Chen and Dodd (1997) and Ismail (2006), who refute the claims of the 
EVA proponents that EVA is highly associated with a firm’s value.  
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Table 4.2.1. Selected descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent 
variables / pooled data. 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
MV 7208 0.000 94.300 2.755 4.748 6.452 0.029 66.134 0.058 
BV 7222 0.000 76.605 1.911 3.861 8.612 0.029 107.475 0.058 
NI 7222 -14.550 15.477 0.179 0.667 1.507 0.029 155.965 0.058 
EBITDA 7160 -14.532 24.687 0.429 0.965 5.230 0.029 119.203 0.058 
EBIT 7179 -14.532 24.590 0.326 0.893 5.647 0.029 155.092 0.058 
EBEI 7222 -14.550 15.477 0.181 0.668 1.502 0.029 155.772 0.058 
CFO 5347 -18.042 83.757 0.296 1.442 36.831 0.033 2143.255 0.067 
CVA 7222 -214.271 18.634 -1.040 7.894 -11.332 0.029 169.976 0.058 
EVA 7222 -22.250 19.802 0.076 0.849 -0.439 0.029 155.864 0.058 
N (List wise) 7222 
MV is the market value of firm’s equity, BV is book value, NI is net income, EBITDA is earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, EBIT is earnings before interest and tax, EBEI is 
earnings before extraordinary items, CFO is cash flows from operations, CVA is cash value added and 
EVA is economic value added.  
 
Table 4.2.2 Pair-wise correlation for all the variables 
 
 
MV BV NI EBITDA EBIT EBEI CFO CVA EVA 
MV 1 
        
BV .763** 1 
       
NI .473** .474** 1 
      
EBITDA .611** .620** .919** 1 
     
EBIT .582** .607** .946** .986** 1 
    
EBEI .473** .474** 1.000** .919** .947** 1 
   
CFO .201** .222** .358** .416** .403** .358** 1 
  
CVA .031** .026* .053** .062** .058** .053** .042** 1 
 
EVA .196** .096** .295** .344** .337** .295** .366** .029* 1 
Note: The sample has 7222 firms’ year observations. All variables are expressed per outstanding shares. **.  
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
MV is the market value of firm equity, BV is the book value, NI is the net income available for the common, 
EBITDA is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, EBIT is the earnings before 
interest and tax, EBEI is the earnings before extraordinary items, CFO is the net cash flows from operations 
activities, CVA is the cash value added, and EVA is the economic value added. 
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4.3   The Relative Information Content of Performance Measures  
       
Table 4.3.1 depicts the estimated coefficients and R² of the fixed effects valuation model 
where the dependent variable is specified as a firm’s market value three months after the 
fiscal year end and explanatory variables are variously specified as net income (NI), 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT), earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI), cash flows from 
operations (CFO), cash value added (CVA)
25
 and economic value added (EVA).    
The relative information content is assessed by comparing the adjusted R² that is 
obtained from the 7
th
 separate regressions - one for each performance measure. We 
estimated the panel data regression to be based on equation Eq. (1):      =     +    
     +        +     . The p-values of the fixed effects model from the two-tailed 
statistical tests of relative information content are shown in the last row. 
The results in Table 4.3.1 below report the relative information content of the non-
deflated explanatory variables. Observing the p-values of the fixed effects model, each 
of the seven variables is significant at conventional levels, which implies that the null 
hypothesis of no fixed effects cannot be accepted. Therefore the use of the fixed effects 
model is statistically justified. Regarding value relevance, the results indicate a 
significant difference in relative information content with CFO having a significantly 
higher adjusted R² (= 91.70%) than each of the other six variables This is consistent Ball 
and Brown (1987) and Ali (1994) and might be attributed to the fact that the users of 
accounting information have more confidence in CFO compared with other traditional 
performance (NI and EBITDA). CFO is harder to fudge or manipulate by top managers 
while the latter are highly vulnerable to manipulation as the accounting and GAAP 
standards allow managers a range of treatment choices when it comes to reflecting 
accounting transactions. The difference in significance might also be attributed to the 
fact that the inclusion of book value (BV) into the regression model will capture some 
of the accruals information content. 
The results also indicating that NI (R² = 85.02%), EBITDA (R² = 84.96%), EBEI (R² = 
5.02%), and CVA (R² = 85.25%) are more highly associated with a firm’s market value 
(MV) than EVA. In terms of international comparisons, this finding is strongly 
consistent with what was reported by Biddle et al. (1997), who stated that earnings 
                                                             
25 The data on the CVA measure contains one outlier, and the following results on CVA should therefore 
be treated with caution. 
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before extraordinary items were more closely associated with stock returns (adjusted  R² 
= 9.04%) and outperform EVA (adjusted  R² = 5.07%). Our results also confirm the 
suggestion by West and Worthington (2000) that EBEI more effectively explains the 
compound annual stock market return (MAR) than EVA (R² = 23.67% for EBEI versus 
14.29% for EVA). Furthermore, Chen and Dodd (2001) claim that the operating income 
(R² = 6.2%) dominates both RI (R² = 5.0%) and EVA (R² = 2.3%).   
Table 4.3.2 presents the results of the value relevance of the performance measures after 
deflating the independent variables by the total outstanding share (tos) at the beginning 
of 1990.  The coefficients of BV generated from a single regression of MV against the 
set of performance metrics are presented in the first column on the left of table 4.3.2. 
The value of the BV coefficient is very close to unity in all cases. This is consistent with 
the theoretical assumption, particularly Ohlson’s assumption, that the relation between 
BV and MV is one-to-one. Consequently this assumption seems to hold. It can be 
noticed that after the deflation by the number of outstanding shares the adjusted    
decreases slightly by approximately 10% as do the coefficients of the performance 
measures. Another observation that can be made in the separate rankings for 
performance measures is that CFO still has the highest association with MV among the 
other measures (   = 79.82%) and that EVA outperforms CVA in explaining the 
variation in stock performance (    = 77.32% versus 76.00%). In sum, the results 
presented in Table B.4.3.2 suggest the following ranking of performance measures with 
regard to their value relevance: CFO (adjusted-    =79.82%), EBITDA (adjusted-    
=77.90%), EVA (adjusted-    =77.32%), EBIT (adjusted-    =77.30%), (NI and EBEI 
(adjusted-    =76.55%) and CVA (adjusted-    =76.00%). 
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Table 4.3.1 
Test results of the relative information content of independent variables using panel data fixed effects model 
Undeflated Variables   
Variables  BV NI EBITDA EBIT  EBEI CFO  CVA EVA   R² F 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 
1.02 1.845 ***             85.02% 119.74 
0.92   1.248 ***           84.96% 118.09 
1.12     0.831 ***         84.52% 114.48 
1.02       1.846 ***       85.02% 119.72 
0.19         3.240 ***     91.70% 171.57 
0.88           1.874 ***   85.25% 121.94 
1.18             0.626 *** 84.93% 118.89 
p-values 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
  
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using two-tailed test. Estimated coefficients are from 
the panel data fixed effects model on equation (1)     =             +       +      where     is firm market value of equity three month after the 
reported date end;      is a performance measure (e.g. NI, EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI, CFO, CVA, EVA). In Panel A we report the results of the regressions where 
the independent variables are not deflated. In Panel B we report the results of the regressions where independent variables are deflated by the 
outstanding number of shares. The last row shows the two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² and F- test 
respectively. 
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Table 4.3.2 
Test results of the relative information content of independent variables using panel data fixed effects model  
Variables deflated by Outstanding Share Number 
Variables BV NI EBITDA EBIT  EBEI CFO  CVA EVA   R² 
F 
(209.53) 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 
1.12 0.70 ***             76.55% 83.30 
1.03   1.13 ***           77.90% 89.27 
1.08     0.97 ***         77.30% 86.36 
1.12       0.69 ***       76.55% 86.89 
1.11         1.27 ***     79.82% 66.62 
1.18           0.06 ***   76.00% 80.69 
1.18             0.81 *** 77.32% 87.03 
p-values 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000   
  
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using two-tailed test. Estimated coefficients are from 
the panel data fixed effects model on equation (1)     =           +       /       +      where     is firm market value of equity three month after 
the reported date end;      is a performance measure (e.g. NI, EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI, CFO, CVA, EVA). In Panel A we report the results of the 
regressions where the independent variables are not deflated. In Panel B we report the results of the regressions where independent variables are 
deflated by the outstanding number of shares. The last row shows the two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² 
and F- test respectively. 
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4.4   The Incremental Information Content of Performance Measures 
The incremental criterion asks whether a specific measure has additional information 
content over that already existing in other measures and is applicable when intending to 
assess measures in regard to other performance measure’s information content.  The 
steps outlined by Biddle et al. (1995, 1997) and Charitou et al. (2001) were followed to 
assess the incremental information content of the different performance metrics. It was 
assessed by comparing the adjusted    from a separate regression, one for each 
performance measure, and the adjusted    from a combination of two different 
performance metrics. 
Table 4.4.1 indicates that there is significant incremental information content existing 
between pairwise measures. The p-values in the last row show that the fixed effects 
model is more specified in favour of the random model and represents that in all cases 
the null hypothesis that the pairwised variables are jointly insignificantly different from 
zero (Biddle el al., 1995). The first row shows the adjusted    from the single variable 
regression for measure separately. For example, the first    figure, 79.82%, is obtained 
by regressing the deflated market value against CFO. Apart from NOPAT, CFO has the 
highest explanatory power, which is consistent with Charitou et al. (2001) who used UK 
data over the period 1985–1993 to investigate the value relevance of operating cash 
flows and earnings where they claimed that operating cash flows revealed incremental 
information content beyond earnings when pooled data were used.  
The rest of Table 4.4.1 provides the adjusted    obtained from various pairwise 
combinations of performance measures. Each cell contains the adjusted    from a 
bivariate regression involving the row head and the column head. Under this figure a 
smaller value is given in parenthesis. This is the increment in the adjusted    obtained 
by adding the second variable. For example, when we use CFO and EBITDA we obtain 
an adjusted coefficient of determination of 80.73%. However adding EBITDA to CFO 
increases the    by 0.91%, while adding CFO to EBIDTA increases it by 2.83%. 
Consistent with previous literature all the performance measures have, or contained 
more, information than other performance measures except for EBIT as, when paired 
with CVA, the adjusted    decreased by 0.01. 
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Table 4.4.1 
The Incremental Information Content of Performance Measures 
Panel: A regression results 
using deflated variables   
CFO  EBITDA EVA EBIT  NI EBEI CVA NOPAT 
   Adjusted R² 
 (single regression) 
  79.82% 77.90% 77.32% 77.30% 76.55% 76.55% 76.00% 80.70% 
  
 A
d
ju
st
e
d
 R
² 
(p
a
ir
w
is
e 
c
o
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s)
 
CFO    80.73% 80.36% 80.47% 80.13% 80.13% 79.86% 82.01% 
    (2.83%)  (3.04%)  (3.17%)  (3.58%)  (3.58%) (3.86%) (1.31%)  
EBITDA 80.73%   78.93% 79.86% 78.89% 78.89% 77.91% 80.70% 
  (0.91%)   (1.61%) (2.56%)  (2.34%)   (2.34%) (1.91) (0.00%)  
EVA 80.36% 78.93%   78.45% 77.99% 77.99% 77.36% 80.71% 
  (0.54%) (1.03%)    (1.15%) (1.44%) (1.44%)  (1.36%) (0.01%) 
EBIT  80.47% 79.86% 78.45%   77.71% 77.71% 77.29% 80.70% 
  (0.65%) (1.96%) (1.13%)   (1.16%)   (1.16%)  (1.29%) (0.00%) 
NI 80.13% 78.89% 77.99% 77.71%   76.55% 76.58% 80.72% 
  (0.31%) (0.99%) (0.67%) (0.41%)   (0.00%)  (0.58%) (0.02%)  
EBEI 80.12% 78.89% 77.99% 77.71% 76.55%   76.58% 80.72% 
  (0.30%) (0.99%) (0.67%) (0.41%) (0.00%) 
 
 (0.58%) (0.02%)  
CVA 79.86% 77.91% 77.36% 77.29% 76.58% 76.58%   80.70% 
  (0.04%) (0.01%) (0.04%) (-0.01%) (0.03%) (0.03%) 
 
(0.00%)  
NOPAT 82.01% 80.70% 80.71% 80.70% 80.72% 80.72% 80.70%   
  
(2.19%) (2.80%) (3.39%) (3.40%) (4.17%) (4.17%) (4.70%) 
 
p-values 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Estimated    is from the panel data fixed effects model on equation:  
                                                where     is the firm market value 
of equity three months after the reported date end,     and     are any two pairwised performance measures. Fixed effects p-values (F–statistics) are also reported. The 
second row represents the adjusted    for the single regression. The numbers in brackets represent the difference between     obtained from the single regression and 
the     obtained from pairwise regression.NI: net income available to shareholder. EBITDA: earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. EBEI: 
earnings before non-recurring items. CFO: net cash provided by operating activities. EVA: economic value added. CVA: cash value added is calculated as: OCF – 
OCFD (dividends and interest). 
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The pairwise combinations of EBITDA and EBIT, EBIT and EVA, and EBITDA and 
EVA, indicate that adjusted   , the explanatory power, has increased by 1.96, 1.13, and 
1.03 respectively over EBITDA and EBIT alone. Again the result also indicates that NI 
has no incremental information content beyond EBEI (0.00 differences). This could be 
attributed to what we have mentioned earlier which is that the reported NI and EBEI are 
equal because there are no extraordinary circumstances which exist and even if they did 
exist it was in small numbers and the descriptive statistics show that NI and EBEI are 
perfectly correlated. Hence the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) was introduced 
to replace the EBEI as a performance measure. Moreover, the result indicates that NI 
has increased the explanatory power of EVA by some 0.67%. This is inconsistent with 
Bao and Bao (1998) who claimed that NI has a zero impact on EVA. Overall, the results 
of Table 4.4.1 indicate that the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) exhibits the 
largest incremental information among the performance metrics, with an increase of 
2.19 with CFO, 2.80 with EBITDA, 3.39 with EVA, 3.40 with EBIT, 4.17 with both NI 
and EBEI, and 4.70 with CVA. Contrary to West and Worthington (2000) and 
according to our results the most logical pairwise combination in explaining market 
value (stock price) is therefore composed of CVA and NOPAT. However, consistent 
with Biddle et al, (1997) our finding does not support the adage that EVA is the 
dominant measure and superior to earnings and cash flow measures in its association 
with the market value and annual stock return (price).  
An interesting result is that the CFO has an incremental information content over the 
rest of the performance measures When paired with EBITDA, EVA, EBIT, NI, EBEI, 
CVA and NOPAT the adjusted    increased by 2.83, 3.04, 3.17, 3.58, 3.58, 3.86 and 
1.31 per cent respectively. This is in contradistinction to Board and Day’s (1989) claim 
(they were the first in the UK to examine the incremental information content of 
earnings components). They claimed that net income and working capital from 
operations (WCFO) defined as the net income plus depreciation plus deferred tax 
separately, hold more information content than net cash (quick) asset (NETQ) that is 
defined as the net income plus depreciation plus deferred tax plus change in stock and 
work in progress. In addition their results pointed out that with regard to the incremental 
information content, net cash flow was the poorest of the measures examined. This 
might be attributed to the proxies used for the cash flow figure as in that period 1961-
1977, the period of their study, the cash flow statement was not mandatory and the 
companies voluntarily prepared the statement of cash flows. Arnold et al. (1991) 
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reported evidence on the information content for cash flows, which was at odds with the  
results of  prior UK studies. The differences in the results obtained by different studies 
dealt with the information and incremental information content were due to the 
differences in the sample and the period of the study. Notwithstanding, with regard to 
the differences in performance measures and incremental information content, the best 
combination (but not the most accurate) is  when CFO composes NOPAT or EBITDA 
where the adjusted     is 82.01% or 80.73% in sequences, followed by NOPAT with NI 
(   = 80.72%) and NOPAT with CVA (   = 80.70%). 
4.4.1 The Incremental Information Content of Net Income Components 
As discussed in section 3.2.2 hypothesis     states that net income (NI) components 
have no statistically significant effect on annual stock price performance. The 
hypothesis predicts that decomposing net income (NI) into its main components, cash 
flows and aggregate accruals, is expected to increase the NI (earnings) ability to explain 
the changes in annual stock performances. The assumption is that each component is 
expected to reflect different information content (Dechow et al, 1998; Barth et al, 
2001). The aforementioned hypothesis is examined by conducting the following panel 
regression model under the fixed effects methodologies.  
    
     
                                                                  
                                                                                           
where      is the firm market value three months after the fiscal year end; CFO is the 
net cash flow from operating activity, ΔAP is the change in account payables; ΔAR is 
the change in accounts receivable;  ΔINV is the change in inventories, DEP is 
depreciation, AMORT is amortization, and OTHER is other accruals. The values of 
both dependent and explanatory variables have been deflated by the outstanding share 
of each period consistent with Garrod et al. (2000).  
Table 4.4.1.1 shows some descriptive statistics of NI components. First, CFO has the 
larger mean among the other explanatory variables (0.29) with a standard deviation 
(1.41). This value ranges from a minimum of -18.04 to a maximum of 83.76. This is 
consistent, as expected, with the results obtained by Dechow et al. (1998) and Barth et 
al. (2001). Second, while CFO has the larger standard deviation among NI components, 
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change in inventory (∆INV) has the larger standard deviation among the short term 
components of accruals (1.12) with a mean value of 0.052. Change in accounts 
receivable (∆AR) and change in accounts payables (∆AP) have mean values of 0.04 and 
0.03 respectively with standard deviations of 0.47 and 0.24. The mean value of 
depreciation (∆EP), the long term accruals components, is 0.1 with a standard deviation 
of 0.15. Amortization (AMORT) has a mean value of 0.012 and a 0.04 standard 
deviation. Finally the other accruals (OTHER) have a least and negative mean of -0.047 
with a value range from a minimum of -34.01 to a maximum of 11.00.   
Table 4.4.1.1 
Descriptive statistics on the Net Income components  
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MV 7208 0 94.3 2.755 4.748 
BV 7222 0 76.605 1.911 3.861 
CFO 5347 -18.042 83.757 0.295 1.442 
AMORT 5776 -0.069 0.780 0.012 0.039 
∆AP 5633 -3.587 3.842 0.028 0.244 
∆AR 7222 -14.914 15.102 0.040 0.471 
∆EP 5649 0.000 2.676 0.095 0.153 
∆INV 7222 -64.761 26.732 0.052 1.124 
OTHER 7222 -34.013 10.957 -0.047 0.806 
 
Table 4.4.1.2 
Pairwise correlation for Net income components 
 
Variables MV BV AMORT ∆AP ∆AR ∆EP ∆INV OTHER 
MV 1 
       
BV .763
**
 1 
      
AMORT .293
**
 .091
**
 1 
     
DAP .098
**
 .038
**
 .000 1 
    
DAR .106
**
 .083
**
 .005 .263
**
 1 
   
DEP .349
**
 .289
**
 .276
**
 .046
**
 .075
**
 1 
  
DINV .119
**
 .090
**
 -.003 .130
**
 .190
**
 .011 1 
 
OTHER -.075
**
 -.065
**
 -.067
**
 -.299
**
 -.485
**
 -.044
**
 
-
.310
**
 
1 
Note: The sample has 7,222 firms-year observations. All variables are expressed per 
outstanding shares. **.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation 
is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). where     is firm market value three months after 
the fiscal year end; CFO is the net cash flows from operations, ΔAP is the increase or 
decrease on accounts payable, ΔAR is the increase or decrease on accounts receivable, 
ΔINV is the increase or decrease on inventory, DEP is depreciation, AMORT is 
amortization, and OTHER is other accruals either gains or losses.  
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Table 4.4.1.2 shows the correlation matrix for the set of NI components. The results 
indicate that most correlations are positive and significant. However, the other accruals 
(OTHER) correlations with the remaining components are all negative and significant. 
The long term accruals components, BV, DEP and AMORT, have the highest 
correlation with market value (0.763, 0.349 and 0.293 respectively), followed by the 
change in inventory (0.119) then the change in accounts receivable (0.106) and then 
change in accounts payables (0.098). Turning to the correlation between other variables, 
the highest correlation exists between depreciation (DEP) and both book value (BV) 
and amortisation (AMORT), at 0.289 and 0.276 respectively. Change in accounts 
receivable (∆AR) and amortization have the lowest correlation (-0.49%). Table 4.4.1.2 
also shows that all the correlation coefficients are less than 0.5.   
Turning to the incremental information content of the NI components, Table 4.4.3 
shows that all NI components are significant and positively associated with the share 
price performances at the 0.05 level except for ΔAP, DEP and AMORT which has a 
significant and negative sign. This is consistent with what Barth et al, (2001) reported. 
They do not predict the sign of other accruals (OTHER) but their result shows a positive 
and significant association which is consistent with what this study revealed. 
Furthermore, the results reveal that the NI components have incremental information 
content. The results show a higher    when decomposing the NI into cash flows and 
accruals at 82.70% while    is equal to 76.55% when we run the regression against the 
NI alone.  The increase in    by 6.15% indicates that cash flows and accruals 
components jointly significantly outperform NI in explaining changes in price 
performances. This is consistent with previous price-based studies. Wilson (1986 and 
1987) and Garrod et al. (2000) claim that decomposing NI (earnings) into its main 
components, the cash flows and accruals, will enhance the model’s ability to explain the 
stock performance’s volatility.     
Prior UK and USA price-based studies that examined the information content of 
accruals decomposed total accruals into long and short term components, not individual 
components, which raised difficulties when comparing our results with those which 
previous studies predicted.  
While results in Table 4.4.3 convey that both short-term accruals (e.g. ΔAP, ΔAR, and 
ΔINV) and long-term accruals (e.g. DEP and AMORT) are relevant as explanatory 
variables in explaining stock performance, previous studies contradicted each other 
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regarding the value relevance of long and short term accruals. There have been volumes 
written that attempt to investigate the effects of both long and short term accruals. For 
instance, Rayburn (1986) and Dechow (1994) claimed that short-term accruals have 
information content but long term accruals have no information content. Contrary to 
them, Garrod et al. (2000) reported that long term accruals contain information but short 
term accruals have no information content. Along the same lines, McLeay et al. (1997) 
analysed UK data and reported that the components of accruals, namely the short and long term, 
have incremental information content beyond that already existing in aggregate earnings. 
To conclude, the results in Table 4.4.3 provide empirical evidence on the usefulness of 
decomposing earnings into operating cash flows and aggregate accruals. They also 
provide empirical evidence on the usefulness of decomposing aggregate accruals into its 
main components. Christie (1987) stated that there is no optimal deflator in levels 
models, but deflation by anything other than a function of independent variable can lead 
to some specification errors. To this end, all the variables are deflated by the 
outstanding share at the beginning of each period. 
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Table (4.4.3) 
Test results of the relative information content of Net Income (NI) Components 
 
            
Regression results 
using deflated 
variables  
BV 
+ 
NI 
+ 
CFO 
+ 
ΔAP 
- 
ΔAR 
+ 
ΔINV 
+ 
DEP 
- 
AMORT 
- 
OTHER 
± 
R² 
     F      
(209.533) 
Coefficient estimates 1.12 0.70               76.55% 83.30 
Fixed effects p-
values 
0 .0000 
*** 
0.0000 
*** 
                  
Coefficient estimates 0.90 
 
2.2940 -0.6451 1.3820 1.4489 -3.9610 -8.4590 0.7055 82.70% 
 F    
(214.331) 
p-values 0 .0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000   73.84 
  *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***     
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using two-tailed test. Estimated coefficients are 
from the panel data fixed effects model on equation (Model 3): 
    
     
                                                          
                                                                                 where     is firm market value of firm equity 
three months after the reported date; CFO is the net cash flows from operations activity, ΔAP is the increase and decrease on accounts payable, 
ΔAR is the increase and decrease on accounts receivable , ΔINV is the increase and decrease on inventories, DEP is depreciation, AMORT is 
amortization, and OTHER is other accruals. We report the results of the regressions where all variables are deflated by the outstanding number 
of shares. The last row shows the two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² and F- test respectively. 
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4.4.2    The Incremental Information Content of EVA components 
The incremental information content of the economic value added (EVA) components 
will be assessed according to the methodology used by West and Worthington (2000) 
and Bowen et al, (1987). We extend this methodology by adopting the valuation part of 
the Ohlson model and inserting the BV as an explanatory variable. The Stern Stewart 
accounting adjustments to net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and the invested 
capital (IC) are excluded as it was shown in previous studies that they add little to the 
information content of EVA (Young, 1999).  Young (1999, p.9) claimed “…that most 
of the proposed adjustments have little or no qualitative impact on profits”. More 
importantly, most of these adjustments are costly when applied and undisclosed by 
Stern Stewart. The incremental information content hypothesis is examined by 
conducting the following Panel regression model under the fixed effects methodologies.  
    
     
                                                                   
                                                                   
     is the firm market value three months after the fiscal year end t for firm i; BV is 
the book value, CFO is the net cash flow from operating activity, ACCR is defined as 
NI– (OCF+∆AR+∆INV-∆AP-DEP), ATINT is after tax interest  and CAPCHG is the 
capital charge. We report the results of the regressions where all variables are deflated 
by the outstanding number of shares (tos). 
The descriptive statistics for EVA’s components are presented in Panel A of Table 
4.4.4. Consistent with Ismail (2006) ATINT has the lowest mean and standard deviation 
among the components, whereas BV, CFO and ACCR have the highest standard 
deviation, at 3.86, 1.44 and 1.19 respectively. The means of the variables used in the 
estimation model are positive except that ACCR is negative (ACCR= NI – CFO). The 
negative sign of the ACCR mean is attributed to the fact that accruals include the non-
cash items, depreciation and amortization, and this is consistent with what Sloan (1993) 
and West and Worthington (2000) had claimed.    
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Table (4.4.4) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on the Economic value added (EVA) components 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BV 7222 .00005 76.605 1.911 3.861 
CFO 5347 -18.042 83.757 0.297 1.442 
ACCR 7222 -68.280 23.343 -0.039 1.197 
ATINT 7222 -2.296 4.494 0.050 0.136 
CAPCHG 7222 -9.125 24.866 0.214 0.760 
 
Panel B:  Pair-wise correlation for Economic value added (EVA) components 
  MV BV CFO ACCR ATINT CAPCHG 
MV 1      
BV .763
**
 1     
CFO .201
**
 .222
**
 1    
ACCR .052
**
 .038
**
 -.865
**
 1   
ATINT .435
**
 .571
**
 .157
**
 -.018 1  
CAPCHG .340
**
 .423
**
 .193
**
 .037
**
 .370
**
 1 
Note: The sample has 7,222 firms-year observations. All variables are expressed per outstanding shares. 
**.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). The variables are defined as:     is firm market value three months after the reporting date; 
CFO is the net cash flow from operating activity, ACCR is accruals, ATINT is after tax interest , and 
CAPCHG is the capital charge. 
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Panel B of Table 4.4.4, consistent with Biddle et al, (1997), reveals that CFO has a 
negative significant correlation with ACCR. The correlations between CFO, ATINT 
and CAPCHG are significant and positive, while our results report that the correlation 
between ACCR and ATINT is negative and insignificant. Further, the negative 
correlation between CFO and ACCR is consistent with the fact that “accrual process 
smoothing earnings relative to the underlying operating cash flows” (Biddle et al, 1997, 
p.316).  
However, for the purposes of the current research, the accounting adjustments 
(ACCTADJ) first introduced by Stern and Stewart (1991) were excluded from EVA’s 
components. This exclusion was as a result of the fact that from the beginning I have 
treated the EVA as it is mentioned in the economic theory, that is, similar in its essence 
to the residual income (RI) concept mentioned in the literature centuries ago ( Drucker, 
1995).  Another important reason is that many researchers treat these adjustments as 
cosmetic and adding little information content to EVA (Young, 1999). Finally, few UK 
companies announced the adoption of EVA and the adoption period was brief. Hence, 
EVA is defined as: 
                                  
Table 4.4.5 provides results of the incremental information of the EVA components 
from. 
                                                        
                                               . 
In this regression all the coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level of significance and 
different from zero. The sign of the association (provided below the variables) is in line 
with the literature except for ATINT which has an opposite sign.    
The results show higher    when decomposing the EVA into its main components 
(80.23%) while     is equal to 77.32% when we run the regression against the EVA 
alone. The increase in    by 2.91% indicates that EVA components together 
significantly outperform EVA in explaining changes in price performances. This is 
consistent with previous price-based studies (Biddle et al, 1997; West and Worthington, 
2000). Biddle et al., claim that decomposing EVA into its main components will 
enhance some of the model’s ability to explain the stock performance’s volatility. 
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Again, consistent with West and Worthington (2000) CFO and ATINT have the highest 
positive coefficient among EVA components.   
Table 4.4.6 provides the results of the pairwise regressions of the EVA components. All 
the components are significant at conventional levels. The results indicate that in each 
pairwise comparison, each component of EVA has an incremental information content 
beyond that which already exists in other components. Based on the partial F-test all 
pairwise between any two components are significantly different from one another and 
this is consistent with the results revealed by Biddle et al., (1995), Biddle et al., (1997) 
and Ismail, (2006). Moreover, the best pair of components is the one between the 
ACCR, a component on NOPAT, and the CAPCHG (calculated as invested capital (IC) 
× WACC), an EVA component, followed by ACCR and ATINT (calculated as Interest 
expense (1- Tax rate)) where the pairwise partial F-tests are 81.81 and 81.79 respectively. 
While CFO and ATINT have the highest coefficient estimates among the other 
components (1.81, 1.90 respectively) when paired they had a low partial F-test (66.31).  
The results also indicate that the EVA main components (e.g. CAPCHG and ATINT) 
have added some information content when they were paired with other EVA 
components. However, this contribution does not reach the level that makes EVA the 
dominant performance measure. As seen in section 4.3, EVA has been positioned as the 
third performance measure in its association with stock performances. The negative 
association between CAPCHG, which is equal to (capital employed
26
 × WACC), and 
market value corresponds with the literature and may be attributed to the size effect 
theory where large firms earn low returns (Banz, 1981).    
                                                             
26 Capital employed refers to total equity plus non-current liabilities. 
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Table (4.4.5) 
Test results of the relative information content of Economic value added (EVA) Components 
 
Regression results using deflated 
variables  
BV EVA 
CFO 
+ 
ACCR 
+ 
ATINT 
- 
CAPCHG 
- 
Adjusted-
R² 
     F  (209.533) 
Coefficient estimates 1.18 0.81         77.32% 82.03 
Fixed effects p-values 
0 .0000 
*** 
0.0000 
*** 
            
Coefficient estimates 1.046 
 
1.805 0.6138 1.9036 -0.0679 80.23%  F    (212.352) 
p-values 0 .0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0 .0004 0.0094   67.30 
  *** 
 
*** *** *** ***     
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using the two-tailed test. Estimated 
coefficients are from the panel data fixed effects model on equation (Model 3): 
    
     
                                            
                                               .  where     is market value of firm equity three months after the reporting date;    is 
the intercept, CFO is the net cash flows from operations activity, ACCR is accruals, ATINT is after tax interest , and CAPCHG is the capital 
charge. We report the results of the regressions where all variables are deflated by the outstanding number of shares. The last row shows the 
two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² and F- test respectively. 
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Table 4.4.6 Tests of incremental information content of EVA 
Variables Coefficient estimates 
 
Pairwise partial F- test 
BV 1.05   
  
     
CFO 1.81 
   
  
67.60*** 
  
ACCR 0.61 
 
66.31*** 
 
  
81.79*** 
 
66.28*** 
ATINT 1.9 
 
81.81*** 
 
  
80.17*** 
  
CAPCHG -0.07 
   
     
Adjusted R² *80.23%   
  
p-values based F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using the two-tailed test. 
Estimated coefficients are from the panel data fixed effects model on equation:                               
                    where     is the market value of firm equity three months after the reporting date,    is the intercept,     
and     are any two pairwised variables (e.g. CFO, ACCR, ATINT, and CAPCHG). Pairwise partial F–statistics are also 
reported. In the first column the tests are performed between the first and second, the second and third and third and fourth 
coefficients. The second column contains tests between the first and the third and the second and the fourth coefficients. The 
last column contains tests between the first and the fourth coefficients. We report the results of the regressions where all 
variables are deflated by the outstanding number of shares. The last row shows the two-tailed p-values of the non-directional 
F-test.  
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Finally, Table 4.4.7 shows some statistics that associated with the comparison of the 
Adjusted    of the pairwised regression of the components of EVA. The results show 
that CAPCHG and ATINT are insignificant when paired with CFO and ACCR. 
Notwithstanding this result, all of the EVA components are significant and contained 
information beyond each other. 
Table 4.4.7 
The Incremental Information Content of Economic value added (EVA) components  
 
Panel: R regression results 
using deflated variables    
  ATINT/CHAPCHG ACC/CHAPCHG CFO/ATINT 
Adjusted R²  pairwise 
regression 
75.60% 75.70% 78.73% 
Single regression   
78.70% CFO  
  
0.174 
75.70% ACCR 
 
0.000 
 
75.60% CHAPCHG 0.469 0.424 
 
75.60% ATINT 0.142   0.000 
Note: Estimated    are from the panel data fixed effects model in equation:  
     
     
    
                                 where      is the market value of firm equity three 
months after the reporting date,     and     are any two pair wised performance measures. 
p-values) are also reported for each component when they are paired. CFO is net 
operating cash flow, ACCR is accruals, CHAPCHG is capital charges and ATINT is after 
tax interest. 
Board and Day’s (1989) study is considered the first in the UK to examine the 
incremental information content of earnings’ components. Board and Day compared the 
respective abilities of net income, working capital from operations and net cash flows to 
explain the variations in stock return over the period 1961-1977. They declared that net 
income and working capital from operations separately hold more information content 
than net cash flows. They also extended their investigation to the incremental 
information content for these variables. The results regarding the incremental 
information content, pointed out that the net cash flow was the poorest of the measures 
examined.  
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4.5   Empirical Results of the Return Model  
Most of the past extant literature (e.g. Board and Day, 1989; Biddle et al. 1995, 1997; 
Bao and Bao, 1998; West and Worthington, 2000; Ismail, 2006) adopted the return 
model, the valuation component of the Ohlson model, to examine the value relevance 
and incremental information content of a set of different accounting measures and also 
test the association between these measures and the variation in annual stock. One 
common feature of the aforementioned papers is that the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression was the technique applied for the set of cross-sectional and time series data to 
obtain the results. This is the procedure that was sharply criticised by econometricians 
because it might lead to biased and inaccurate estimates of the coefficients. Along the 
same lines, Gujarati (2003) suggests applying panel data regression which takes into 
consideration the specific characteristic of each cross-section as opposed to the OLS 
regression.  
We extend the previous work by introducing the book value (BV) in the valuation 
model and treating it as an independent variable to be combined with the other 
performance measures in a multivariate regression. Ohlson (1995) defines the stock 
price as the combination of current BV, current abnormal earnings and other value 
relevant information. Furthermore, we adopt the fixed effects model and allow the 
intercept to vary across individuals but not across the time dimension. Finally, in terms 
of comparison, we will report the results obtained from adopting both the traditional 
valuation method and the one introduced by Ohlson (1995).   
The results in Table 4.5.1 show the value relevance of the investigated performance 
measures using the same model adopted by Biddle et al. (1997) and West and 
Worthington (2000). The analysis shows that all the performance metrics are significant  
and positively associated with the compound share return at the 0.05 level except for the 
CVA which has a significant and negative sign. Moreover, the explanatory power for all 
variables is significantly higher than that found in the study by Biddle et al., (1997). 
The negative sign of the CVA is consistent with the profitability concept where 
companies in the long run are less capable of generating high profits and accept the 
level of return that is sufficient to cover its cost of capital which means firms will enter 
into the value destroying phase rather than generating value. The explanatory power of 
EBITDA is 15.13% higher than NI and both EVA and CVA. This is against the 
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unwritten rule that EVA has the ability to overshadow other performance measures. 
Regardless of the low Adjusted    of accounting–based measures, reported by Biddle 
et al, (1997), our result is consistent with the claim that traditional performance 
measures (i.e. EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI)  have more information content than that of 
value added measures (i.e. EVA and CVA). Moreover, NI stands on the fourth position 
after EBITDA, EBIT and EBEI respectively. In terms of a comparison of our results 
this is highly consistent with West and Worthington (2000) who estimated the value 
relevance of EBEI, RI, NCF and EVA at 23.7%, 19.3%, 18.1% and 14.29% 
respectively.    
Table 4.5.2 presents results obtained after extending the Biddle model to include the 
security book value BV into the valuation model, that is: 
         
    
    
   
   
    
      
The inclusion of the book value of equity controls for possible size effect. It is well-
known that small firms earn abnormally larger returns even after controlling for risk. 
Therefore, attempting to explain returns by a single performance measure might suffer 
from an omitted variable bias. The omitted variables may vary, but it is believe that size 
is a good proxy for other factors that might influence the firm’s return. 
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Table 4.5.1 
Test results of the relative information content of independent variables using the Return Model and panel data fixed effects model (Time 
Effects). Variables are used in levels 
 
Regression results using 
Return Model  
NI EBITDA EBIT  EBEI CFO  CVA EVA   R² F 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 
0.152 ***             14.70% 37.96 
  0.103 ***           15.13% 39.00 
    0.121 ***         15.11% 39.02 
      0.152 ***       14.73% 38.10 
        0.106 ***     13.80% 39.04 
          -0.0002 ***   12.35% 31.25 
            0.042 *** 12.87% 32.79 
p-values 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
  
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using the two-tailed test. Estimated 
coefficients are from the panel data fixed effects model in equation (1)     =   +           /+      where     is compound annual 
market return value three months after the reporting date;    intercept;     is a performance measure (e.g. NI, EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI, 
CFO, CVA, EVA). We report the results of the regressions where the independent variables are deflated by market value at t-1. The last 
row shows the two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² and F- test respectively. 
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Table 4.5.2 
Test results of the relative information content of independent variables using Return Model and panel data fixed effects model (Time 
Effects). Variables are used in levels 
Regression results 
using Return 
Model 
BV NI EBITDA EBIT  EBEI CFO  CVA EVA   R² F (32.68) 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 
0.002 
(0.134) 
0.147 ***             14.71% 36.84 
-0.002 
(0.432) 
  0.106 ***           15.14% 37.79 
-0.0001 
(0.937) 
    0.121 ***         15.11% 37.79 
0.002 
(0.141) 
      0.146 ***       14.76% 36.68 
0.003 
(0.153) 
        0.102 ***     13.81% 37.36 
0.009 
(0.000)*** 
          -0.0002 
 
  12.72% 31.15 
0.016 
(0.000)*** 
            0.065 *** 13.89% 34.47 
p-values  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.113 0.0000   
  
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using the two-tailed test. Estimated coefficients 
are from the panel data fixed effects model on equation (1)     =    +         +        /     +      where     is the compound annual market 
return value three months after the reporting date;    intercept;      is a performance measure (e.g. NI, EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI, CFO, CVA, EVA).  
We report the results of the regressions where independent variables are deflated by the market value at t-1. The last row shows the two-tailed p-
values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² and F- test respectively. Numbers between brackets are p-values.  
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Two observations from Table 4.5.2 are of special interest. First, by comparing the 
results presented in Table 4.5.1 with 4.5.2, particularly the adjusted-  , we discover 
that the inclusion of BV into the valuation model has a significant effect with the 
adjusted-R² barely changing. We also note that EVA has the highest increase in 
explanatory power- adjusted-R² increased by 1.02 % for EVA (Table 4.5.2). We also 
notice that all the variables, except for CVA, are significant at conventional levels. The 
second observation we can make is that BV appears insignificant in all combinations 
except when paired with the cash value added measures (CVA and EVA). This might 
be attributed to the inherent characteristics of accrual that BV might contain important 
information about stock returns and performances that already exist in other measures 
(e.g. NI, EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI and CFO).  The abovementioned results describe how 
the explanatory variables behave in levels. Tables 4.5.3 show how the same variables 
behave in changes in levels.   
Looking at the results in Table 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 using the changes in variables, it can be 
noticed that all of the explanatory variables are significant. For all variables the 
Adjusted     is slightly low. Again EVA and CVA, the value added measures, were still 
dominated by the traditional and cash flow metrics. NI still has a higher explanatory 
power than EVA. Consequently, despite the valuation model we use- the price or return 
model- the claim that EVA is dominant among the performance measures is refuted.    
The same results are obtained when applying the return model and including the BV 
value as a dependent variable. ∆EBEI have the highest explanatory power (   
      ) followed by ∆EBITDA and ∆EBIT where    is 13.61% and 13.57% 
respectively. CVA has the lowest adjusted    (12.76%) and is negatively associated 
with the stock return. 
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Table 4.5.3 
Test results of the relative information content of independent variables using Return Model and panel data fixed effects model (Time 
Effects). Variables are used in changes 
 
Regression results 
using Return Model  
∆NI ∆EBITDA ∆EBIT  ∆EBEI ∆CFO  ∆CVA ∆EVA   R² F (30.65) 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 
0.075 ***             13.30% 33.32 
  0.060 ***           13.61% 33.82 
    0.069 ***         13.57% 33.84 
      0.076 ***       13.37% 32.74 
        0.039 ***     12.87% 35.45 
          -0.0006 ***   12.62% 32.12 
            0.020 *** 12.69% 32.31 
p-values 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
  
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using the two-tailed test. Estimated 
coefficients are from the panel data fixed effects model on equation (1)     =   +        /    +      where     is the compound 
annual market return value three months after the reporting date end;    intercept;     is a performance measure (e.g. NI, EBITDA, 
EBIT, EBEI, CFO, CVA, EVA). We report the results of the regressions where independent variables are deflated by the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the period        . The last row shows the two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The 
last two columns show the R² and F- test respectively. 
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Table 4.5.4 
Test results of the relative information content of independent variables and BV using Return Model and panel data fixed effects 
model (Time Effects). Variables are used in changes 
 
Regression results 
using Return Model 
∆BV ∆NI ∆EBITDA ∆EBIT  ∆EBEI ∆CFO  ∆CVA ∆EVA   R² F (21.48) 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 
0.002 
(0.376) 
0.072 ***             13.32% 32.28 
-0.002 
(0.469) 
  0.063 ***           13.61% 32.75 
-0.0003 
(0.937) 
    0.069 ***         13.57% 32.74 
0.002 
(0.391) 
      0.073 ***       14.76% 32.44 
0.003 
(0.248) 
        0.035 ***     12.89% 33.82 
0.007 
(0.001)*** 
          -0.0005 ***   12.76% 30.73 
0.011 
(0.000)*** 
            0.026 *** 12.94% 31.22 
p-values 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000   
  
Note: ***, **,* Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, using the two-tailed test. Estimated 
coefficients are from the panel data fixed effects model on equation (1)     =            +             )/       +      where     is the 
compound annual market return value three months after the reporting date,     intercept,      is a performance measure (e.g. NI, EBITDA, 
EBIT, EBEI, CFO, CVA, EVA). Independent variables are deflated by the market value at the beginning of each period. The last row shows 
the two-tailed p-values of the fixed effects model. The last two columns show the R² and F- test respectively. 
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4.6      Conclusion  
In this chapter I have examined the associations between the traditional, cash flow and 
value added performance measures and the changes in share price and return 
performances during the period 1960 to 2012. The performance measures examined are:  
NI, EBITDA, EBIT, EBEI, CFO, EVA and CVA. I extended the work of Biddle et al. 
(1997) and West and Worthington (2000) through the incorporation of the book value 
(BV), as a major explanatory variable with other performance measures into the price 
and return valuation model as a determinant of the share price (Ohlson, 1995). The BV 
component had been excluded by different scholars while adopting the traditional price 
and return valuation models. 
The main performance measures, i.e.  The net income (NI) and the economic value 
added (EVA), are the most vulnerable to attack and debate from researchers. I 
decomposed them into their major components to examine whether these components 
contain more information than the original measure. Moreover, the accounting 
adjustment that Stern & Stewart suggested to the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) 
and the invested capital (IC) were excluded from EVA’s components as, first, the 
adoption of EVA as a compensation and management tool was limited to five 
companies in the UK. Second, as claimed by Young (1999) this accounting adjustment 
added little to the EVA information content. Finally, these adjustments are obviously 
undisclosed by Stern and Stewart (1991). 
As the obtained results, (in regard to the superiority of any of these performance 
measures from previous US and UK studies) were mixed and as these differences were 
attributed to the different methodologies adopted by different researchers, the way they 
select the variables and the proxies they used for different accounting numbers. The 
current research attempts to overcome these contradictions within the results obtained 
by adopting the same methodology over the period of investigation (1960-2012) and to 
using the same definition and calculation of the variables used to conduct this research. 
Further, the variables were used in level and change forms.  
The results obtained in this chapter show that when applying the price model, the CFO 
has the highest explanatory power among the other variables and outperforms both the 
NI and the EVA which were the measures that were the focus of attention for long 
periods of time. Interestingly, the adjusted-    increased rapidly after the incorporation 
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into the price model of BV as an explanatory variable. In addition the results show that 
EBITDA is the dominant among variables when we used the return model following 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) but the adjusted-   is quite low compared to 
that which I obtained from the price model. 
With regard to the incremental information content, the result indicates that there is 
significant incremental information content existing between pairwise measures. The NI 
still has the ability to outperform EVA as its explanatory power increases by 0.67% 
when paired with NI. The highest adjusted-    is obtained when CFO is paired with 
NOPAT (  =82.01%) and the lowest exists when NI is paired with EBEI (  =76.55%). 
The results also provide empirical evidence on the incremental information content of 
EVA and NI components with regard to explaining the variation in stock performances. 
The adjusted-    increased by 2.91% after the decomposition which indicates that 
EVA’s components together significantly outperform EVA in explaining changes in 
price performances. The best results are achieved when accruals (ACCR) are separately 
paired with the capital charge (CAPCHG) and after tax interest (ATINT).  Interestingly, 
the traditional performance measures still have the ability to compete and outperform 
the value added measures.   
One interesting result is that when I regressed the extended version of the Biddle et al. 
model the results obtained which were in favour of the adjusted-   were similar to the 
results obtained when applying the return model and excluding the book value (BV) as 
a dependent variable. This might indicate that unlike the price model, the book value 
(BV) adds little to other variables’ information content. The changes in earnings before 
extraordinary items (EBIT) have the highest adjusted-   (14.76%) when adopting the 
extend version of Biddle et al, and earnings before interest depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) had the highest adjusted-    (13.37%) when adopting the 
normal return model.  
In conclusion, while much of the debate regards accurate and best performance 
measures, it must not be forgotten that determining which of the performance measures 
is the best is a murky matter.  
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of Economic Value Added (EVA) Adoption 
On Stock Performance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the role of the executive manager is to maximize the firm’s 
value (Wallace, 1997; Malmi and Ikaheimo, 2003). The shareholders of a business 
enterprise are better off when its management chooses investment decisions that lead to 
maximizing their wealth. Therefore, evaluating a manager’s performance on the basis of 
whether it increases the stakeholder’s wealth is a proper approach. To this end, many 
performance metrics have been advocated by researchers that examine how well a firm, 
and particularly the executive manager of that firm, performs. These methods include: 
(i) traditional methods such as accounting earnings or operating profit; (ii) profitability 
measures such as return on asset (ROA) or return on investment (ROI); (iii) cash flow 
measures; and (iv) value-based performance measures such as residual income (RI) 
method and particularly economic value added (EVA) and cash value added (CVA).  
Currently the advocated performance tools are the value-based management (VBM) that 
takes into consideration the cost of invested capital (debt and equity) when calculating 
the increase in wealth a firm generates as a result of this investment, such as the residual 
income method (RI). One question that needs to be asked is why this issue has received 
such attention? According to Drucker (1995, p.59) “until a business returns a profit that 
is greater than its cost of capital, it does not create wealth; it destroys it.” The most 
commonly used residual income performance measurement metrics are the economic 
value added (EVA) first introduced by Stern & Stewart Co. in 1991, and the cash value 
added (CVA) model by the Boston Consulting Group (Malmi and Ikaheimo, 2003).  
The vast majority of research has examined whether the adoption of EVA’s incentive 
compensation plan has any impact on managers’ investment behaviour (Wallace, 1997; 
Kleiman, 1999; Hogan and Lewis, 2005). All of this empirical research has the common 
assumption that the adoption of the EVA compensation system will rationalize a firm’s 
investment decision and will lead to using the existing assets more efficiently to 
generate more residual income and, hence, to maximize shareholders’ wealth as well.   
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the adoption of the EVA framework 
enhances the firm’s performance and to gauge the long-term effects of such an adoption 
on the firm’s profitability. It also assesses whether the market reacts to the 
announcement of the adoption of EVA as a compensation system. The event study 
methodology initially introduced by Fama et al. (1969) will be used to assess the impact 
of EVA’s adoption on a firm’s performance.  
In a corporate context, the usefulness of event studies arises from the fact that the 
magnitude of abnormal performance at the time of an event provides a measure of the 
(unanticipated) impact of this type of event on the wealth of the firms’ shareholders. 
Event studies start with a hypothesis on how a particular event is expected to affect the 
value of a firm. The hypothesis that the value of the company has increased (decreased) 
will be reflected in the stock showing an abnormal return. Coupled with the notion that 
the information is readily contained in prices, the concept of abnormal returns (or 
performance) is the key point of event study methods. 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that stock prices fully reflect all publicly 
available information and no information or analysis can provide investors with the 
opportunity to outperform the market. As a result any news announcement concerning a 
company is rapidly subsumed within its stock price and announcements will on average 
not affect stock prices beyond a very short period of time. Departing from EMH, when 
these announcements take place there might sometimes be   an abnormal reaction in the 
share prices of the underlying stocks. Such reactions can be measured using the event 
study approach where the movement in stock prices around the event dates is analysed 
to determine if the event in question has had an effect on the value of the underlying 
stocks or not. 
The most common approach of the event study involves three steps: (1) The 
computation of the parameters in the estimation period; (2) The computing of the 
forecast errors (and obtaining variance/covariance information) for a period, or over an 
event window; aggregate across firms and infer the average effect; (3) Use the abnormal 
returns in a cross –sectional regression against the relevant features of the stock which is 
supposed to influence the impact of the event. 
The use of the traded market EVA performance measure has grown rapidly since the 
1990s in the USA and across different European countries. In the UK there are four 
companies that reported the EVA as a performance and management tool. These 
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companies are Tate & Lyle, GSK, Hanson (now Heidelberg) and Diageo. While EVA 
was implemented in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some companies may no longer be 
using it.
27
 As a result the focus will be on the USA companies that have adopted EVA 
as a management tool and as a compensation system. 
The structure of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 5.2 will discuss 
the main results of the previous studies that have investigated the impact of EVA 
adoption on a firm’s performance. Section 5.3 describes the sample and section 5.4 the 
methodology used. Section 5.5 discusses the empirical results obtained and finally 
section 5.6 summarises the main conclusions. 
5.2 Previous studies 
There is an underlying assumption that firms adopting the residual income method have 
the ability to enhance their profitability and maximize shareholder’s wealth. This can be 
achieved by increasing a firm’s ability to generate a large residual income and 
encourage managers to invest in those projects that can earn more than the cost of the 
capital invested. Furthermore, EVA’s proponents claim that the adoption of the EVA 
framework will affect the manager’s behaviour and lead to the best alignment of 
management interests with those of the shareholders (Stewart, 1991; Wallace, 1997). To 
address this growing issue, several empirical studies were conducted to explore whether 
the adoption of residual income-based performance incentives, namely the adoption of 
the EVA framework, will lead to any differences in firms’ investment patterns (Wallace 
1997: Kleiman, 1999; Sharma and Kumar, 2010). However, the results have been 
mixed.    
Wallace’s (1997) study is a seminal contribution that addressed the changes in 
profitability that a firm achieves when adopting EVA. Wallace’s methodology has been 
replicated by a number of scholars such as Kleiman (1999), Hogan and Lewis (2005) 
and Balachandran (2006). Wallace (1997) compared a group of forty companies 
adopting residual income (RI) as a compensation plan with the same number of control 
firms to examine whether the adoption of RI, the investing decision, finance decision, 
operating decision and shareholder wealth would increase or decrease within three post 
                                                             
27 Source: Stern Stewart Ltd. London Branch dated March 15, 2012. 
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adoption periods. Wallace’s methodology has been discussed in detail in chapter 6 of 
the current study. 
In a closely related study, Kleiman (1999) extended Wallace’s methodology by using a 
sample of 71 firms adopting EVA as an incentive compensation system. Based on US 
data for the period 1987-96, he examined the impacts of the adoption of EVA on 
shareholders’ value. He also replicated the same method used by Wallace (1997) to 
estimate the ‘closest-matched peer firm’ (the control firms). Unlike Wallace, the focus 
was limited to those firms that adopted the EVA compensation plan rather than the RI- 
based compensation plan and on the consequences of the EVA adoption on 
shareholders’ value rather than on the improvement of firms’ operating performances.  
The findings of Kleiman (1999) were that all the EVA adopters show a significant and 
higher stock performance (return) than their competitors, the peer companies, while 
before the adoption date they were equivalent with regard to their stock performances. 
Turning to operating performance analysis, the findings of Kleiman contend that firms 
were monitoring their working capital regardless of the incentive compensation plan 
they adopted. Moreover, his results do not show any capital expenditure decline, the 
manager’s behaviour has no obvious bias against new investment which is a finding 
inconsistent with that of Wallace (1997). Further, consistent with theoretical arguments 
and as Wallace (1997) reported, EVA-adopting companies significantly increase their 
financial leverage. This increase is mostly achieved through extended share repurchases. 
Finally, the results show substantial enhancement in both operating margins and 
operating profits before depreciation.  
Responding  to the criticism that was raised against Wallace’s (1997) work, Hogan and 
Lewis (2005) used a sample of 108 firms that chose to adopt the economic profit plans 
(EPPs) as incentive compensation systems between 1983 and 1996 to examine whether 
the adoption would affect these firms’ operating, organizational, financial and 
compensation characteristics. Unlike Wallace and probably to account for the pre-
adoption performances they estimate a logistic regression model to select the optimal 
control-matched firms. Accordingly, their control firms’ sample fall into four 
categories: anticipated adopters, surprise adopters, anticipated non-adopters, and 
surprise non-adopters. They then compare the performances of these categories to assess 
whether adopting firms will outperform firms that are predicted to adopt EPPs but do 
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not. The focus of their research has been on analysing whether the adoption firms will 
achieve the same increases in their performance if they chose to continue using 
traditional performance-based compensation plans. Furthermore, they replicate the same 
method used by Wallace (1997).  
The findings of Hogan and Lewis (2005) reveal that all EPP adopter firms show a 
significant enhancement in operating performance relative to their past performance 
(pre-adoption period). In addition they show a significant difference in investment 
behaviour, operating performance and value creation. This result is consistent with the 
notion that an EPP-based compensation system encourages managers to choose 
profitable projects that ultimately maximize shareholders’ wealth. Turning to the 
control-matched firms’ categories and the comparison of the performance of anticipated 
adopter firms to that of surprise non-adopters the findings of Hogan and Lewis reveal 
that adopter firms used the operating asset more efficiently, improved their operating 
performance, and maximized outstanding shareholder wealth. This is consistent with 
Wallace’s findings (1997). However, their results fail to show a significant 
improvement when compared with anticipated non-adopters and surprise adopter firms.     
Similarly, Balachandran (2006) investigated whether switching from tradition 
accounting-based performance plans, specifically earnings and returns on investment-
based compensation plans, to an EVA- based compensation incentive will affect the 
investment motif. He used a sample of 181 firms that adopted the residual income (RI)-
based compensation incentive. These firms fell into two main categories: those which 
previously adopted earnings as a compensation plan and then shifted to RI-based 
compensation plan and those that adopted ROI-based compensation plan.  
The criterion that Balachandran used to judge whether there is any difference in 
investment patterns is the firm’s ability to generate more residual income after the 
adoption (the delivered RI is likely to improve). Furthermore, he applied three 
specifications to conduct his test. In the first and second specifications the firm used its 
own controls but the control variables are different for each specification 
(Balachandran, 2006. p.390). Finally, he used both the adopted firm and the matched 
firm as a control variable. 
Balachandran concludes that the results regarding the control variable used are mixed. 
For the first specification the results show a significant difference in the investment 
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pattern when the firm switched from an earning-based compensation plan to an RI-
based compensation incentive; the second specification shows the same significant 
difference for firms which switched from an ROI- based compensation plan while the 
third specification shows no significant difference in investment pattern. Turning to the 
delivered RI, the results show that the generated RI is increased when firms adopted the 
RI-based compensation plan. Finally, his conclusion is consistent with Wallace’s (1997) 
notion that “you get what you pay for”.  
However, in Wallace’s and Balachandran’s (2006) analyses of the firms that adopted 
the residual income-based compensation plan, they did not indicate whether these firms 
specifically adopted the EVA framework. Thus, the findings of their research will not 
only attribute to EVA a compensation technique but this advantage should be traced to 
all residual income (RI) methods.  Kleiman (1999) limited his sample to those firms that 
adopted the EVA framework and discussed the impact of EVA’s adoption on the firm’s 
ability to maximize shareholder value. This will more effectively indicate whether the 
enhancement the companies have achieved regarding stock price performance could be 
attributed directly to its ability to generate more operating income after adoption rather 
than to the existing economic circumstances in the market where all these firms operate. 
Hopefully, Kleiman’s finding will respond well to the question that has received much 
attention in the literature:   could “EVA and residual income prove effective in 
motivating managers for shareholder wealth creation” (Sharma and Kumar, p. 205). 
In a similar work, Lovata and Costigan (2002) used a sample of 115 US firms to 
examine the characteristics of firms that have integrated EVA into an incentive 
compensation system. The theory’s assumption is that the adoption of the EVA 
framework will better align the managers’ interests with those of the shareholders which 
would mitigate the moral hazard issue.  Their claim was that firms which experience 
high agency conflicts are more likely to adopt the EVA-based compensation plan. 
Lovata and Costigan make a comparison between companies adopting EVA and 
companies that have not in order to investigate whether the adoption of an EVA 
compensation plan will alleviate the agency conflicts. They used the agency theory 
variables such as the firm coefficient of risk Beta, institutional ownership, insider 
ownership, and R&D/Sales ratio to test the implication of adopting EVA for 
organizational behaviour and characteristics. 
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The results of Lovata and Costigan show that the EVA compensation system is suitable 
for the companies that have the following characteristics: (i) less insider ownership, (ii) 
high proportion of institutional investors, and (iii) companies that maintain a lower 
R&D/Sales ratio. However firms where their current earnings have less power to predict 
future success tend to use performance measures rather than the EVA metric. 
Additionally, as the abovementioned studies point out, the EVA technique may be used 
for two purposes. It is adopted as a decision making tool and used as a compensation 
incentive plan. In the literature, firms usually first adopt the EVA framework as a 
management tool and then introduce it as their incentive compensation scheme (Ittner 
and Larcker, 1998)  However, they claim that the majority of firms introduce the EVA 
framework for decision making, rather than as an incentive compensation plan.   
Previous tests have encountered several difficulties in addressing this argument. The 
reason is simple: you cannot formally test different and unrelated samples. Our data on 
the other hand enable testing across all available news types because they are from the 
same sample. The sample selection processes will be explained in detail in section 5.3 
below. 
5.3 Sample  
This chapter aimed to examine the consequences of adopting the EVA compensation 
incentives plan. The sample comprises US firms that have chosen to adopt the EVA 
compensation system. Consistent with Wallace, 1997 and Kleiman (1999) the first year 
of the company announcing its adoption of EVA is defined as the event year, and for the 
purpose of the current research we consider the month of December of that year as an 
event date (   ). Initially, we start with Wallace’s 23 firms that adopted the EVA 
compensation plan. This list of adopter firms was then updated by Kleiman and the 
number of EVA adopters was increased to 71 firms. Then, we began our search using 
various databases where the EVA-implementing firms may be identified. These 
comprise the Stern Stewart & Co. brochure, Lexis-Nexis, Proxy Statement, 10-Q report 
and Wall Street Journal. The majority of firms which adopted EVA have disclosed such 
information in their official release. For example, RR Donnelley & Sons Co. states in its 
10-Q report: 
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“Over the past three years, the company has adopted the principles of 
Economic Value Added (EVA) as its primary financial framework. The 
objective of this system is to put in place a system of value-based metrics that 
measures periodic progress toward improved shareholder value creation. To 
enhance value, the company moved to improve its manufacturing efficiencies 
in 1996 by initiating the restructuring of its U.S. gravure printing platform; 
closing of its commercial print operations in the United Kingdom; and 
integrating its Digital Division assets into other operations. These actions 
should generate sustainable cost savings in the long run. During 1997, as the 
restructuring continues, operating efficiency will decline temporarily due to 
the movement of equipment, retraining of people and movement of printing 
among facilities. 
Over time, the application of the EVA financial framework to the 
company's decision-making process is likely to produce slower revenue 
growth, enhanced free cash flow, a stronger competitive position and 
improved return on invested capital”28. 
I identified an initial list of 101 firms adopting EVA in the period 1987- 2001; these 
represent different US market sectors. A total of 12 EVA adopters were then excluded 
from the sample because of the unavailability of price/return information and 
accounting data, leaving a final sample of 89 EVA adopters on NASDAQ, NYSE and 
American Stock Exchange Markets. Figure 5.3 shows that most EVA adoption took 
place in the period 1990-1996.  
 
 
  
                                                             
28 Source: United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. 2059. RR Donnelley & 
Sons Co, FORM 10-Q, May 7th 1997. 
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Assessing abnormal performance is tricky. Barber and Lyon (1996) favour the use of 
control firms in calculating abnormal return that would alleviate the problems of the 
misspecification that resulted from the bias occurring because of the inclusion of new 
listed firms in the market index portfolio and the rebalancing process of market index 
(portfolio). Given the advantages of the control firm approach, I followed in the steps of 
Wallace (1997). I began by determining the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code of adopter companies using the Centre for Research in Security Prices CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT database.  Subsequently, I selected a sample of the best matched 
controlling firms that closely resembled the event firm to compare their performance. 
The prices and returns data of both adopting and control firms that were used to analyse 
the long-term effects of adoption were collected using CRSP. The selection processes of 
the controlling firms were based on the following criteria: 
1. The company should have the same 4-digits SIC code (Same industry sector). If 
not, we chose the best matched company with a 3-digits SIC code. 
2. Size: we used the total asset and number of outstanding common shares in the 
year prior to the year of adoption to match adopters and control firms. 
3. Time period: the control firm should have sufficient annual data and its 
operating period should match that of the adopting firms’ operating period. 
 
Table 5.3 provides a breakdown of firms adopting EVA and the year of adoption, the 
main control firms and the SIC code respectively.  
Another potential problem might be self-selection bias. This is mainly due to the 
possibility that those firms that selected EVA belong to a certain class of performance. 
Thus, comparing EVA adopters to non-EVA adopters might simply reflect their 
inherent superior performance and not the effect of adopting EVA. Fortunately, this 
concern is not justified for the simple reason that the control firms use residual income 
and this latter is very similar to EVA. Given that the control firms are matched as 
precisely as possible, the difference in performance, if any, can be relatively safely 
attributed to the adoption of EVA.  
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Table (5.3) EVA Adopting Companies 1987-2001(USA) 
NO. SAMPLE COMPANY 
ADOPTION 
YEAR 
CONTROL COMPANY SIC CODE 
1 COCA COLA 1987 PEPSICO INC 2080 
2 CSX CORPORATION 1988 SANTA FE FINANCIAL CORP 6711 
3 CILCORP 1989 ALLETE INC 4931 
4 CRANE CO 1990 WHITTAKER CORP 3490/3494 
5 BRIGGS & STRATTON 1990 STEWART & STEVENSON SVCS INC 3510/3519 
6 QUAKER OATS 1991 RALSTON PURINA CO 2040/2043 
7 BALL CORP 1992 CROWN HOLDINGS INC 3221 
8 WHIRLPOOL CORP 1992 AKTIEBOLAGET ELECTROLUX 3630 
9 AT&T 1992 G T E CORP 4813 
10 SCHERER, R.P. 1992 FOREST LABS INC 2834 
11 WELLMAN 1993 ASHLAND INC NEW 2824 
12 GRAINGER, W.W. 1993 WAXMAN INDUSTRIES INC 5063 
13 MANITOWOC CO 1993 ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC 3531 
14 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP 1993 APPLE INC 3573 
15 FURON CORP. 1993 WYNNS INTERNATIONAL INC 3079 
16 HARNISCHFEGER IND. INC.  1993 APPLIED MATERIALS INC 3536 
17 HEWLETT PACKARD CO. 1993 HITACHI LIMITED 3571 
18 RUBY TUESDAY INC.  1993 
WORLDWIDE RESTAURANT 
CNCPTS INC 
5812 
19 SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC.  1993 CABOT CORP 3533 
20 TRANSAMERICA CORP 1993 LOEWS CORP 6711 
21 ACXIOM CORP 1994 MCGRAW HILL COS INC 7370 
22 BOISE CASCADE CORP 1994 BT OFFICE PRODUCTS INTL INC 2421 
23 FLEMING COMPANIES INC 1994 NASH FINCH COMPANY 5141 
24 GEORGIAPACIFIC GROUP 1994 WEYERHAEUSER CO 2435 
25 LILLY (ELI) & CO 1994 WYETH 2834 
26 SPRINT FON GROUP 1994 CENTEL CORP 4813 
27 CENTURA BANKS INC 1994 AMERICAN FLETCHER CORP 6036 
28 CORE INDUSTRIES INC.  1994 WHITTAKER CORP 3429 
29 DEERE & CO.  1994 KUBOTA CORP 3523 
30 EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO.  1994 ROHM & HAAS CO 3861 
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Table (5.3) continued. 
NO. SAMPLE COMPANY 
ADOPTION 
YEAR 
CONTROL COMPANY 
SIC 
CODE 
31 GENCORP INC. 1994 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 3011 
32 INCSTAR CORP. 1994 A M A G PHARMACEUTICALS INC 2830 
33 INSTEEL INDUSTRIES 1994 NATIONAL STANDARD CO 3310 
34 OHIO EDISON CO. 1994 NORTHEAST UTILITIES 4911 
35 REYNOLDS METALS CO.  1994 KAISERTECH LTD 3353 
36 TENNECO INC.  1994 CHAMPION PARTS INC 3714 
37 WALLACE COMPUTER SERVICES  1994 MOORE WALLACE INC 2761 
38 ZOLTEK COS. INC.  1994 WOODWARD INC 3620 
39 ARMSTRONG HOLDINGS INC 1995 NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 2511 
40 BARD (C.R.) 1995 TELEFLEX INC 5086 
41 PERKINELMER INC 1995 BIO RAD LABORATORIES INC 3823 
42 SPX CORP 1995 GIDDINGS & LEWIS INC WIS 3540 
43 AMERICAN PRECISION IND.  1995 FRANKLIN ELECTRIC INC 3443 
44 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES 
INC.  
1995 E G & G INC (VISKASE COMPANIES) 2511 
45 BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS INC. 1995 PERKINELMER INC 5311 
46 EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.  1995 PANASONIC CORP 3621/3823 
47 IPALCO ENTERPRISES INC.  1995 TUCSON /U N S ENERGY CORP 4911 
48 KAISER ALLUMINUM CORP.  1995 MAXXAM INC 3334 
49 KNIGHT–RIDDER INC. 1995 NEW YORK TIMES CO 2711 
50 NEW JERSEY RESOURCES  1995 ATMOS ENERGY CORP 4924 
51 SEQUENT COMPUTER  1995 STRATUS COMPUTER INC 3570 
52 ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 1996 TELLABS INC 3679 
53 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 1996 CHIRON CORP 3861 
54 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 1996 BARD C R INC 3841 
55 DONNELLEY (R R) & SONS CO 1996 BOWNE & CO INC 3229 
56 GUIDANT CORP 1996 MEDTRONIC INC 3841 
57 KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT 1996 C M P GROUP INC 4911 
58 OLIN CORP 1996 F M C CORP 2810 
59 SILICON VY BANCSHARES 1996 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 6022/6710 
60 TUPPERWARE CORP 1996 ENVIRODYNE INDUSTRIES INC 3089 
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Table (5.3) continued. 
NO. SAMPLE COMPANY 
ADOPTION 
YEAR 
CONTROL COMPANY 
SIC 
CODE 
61  MILLER HERMAN 1996 H N I CORP 2531 
62 CINCINNATI MILACRON  1996 KENNAMETAL INC 3541 
63 HACH CO.  1996 COHERENT INC 3820 
64 KLLM TRANSPORT SERVICES 1996 MATLACK SYSTEMS INC 4210 
65 NEW ENGLAND BUSINESS SERVICES 1996 ENNIS INC 2761 
66 QUAKER STATE  1996 TESORO CORP 2911 
67 STRATTEC SECURITY CORP  1996 F M C CORP 8740 
68 TEKTRONIX 1996 SNAP ON INC 3825 
69 CDI CORP  1997 ROBERT HALF INTL INC 3269 
70 GC COMPANIES INC 1997 MARCUS CORP 7830 
71 JOHNSON OUTDOORS INC   1997 ELECTRO SCIENTIFIC INDS INC 3940 
72 MILLENNIUM CHEMICALS INC 1997 BIG THREE INDS INC 2813 
73 PHARMACIA CORP 1997 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 2823 
74 RYDER SYSTEM INC 1997 ROLLINS TRUCK LEASING CORP 6159 
75 TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 1997 UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES INC 8062 
76 WEBSTER FINL CRP WATERBURY 1997 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 6035 
77 FEDERALMOGUL CORP 1998 DANA HOLDING CORP 3562 
78 MATERIAL SCIENCES CORP 1998 SHAW GROUP INC 3470 
79 MONTANA POWER CO 1998 C H ENERGY GROUP INC 4911 
80 PENNEY (J C) CO 1998 DILLARDS INC 5311 
81 STANDARD MOTOR PRODS 1998 HARBINGER GROUP INC 3694 
82 BRADLEY PHARMACEUTICALS 1998 BALCHEM CORP 2830/5120 
83 BEST BUY CO INC 1998 RADIOSHACK CORP 5732 
84 INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS  1999 RALSTON PURINA CO 2041 
85 TOYS R US INC 1999 MICHAELS STORES INC 6711 
86 GENESCO 1999 FOOT LOCKER INC 2341 
87 MOLSON COORS 1999 ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC 2082 
88 SCHNITZER STEEL 2000 ENVIROSOURCE INC 3310 
89 HARSCO 2001 DYNAMIC MATERIALS CORP 3446 
  Source: Wallace, 1997 and Kleiman (1999), Stern Stewart & Co. brochure, Lexis-Nexis, Proxy 
Statement and 10-Q report and Wall Street Journal. 
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5.4 Methodology 
Defenders of economic value added (EVA) claim that it helps to enhance the investment 
activity that leads to a notable market reaction (Stewart, 1991). The object of the current 
research is to examine whether the adoption of EVA has the predicted effects on 
investment behaviour. If the market reacts to this claim we should observe some 
enhancement in stock performance (abnormal return). In order to test this claim we use 
the event study methodology. In practice event study methodology has been used for 
two fundamental reasons: 1) to test the market efficiency, particularly testing the null 
hypothesis that the market (price) incorporates all the public information efficiently and 
2) to assess the impact of some event announcement on the firm’s wealth. 
Fama et al. (1969) made two modifications to the event study methodology which have 
later become standard. First, in their response to the market’s stationarity concern they 
suggested five to seven years data as an optimal period for monthly observation studies. 
Second, they stated that if the event date is included in the event’s window to estimate 
the parameters, the estimation process will lead to a bias coefficient because the 
disturbances are non-zero.  This bias is in decline as long as the data periods matched 
that of Fama et al. (1969).    
The current research will use the same methodology as Wallace’s (1997) except that 
while Wallace’s sample consists of those firms adopting a residual income-based 
management system, this research uses only firms adopting EVA for incentive 
compensation purposes. Moreover, while Wallace used a five-year return to conduct his 
research, the current research uses the monthly market returns and focuses on long-term 
abnormal stock return where we use statistics to detect monthly abnormal returns for the 
period 1960-2012. In order to estimate the parameters of the return equation, our sample 
includes observations since the 1960s prior to the adoption, the year of adoption, and up 
to the year 2012 after the adoption. The estimated event study window is set between 30 
months prior to the adoption date and 30 months after the adoption. However, as it is 
difficult to determine the accurate date of EVA adoption we consider the month of 
December, the earliest year the company released the adoption of EVA, as the event 
date.  
Many studies have discussed and examined the long-term financial performances after 
the occurrences of certain events such as the IPO, mergers and acquisitions and the most 
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popular event, the cash dividends. One common feature of these studies is that of the 
classical event approach, which fully intended to investigate very short-term events. In a 
string of remarkable papers, Barber and Lyon (1996, 1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999), revealed that the standard classical event study framework can lead to many 
partialities when applied to the measurement of long-term abnormal performances and 
recommended further study for such long-term events analysis. Consequently, Fama 
(1998) raised two important key issues regarding measuring long-term abnormal 
returns: first, the model’s ability to correct for risk when estimating abnormal returns is 
quite low and second, the estimation of abnormal returns is probably subject to a range 
of statistical biases. 
In the literature there are two methods to test the events and detect a long-run abnormal 
stock return: the cumulative abnormal return (hereafter, CAR) and the Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Return (hereafter, BHAR). The main difference between CAR and BHAR is 
mainly attributed to the compounding of the monthly return; while BHAR incorporates 
the effect of compounding CAR does not (Barber and Lyon, 1997).  
Regardless of the methodology used to measure the performance of the EVA adopter, 
CAR or BHAR, we need to measure the abnormal return. The abnormal return is the 
difference between the actual return and the expected return of a security. Events in the 
theory of finance can usually be classified as information that has not already been 
contained in the share’s market price.  
According to the market model, the most popular in practice, for each asset i the asset 
returns are given by: 
                        
                                 
          
where     is the return on individual asset,   ,    are parameters, and      is the return 
on the market portfolio
29
 (or the control firms, as the current research intends  using) . 
Following this the parameter estimates of the market model through the estimation 
period were used to calculate the abnormal return, that is: 
                                                             
29 In application, a broad-based stock index, such as S&P 500 or value weighted indices, are used as the 
market portfolio. 
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where   
 ,   
  are the parameters estimated during the estimation period,          
represents the abnormal return. The average abnormal return (    ) during month s can 
be defined as: 
     
 
  
     
  
   
 
where      is the abnormal return estimator for security i and    is the number of the 
companies in the sample during month s. The estimator of the cumulative average 
abnormal return in the window of (  ,  ) is: 
              
  
    
  
Then, as we refer to the abnormal return in our study as the difference between the 
return of the event firm and that of the matched firm or portfolio index (S&P500), the 
average CAR, is the summation of the average abnormal return (AR), are given as 
follows: 
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where    
  indicates the return on event firm i in event month t,    
   indicates the return 
on the benchmark firm (control firm) or portfolio during the same period, and    
indicates the number of event firms in event month t. 
The second method used to calculate the abnormal return is BHAR which is defined as 
the compound returns on the event firm less the compound return on a control firm / 
reference portfolio- that is BHAR: 
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where   is the period of investment in months,    
  is the return on the event firm 
(adopter firm) i in month t.    
  is the benchmark returns. As our main method to test the 
event is BHAR it is more efficient to highlight the skewness problem inherited within 
the process of making inferences using BHAR. This problem, as Barber and Lyon 
(1997) reported, is mainly attributed to new listing and rebalancing biases. In order to 
conduct the significance test in event time using BHAR, the following conventional t-
statistic is used: 
NBHAR
RAHB
t
i )( 



   
where RAHB  is the cross sectional sample mean, )(  iBHAR  is the cross-sectional 
standard deviation, and N  is the number of EVA adopter firms. As this conventional 
test is likely to be skewed, we use a bootstrap correction, originally constructed by 
Johnson (1978), that is:  
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where ˆ  is the coefficient of skewness, and )(/   iBHARRAHBS  . This adjustment 
was recommended by Lyon et al. (1999) because of the assumed skewness of BHAR 
returns. They use the standard bootstrap procedure with bootstrap sample size of 4/N . 
Similarly, Kothari and Warner (1997) state that, drawing statistical inferences from a 
bootstrap approach is likely to be a better technique for statistical testing of long-term 
stock abnormal performance. However, while bootstrapping is the best action to remedy 
skewness it fails to address the theme of cross-sectional correlation and 
Heteroscedasticity. 
To my knowledge, the inherent skewness problem cannot be addressed in a cross-
sectional test and although Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that for t-statistics to be 
corrected for cross-sectional dependence these are not t-statistics that are simultaneously 
corrected for skewness.  In any event, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) strongly preferred to 
use calendar time methods to allow for cross-sectional correlations. The issue of 
Heteroscedasticity is not addressed by conducting the ordinary bootstrap either. We 
would recommend the use of the wild bootstrap instead.  This standard procedure has 
the advantage that it maintains the first and second moments of the parent distribution. 
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The difference between these corrections methods, the ordinary and wild bootstrap, is 
simple. Assume that the residuals from a regression are iˆ  (in our case
RAHBBHARii ˆ ). In the regular ordinary bootstrap we resample by drawing 
NN *  residuals,
*ˆ
i , with replacement from the series iˆ . In the wild bootstrap we 
produce the bootstrap residuals 
*ˆ
i  as the product of the original residuals and an 
independent random variable, i , with zero mean and unit variance. This ensures that 
the bootstrap variance will be the same as that of the parent distribution. For example, 
i  can be standard normal and hence  
0)ˆ()()ˆ( *  iii EEE   and )ˆ()ˆ()()ˆ(
*
iiii VVVV    
However, if the data is skewed, re-sampling based on the standard normal will yield 
zero skewness since 0)(
3 iE  . To preserve skewness, Liu (1988) and Mammen (1993) 
suggest ways of obtaining 1)(
3 iE  .  One suggestion is: 
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This will guarantee that 0)( iE  , and  1)()(
32  ii EE   . However, this scheme will 
not preserve the kurtosis of the parent distribution since 2)(
4 iE  . An alternative 
scheme (see Davidson et al. (2007)) is to use 







ppw
ppw
i
1..1
2
1
..1
  
This will preserve the mean, variance and kurtosis ( 0)( iE  , and 1)()(
42  ii EE  ) 
but not skewness ( 0)(
3 iE  ). Accomplishing both preservations is not possible. 
Davidson et al. (2007) recommend some combination that will achieve partial 
refinement. However, here we advocate combining the skewness adjusted t-statistic 
with the kurtosis preserving wild bootstrap. Providing the skewness adjustment of 
Johnson (1978) is fairly accurate, the parent distribution of the adjusted statistic is 
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expected to be symmetric. Therefore, achieving 1)(
4 iE   will be more important than 
achieving 1)(
3 iE  . Accordingly, we adopt this combined Skewness-Adjusted and 
Kurtosis Preserving Bootstrap approach in our tests. 
A further serious problem that we confront both in the EVA adopter sample and the 
control firm sample is that of firms that de-list within the measurement period. Delisting 
can result from acquisition, bankruptcy or going private. Liu and Strong (2006) replace 
de-listed firm returns by either zero or the risk-free rate. They find similar results in 
both cases. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p.298) 
replace all de-listed firms with the benchmark return. This has the potential to create an 
upward bias in the estimated BHAR returns, since some of these de-listings are 
bankruptcies. However, for the purpose of our study we use the following rules. If an 
observation is missing within a valid set of observations we set the return equal to zero. 
If the de-listings are due to bankruptcy we replace the missing return by -1. Finally, if 
the delisting is due to a value preserving event such as a merger, we replace the return 
by the benchmark return. We use CRSP description as a distinguishing feature of the 
delisted firms. The Delisting Code is a 3-digit integer code. It either (1) indicates that a 
security is still trading or (2) provides a specific reason for delisting.  All delisting codes 
are categorized by the first digit of the delisting code. The second and third digits of the 
delisting codes provide further details of delisting events. Additional delisting codes, 
specific to various delisting categories, have been created to indicate when an issue is 
closed to further research, or if the issue is pending further research. The most important 
codes are 241, 231, 233, 331, 251, 552 and 574. These categories of delisting are most 
likely to be stocks that are either worthless or some distance from providing 
shareholders with any terminal value, and consequently we treat these cases as if 
investors lost all their investment. Table 5.4 describes these delisting codes. 
It should be noted that benchmarking using the pre-event period from the same event 
firm is not used in this thesis. Previous authors have warned against using this approach. 
Specifically, Wallace (1997, p.281) states “Two major validity threats to the analysis of 
an interrupted time series are the possibility that (1) some event other than the treatment 
(a history threat), or (2) natural changes in a firm through time (a maturation threat) cause 
the change in the time series (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The using of a properly selected 
control group decreases these threats since both treatment and control firms are subject to 
potential omitted variables and primarily differ based on the partitioning variable.” 
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Table 5.4 Codes and Descriptions of Delisting Codes 
Code Category 
100 Active 
200 Mergers 
300 Exchanges 
400 Liquidations 
500 Dropped 
600 Expirations 
900 Domestics that became Foreign 
Source: Centre for Research in Security Prices CRSP 
 
5.5 Cumulative Return Results 
As discussed earlier we intend to test the EVA adoption event using CAR and BHAR 
approaches. The following section will shed light on the statistical properties of returns, 
abnormal returns and aggregate abnormal returns, BHAR and CAR, and the empirical 
results obtained and discuss the effects of bootstrapping. The statistics are as follows: 
the mean, the conventional t-test, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, 
kurtosis, the 25th percentile and 75th percentile. A reduced version of tables was used 
to discuss our findings while the complete version of tables showing the full 60 months 
event period for all cases is given in Appendix 2. 
Table 5.5.1 presents the statistical behaviour of adopter firms’ return for the first year 
and the last year of the events window together with the mean returns of January, June 
and December of each year in between. The results show that all the  adopter firms have 
a positive mean return in the first year except for the month of March where the mean 
return is negative and insignificant (-0.007, t-statistic = -0.697) and then the mean return 
remains positive in the next three years where January in year four has the highest 
significant mean return (0.049, t-statistic = 2.609). In year five, the adopter firms start 
with a negative and insignificant mean return (-0.003, t-statistic -0.262) and then result 
in being mostly insignificant, to reach the highest and significant mean return through 
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the five year window (0.052, t-statistic = 4.204). Subsequently, the mean return of 
whole adopter firms decreases and continues to be insignificant. The last two months of 
year five reveal a poor and insignificant increase in the mean return. The EVA adopter 
firms exhibit lower skewness and kurtosis than matching firms. The result shows that 
adopter firms have the highest skewness (3.270) and kurtosis (22.470) in month 25. One 
important observation is that the adopter firms begin to generate a negative return 
during the first three months after the adoption event.  
Similarly, Table 5.5.2 describes the same descriptive statistics of matching firms 
(control firms). The matching firms are notable for its positive mean return (few with 
negative mean returns). The cross-sectional mean matching firms’ return fluctuates 
from -0.003 to 0.028. Another notable feature of matching firms is that skewness and 
kurtosis are relatively higher than in adopter firms and highly volatile, attaining a 
maximum of 8.1 (skewness) and 71.74 (kurtosis) in month 42. However, the volatility 
difference between the benchmark and the event asset may seriously distort the 
performance of tests on CAR. Unlike the adoption firms, the match firm shows a 
positive return during the three months following the adoption date. 
Turning to the abnormal return (AR) which is obtained by subtracting the matching 
firms’ return from EVA adopters’ returns, Table 5.5.3 shows that the whole adopter 
firms’ performance varies from month to month.  Month 11, 52 and 56 are the only 
months that appear to be statistically significant where AR and t- Conventional are 
(0.027, 2.337), (0.078, 4.579) and (-0.044, -2.641) respectively. It is common to find 
adopter firms underperforming the matching firms in many months during the event 
window. However, the matching firms showed some performance improvement during 
the subsequent months of the date of the adoption. Put simply the matching firms 
outperform adopting firms in most of the months that followed the adoption.  
Table 5.5.4 reveals an interesting story about the overall performance, the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) for the 10 years after the adoption date. Most of the CARs 
appear to be positive but insignificant except for the months 27, 28, 29 and 30 which are 
three years after the event date, where the mean return is positive and significant. The 
result also shows up as positive but provides an insignificant performance following the 
event date where the mean return increases dramatically for a few months after the 
adoption released then the performance decreases in year 10 where the adopters 
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underperform the matching firms in the last 4 months in year 10. Figure 5.5.3 depicts 
AR against CAR based on matching firms’ benchmarking.  
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Table 5.5.1 Summary statistics for adopter firm return 
Month N Mean t-stat St. Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.028 2.549 0.103 -0.266 0.376 0.347 1.679 -0.031 0.085 
2 87 0.016 1.729 0.087 -0.161 0.444 1.962 7.116 -0.035 0.042 
3 87 -0.007 -0.697 0.090 -0.284 0.332 0.401 2.201 -0.068 0.045 
4 87 0.028 3.007 0.087 -0.281 0.235 0.124 1.395 -0.017 0.068 
5 87 0.018 2.509 0.068 -0.145 0.230 0.281 0.717 -0.025 0.053 
6 87 0.008 0.924 0.077 -0.177 0.208 0.283 0.129 -0.039 0.053 
7 87 0.010 0.833 0.109 -0.215 0.324 0.363 0.331 -0.059 0.074 
8 87 0.007 0.599 0.113 -0.469 0.343 -0.795 3.365 -0.040 0.073 
9 87 0.015 1.615 0.087 -0.216 0.198 -0.278 -0.008 -0.033 0.070 
10 87 0.002 0.252 0.075 -0.231 0.160 -0.382 0.537 -0.035 0.051 
11 87 0.028 2.762 0.095 -0.214 0.300 0.260 0.649 -0.028 0.082 
12 87 0.018 2.000 0.083 -0.188 0.260 -0.197 0.615 -0.030 0.066 
13 87 0.004 0.380 0.105 -0.327 0.479 0.513 4.981 -0.048 0.054 
18 87 0.027 2.434 0.105 -0.273 0.484 1.296 4.925 -0.027 0.054 
24 87 0.003 0.313 0.090 -0.247 0.220 -0.059 -0.145 -0.074 0.061 
25 87 0.031 1.636 0.179 -0.543 1.200 3.270 22.470 -0.027 0.064 
26 87 0.022 2.074 0.099 -0.206 0.403 0.769 2.926 -0.033 0.068 
27 87 0.033 1.869 0.165 -0.407 0.934 2.592 12.668 -0.038 0.067 
28 87 0.014 1.016 0.130 -0.308 0.631 1.122 5.422 -0.045 0.073 
29 87 0.017 1.657 0.096 -0.280 0.316 -0.022 2.444 -0.036 0.065 
30 87 0.005 0.509 0.087 -0.242 0.299 0.257 1.603 -0.038 0.063 
31 87 -0.013 -1.157 0.106 -0.307 0.395 0.536 3.025 -0.066 0.043 
32 87 -0.033 -2.527 0.120 -0.434 0.342 -0.521 1.906 -0.076 0.029 
33 87 -0.014 -1.158 0.109 -0.473 0.237 -1.246 4.010 -0.050 0.049 
34 87 0.008 0.690 0.110 -0.402 0.281 -0.478 1.829 -0.042 0.078 
35 87 0.034 2.356 0.136 -0.487 0.495 -0.232 4.345 -0.033 0.094 
36 87 0.019 1.613 0.109 -0.319 0.393 0.230 1.717 -0.044 0.081 
37 87 0.049 2.609 0.176 -0.295 0.968 2.486 10.111 -0.033 0.082 
42 86 0.016 0.963 0.150 -0.520 0.609 0.447 3.843 -0.054 0.071 
48 85 0.014 0.994 0.128 -0.265 0.391 0.351 1.198 -0.058 0.074 
49 85 -0.003 -0.262 0.096 -0.257 0.375 0.844 3.273 -0.070 0.041 
50 85 0.000 -0.016 0.134 -0.393 0.430 0.681 2.207 -0.077 0.065 
51 85 0.003 0.239 0.109 -0.360 0.368 0.213 1.678 -0.078 0.065 
52 85 0.052 4.204 0.114 -0.251 0.437 0.499 0.929 -0.020 0.121 
53 85 0.022 1.769 0.115 -0.254 0.599 1.434 6.462 -0.041 0.073 
54 85 0.017 1.299 0.120 -0.340 0.383 0.598 1.488 -0.060 0.061 
55 84 -0.020 -1.268 0.143 -0.644 0.309 -1.241 5.425 -0.080 0.058 
56 84 -0.032 -2.207 0.132 -0.536 0.315 -0.610 2.925 -0.094 0.021 
57 84 -0.008 -0.809 0.095 -0.343 0.250 -0.232 1.994 -0.071 0.042 
58 83 -0.009 -0.514 0.153 -0.811 0.311 -1.607 8.262 -0.078 0.076 
59 83 0.028 1.632 0.154 -0.335 0.900 2.204 12.396 -0.035 0.075 
60 82 0.006 0.432 0.118 -0.429 0.422 0.295 3.540 -0.052 0.048 
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Table 5.5.2 Summary statistic for matching firms return 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.005 0.535 0.078 -0.302 0.260 -0.246 3.375 -0.035 0.039 
2 87 0.012 0.780 0.145 -0.297 1.006 3.703 25.593 -0.047 0.054 
3 87 0.000 -0.014 0.117 -0.611 0.430 -1.728 11.232 -0.023 0.048 
4 87 0.024 2.301 0.097 -0.167 0.372 0.957 1.599 -0.029 0.064 
5 87 0.000 -0.031 0.108 -0.263 0.497 1.211 5.151 -0.043 0.036 
6 87 0.014 1.450 0.090 -0.250 0.311 0.452 1.768 -0.034 0.058 
7 87 0.038 3.028 0.118 -0.206 0.556 1.894 5.809 -0.021 0.076 
8 87 0.022 1.511 0.136 -0.313 0.914 3.418 21.616 -0.020 0.047 
9 87 0.015 1.871 0.074 -0.176 0.226 -0.102 0.668 -0.025 0.061 
10 87 0.002 0.172 0.089 -0.247 0.502 1.808 11.220 -0.037 0.035 
11 87 0.001 0.111 0.081 -0.396 0.145 -1.529 5.858 -0.022 0.051 
12 87 0.024 2.490 0.089 -0.438 0.269 -1.077 8.266 -0.012 0.064 
13 87 0.017 1.905 0.085 -0.143 0.311 0.982 1.526 -0.027 0.062 
18 87 0.018 2.008 0.084 -0.231 0.238 0.020 0.809 -0.035 0.073 
24 87 0.014 1.464 0.091 -0.357 0.249 -0.568 3.281 -0.033 0.068 
25 87 0.000 0.047 0.087 -0.256 0.154 -0.848 0.686 -0.023 0.049 
26 87 -0.008 -0.805 0.094 -0.388 0.195 -1.191 3.455 -0.039 0.051 
27 87 -0.011 -0.922 0.114 -0.439 0.337 -0.408 2.640 -0.059 0.040 
28 87 0.013 1.188 0.104 -0.272 0.383 0.546 2.365 -0.027 0.064 
29 87 0.011 0.817 0.129 -0.395 0.406 -0.357 2.738 -0.027 0.073 
30 87 0.017 1.759 0.089 -0.244 0.252 0.011 0.829 -0.026 0.062 
31 87 0.020 1.611 0.113 -0.306 0.623 1.682 9.072 -0.026 0.072 
32 87 0.014 1.178 0.114 -0.206 0.385 0.574 0.999 -0.051 0.065 
33 87 0.004 0.418 0.094 -0.179 0.415 0.977 3.401 -0.049 0.046 
34 87 0.025 1.003 0.234 -0.224 2.000 7.133 60.273 -0.044 0.044 
35 87 0.036 2.628 0.127 -0.228 0.604 1.986 7.062 -0.019 0.076 
36 87 0.013 1.289 0.096 -0.251 0.338 0.753 2.362 -0.041 0.062 
37 87 0.008 0.646 0.119 -0.318 0.352 0.100 1.359 -0.036 0.071 
42 87 0.072 1.876 0.358 -0.317 3.227 8.100 71.735 0.000 0.089 
48 87 0.031 2.106 0.137 -0.216 0.773 2.635 11.500 -0.028 0.058 
49 87 0.015 1.314 0.103 -0.286 0.485 1.074 4.960 -0.040 0.048 
50 87 0.014 1.090 0.117 -0.286 0.596 1.291 6.501 -0.039 0.068 
51 87 0.007 0.575 0.107 -0.282 0.344 0.506 1.475 -0.038 0.036 
52 87 -0.025 -2.161 0.108 -0.412 0.250 -0.587 2.089 -0.074 0.025 
53 87 -0.004 -0.378 0.103 -0.488 0.223 -1.418 5.534 -0.034 0.048 
54 87 0.010 0.920 0.097 -0.234 0.393 0.972 3.520 -0.032 0.042 
55 86 0.003 0.236 0.099 -0.261 0.310 0.523 1.764 -0.053 0.039 
56 86 0.014 1.144 0.112 -0.197 0.567 1.898 7.247 -0.045 0.049 
57 86 -0.001 -0.098 0.125 -0.382 0.395 0.065 2.282 -0.050 0.038 
58 86 0.014 1.393 0.094 -0.291 0.407 0.610 3.651 -0.041 0.068 
59 85 0.025 2.504 0.093 -0.180 0.306 0.450 0.741 -0.024 0.082 
60 85 0.006 0.604 0.094 -0.270 0.283 0.086 1.305 -0.032 0.055 
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Table 5.5.3   Matching firm based abnormal returns (AR) 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.024 1.599 0.138 -0.259 0.565 1.104 3.605 -0.061 0.084 
2 87 0.004 0.233 0.159 -0.761 0.530 -0.685 6.788 -0.046 0.063 
3 87 -0.007 -0.453 0.134 -0.360 0.509 0.711 2.756 -0.068 0.045 
4 87 0.004 0.310 0.122 -0.305 0.401 0.288 0.763 -0.090 0.090 
5 87 0.019 1.443 0.120 -0.403 0.318 -0.513 1.788 -0.045 0.091 
6 87 -0.006 -0.514 0.115 -0.380 0.233 -0.504 0.659 -0.075 0.074 
7 87 -0.029 -1.849 0.144 -0.601 0.324 -0.479 2.117 -0.123 0.052 
8 87 -0.015 -0.703 0.196 -1.190 0.302 -3.336 17.218 -0.052 0.076 
9 87 0.000 0.020 0.110 -0.271 0.263 -0.071 -0.176 -0.084 0.074 
10 87 0.000 0.030 0.120 -0.561 0.291 -0.960 4.838 -0.057 0.054 
11 87 0.027 2.337 0.109 -0.207 0.347 0.744 0.764 -0.041 0.066 
12 87 -0.006 -0.419 0.131 -0.416 0.531 -0.179 4.303 -0.049 0.057 
13 87 -0.013 -1.131 0.107 -0.361 0.233 -0.543 1.182 -0.071 0.051 
18 87 0.009 0.656 0.133 -0.377 0.431 0.214 1.075 -0.067 0.083 
24 87 -0.011 -0.900 0.117 -0.295 0.286 -0.079 -0.205 -0.092 0.071 
25 87 0.031 1.492 0.193 -0.586 1.096 1.886 10.732 -0.071 0.102 
26 87 0.030 2.271 0.123 -0.315 0.442 0.525 2.012 -0.043 0.082 
27 87 0.044 2.221 0.186 -0.345 0.934 1.475 5.798 -0.047 0.135 
28 87 0.001 0.050 0.167 -0.479 0.631 0.452 2.678 -0.103 0.094 
29 87 0.006 0.355 0.150 -0.442 0.391 -0.044 0.909 -0.086 0.078 
30 87 -0.012 -0.887 0.126 -0.364 0.328 -0.328 0.815 -0.049 0.070 
31 87 -0.033 -2.186 0.140 -0.585 0.445 -0.093 3.718 -0.101 0.034 
32 87 -0.047 -2.785 0.157 -0.588 0.342 -0.857 1.392 -0.117 0.061 
33 87 -0.018 -1.159 0.143 -0.473 0.316 -0.915 2.029 -0.069 0.062 
34 87 -0.017 -0.632 0.252 -1.926 0.421 -5.049 38.721 -0.089 0.106 
35 87 -0.001 -0.075 0.173 -0.615 0.546 -0.571 3.054 -0.071 0.079 
36 87 0.006 0.377 0.139 -0.409 0.358 -0.387 0.768 -0.074 0.092 
37 87 0.041 1.853 0.207 -0.493 0.968 1.144 4.721 -0.055 0.111 
42 86 -0.057 -1.385 0.384 -3.144 0.682 -6.126 50.025 -0.110 0.065 
48 85 -0.019 -0.892 0.192 -0.809 0.442 -1.386 4.719 -0.061 0.101 
49 85 -0.018 -1.112 0.150 -0.560 0.399 -0.198 2.153 -0.087 0.060 
50 85 -0.014 -0.784 0.167 -0.637 0.411 -0.330 1.971 -0.096 0.064 
51 85 -0.007 -0.452 0.153 -0.448 0.354 -0.470 1.557 -0.086 0.078 
52 85 0.078 4.579 0.158 -0.246 0.583 0.612 0.774 -0.017 0.165 
53 85 0.024 1.443 0.150 -0.325 0.536 0.729 1.273 -0.076 0.098 
54 85 0.011 0.706 0.149 -0.487 0.365 -0.258 1.267 -0.057 0.089 
55 84 -0.021 -1.174 0.167 -0.660 0.432 -0.644 3.457 -0.077 0.040 
56 84 -0.048 -2.641 0.166 -0.643 0.299 -0.871 1.714 -0.143 0.046 
57 84 -0.007 -0.488 0.134 -0.450 0.403 -0.189 1.329 -0.071 0.078 
58 83 -0.026 -1.354 0.174 -0.851 0.444 -1.224 6.419 -0.114 0.061 
59 82 0.004 0.214 0.160 -0.331 0.823 1.348 7.517 -0.085 0.080 
60 82 0.003 0.178 0.145 -0.429 0.421 0.207 0.865 -0.084 0.083 
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Table 5.5.4 Matching firm based cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.024 1.599 0.138 -0.259 0.565 1.104 3.605 -0.061 0.084 
2 87 0.028 1.160 0.223 -0.968 0.980 0.037 7.417 -0.084 0.130 
3 87 0.021 0.801 0.247 -0.624 0.932 0.711 2.073 -0.124 0.136 
4 87 0.025 0.881 0.267 -0.615 1.055 0.588 2.004 -0.124 0.146 
5 87 0.044 1.452 0.282 -0.657 0.799 0.310 0.567 -0.150 0.202 
6 87 0.038 1.284 0.273 -0.768 0.900 0.180 1.042 -0.141 0.212 
7 87 0.009 0.276 0.302 -0.705 0.983 0.206 1.239 -0.140 0.133 
8 87 -0.006 -0.183 0.298 -0.768 0.752 -0.209 0.337 -0.165 0.173 
9 87 -0.006 -0.180 0.290 -0.745 0.671 -0.311 0.146 -0.172 0.160 
10 87 -0.005 -0.145 0.335 -0.915 0.808 -0.289 0.600 -0.191 0.196 
11 87 0.022 0.595 0.345 -0.948 1.100 0.018 0.958 -0.183 0.227 
12 87 0.016 0.388 0.388 -1.327 1.249 -0.336 1.909 -0.177 0.218 
13 87 0.003 0.070 0.411 -1.352 1.416 -0.158 2.011 -0.195 0.211 
14 87 0.046 1.058 0.408 -0.980 1.408 0.162 1.116 -0.160 0.246 
15 87 0.069 1.526 0.420 -1.059 1.380 0.166 1.275 -0.163 0.277 
16 87 0.059 1.303 0.420 -0.955 1.225 0.302 0.577 -0.188 0.294 
17 87 0.065 1.429 0.426 -1.002 1.238 0.108 0.587 -0.184 0.319 
18 87 0.075 1.502 0.463 -1.129 1.558 0.416 1.457 -0.192 0.285 
19 87 0.072 1.319 0.508 -1.017 1.835 0.848 2.319 -0.246 0.346 
20 87 0.079 1.454 0.505 -1.019 1.820 0.721 2.139 -0.254 0.334 
21 87 0.033 0.674 0.460 -1.006 1.603 0.273 1.144 -0.306 0.290 
22 87 0.026 0.527 0.459 -1.044 1.543 -0.023 0.814 -0.228 0.291 
23 87 0.052 1.044 0.462 -1.094 1.446 -0.122 0.341 -0.261 0.356 
24 87 0.040 0.754 0.500 -1.261 1.642 0.073 0.754 -0.292 0.369 
25 87 0.071 1.272 0.523 -1.090 2.001 0.394 1.352 -0.355 0.345 
26 87 0.101 1.708 0.554 -1.122 2.078 0.494 1.298 -0.235 0.371 
27 87 0.146 2.157 0.630 -1.204 3.011 1.126 4.581 -0.252 0.414 
28 87 0.147 2.070 0.661 -1.683 3.642 1.433 8.619 -0.189 0.450 
29 87 0.152 2.104 0.675 -1.827 3.736 1.451 8.893 -0.225 0.392 
30 87 0.140 1.984 0.659 -1.653 3.546 1.312 7.815 -0.206 0.451 
31 87 0.108 1.480 0.678 -2.238 3.240 0.548 5.698 -0.229 0.430 
32 87 0.061 0.819 0.690 -2.132 3.582 1.105 7.834 -0.355 0.365 
33 87 0.043 0.541 0.739 -2.160 3.865 1.089 8.359 -0.344 0.381 
34 87 0.026 0.312 0.770 -2.198 3.803 0.774 6.823 -0.391 0.397 
35 87 0.024 0.279 0.817 -2.455 4.024 0.587 7.305 -0.366 0.454 
36 87 0.030 0.343 0.818 -2.698 3.949 0.532 6.817 -0.376 0.442 
37 87 0.071 0.847 0.783 -2.314 3.756 0.757 5.666 -0.342 0.468 
38 87 0.084 1.022 0.771 -2.051 3.471 0.488 4.295 -0.288 0.455 
39 87 0.098 1.173 0.776 -2.042 3.450 0.364 4.015 -0.272 0.469 
40 87 0.122 1.424 0.800 -2.163 3.584 0.473 3.991 -0.249 0.527 
41 87 0.150 1.757 0.796 -1.955 3.685 0.674 4.038 -0.287 0.607 
42 86 0.080 0.821 0.903 -2.904 3.946 0.401 4.149 -0.365 0.621 
43 86 0.060 0.585 0.945 -2.737 3.898 0.425 3.237 -0.421 0.650 
44 86 0.033 0.314 0.984 -2.739 4.161 0.553 3.481 -0.464 0.583 
45 86 0.020 0.171 1.071 -3.462 4.693 0.378 4.421 -0.472 0.605 
46 85 0.014 0.116 1.099 -4.056 4.444 0.104 4.501 -0.495 0.535 
47 85 0.033 0.280 1.101 -3.661 4.162 0.280 3.228 -0.500 0.523 
48 85 0.015 0.119 1.146 -4.384 3.927 -0.023 3.568 -0.468 0.538 
49 85 -0.003 -0.026 1.137 -4.288 4.037 0.117 3.556 -0.547 0.474 
50 85 -0.017 -0.140 1.151 -4.287 4.277 0.233 3.597 -0.607 0.522 
51 85 -0.025 -0.200 1.153 -4.242 4.371 0.181 3.441 -0.659 0.548 
52 85 0.053 0.420 1.172 -4.424 4.365 0.049 3.528 -0.503 0.623 
53 85 0.077 0.626 1.133 -4.291 4.290 0.103 3.763 -0.540 0.626 
54 85 0.088 0.718 1.135 -4.519 3.803 -0.174 3.531 -0.493 0.666 
55 84 0.052 0.408 1.171 -4.644 3.725 -0.301 3.115 -0.490 0.693 
56 84 0.004 0.033 1.181 -4.931 3.412 -0.593 3.500 -0.542 0.635 
57 84 -0.003 -0.022 1.186 -4.677 3.419 -0.424 2.862 -0.548 0.645 
58 83 -0.037 -0.275 1.233 -4.787 3.553 -0.476 3.240 -0.511 0.628 
59 82 -0.035 -0.262 1.215 -4.824 3.280 -0.465 3.126 -0.616 0.636 
60 82 -0.032 -0.245 1.198 -4.538 3.115 -0.424 2.574 -0.581 0.655 
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Figure 5.5.3 Depicts AR against CAR based on matching firms 
 
 
Another benchmark used to analyse the behaviour of the EVA adopter is the S&P500 
market returns. Table 5.5.5 summarises the results and shows that the majority of mean 
returns are positive and significant. Only five months appear insignificant. The 
distribution of the mean return is Platykurtic (Kurtosis < 3) and left skewed 
(Skewness<0).  
Table 5.5.6 describes the statistic of the abnormal return which in this case is obtained 
by subtracting the benchmarking (S&P500) return from the EVA adopters’ returns. The 
mean return is negative and insignificant for the majority of months and negative and 
significant in months 13 and 58 where the mean return and t-statistic are (-0.024, -
2.312) for month 13 and (-0.041, -2.509) for month 58.  
Table 5.5.7 indicates that, in nearly all months, adopter firms outperform the market 
with small variances which does not increase in the best of cases more than 8.5%. The 
mean return based on CAR is positive and insignificant for most months except for 
months 34, 35 and 36. The months which are 4 years after the event date are negative 
and insignificant. All the CAR returns are skewed and leptokurtic, because of 
compounding process inherited in CAR calculations. However, the simple CAR based 
on matching firms and market benchmarking shows similar dynamics- the scale of the 
suggested outperformance is not the same. Firstly, the CAR based on matching firms is 
about twice as large as the CAR based on the market benchmark in the positive cases. 
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Secondly, CAR based on benchmarking is only negative between months 34 and 36. 
This is followed by an apparent upward trend (Figure 5.5.4). 
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Figure 5.5.4 
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Table 5.5.5 Summary statistic for market returns (S&P500) 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.026 8.810 0.027 -0.069 0.132 -0.549 4.995 0.010 0.033 
2 87 0.007 2.183 0.032 -0.092 0.070 0.051 0.333 -0.029 0.036 
3 87 0.001 0.258 0.035 -0.064 0.097 -0.132 -0.921 -0.043 0.027 
4 87 0.016 6.122 0.024 -0.031 0.077 0.007 0.186 0.009 0.028 
5 87 0.020 7.852 0.024 -0.025 0.092 0.283 0.878 0.012 0.036 
6 87 0.008 2.647 0.026 -0.048 0.054 0.124 -1.054 -0.017 0.023 
7 87 0.010 2.434 0.039 -0.046 0.088 0.058 -0.883 -0.012 0.032 
8 87 -0.006 -0.966 0.053 -0.146 0.061 -1.520 1.510 -0.024 0.034 
9 87 0.016 3.766 0.039 -0.082 0.062 -0.315 -1.362 -0.027 0.054 
10 87 0.014 3.499 0.038 -0.218 0.080 -2.402 15.396 -0.005 0.026 
11 87 0.021 4.466 0.045 -0.085 0.075 -0.501 -1.055 -0.013 0.059 
12 87 0.015 5.407 0.025 -0.022 0.112 0.899 1.989 0.010 0.017 
13 87 0.028 9.606 0.027 -0.069 0.071 -1.441 3.024 0.024 0.041 
18 87 0.016 5.375 0.029 -0.072 0.054 -0.726 -0.028 0.002 0.043 
24 87 0.018 5.871 0.028 -0.060 0.112 0.680 1.983 0.010 0.017 
25 87 0.023 6.738 0.031 -0.069 0.071 -1.151 1.137 0.010 0.041 
26 87 0.010 2.206 0.040 -0.092 0.070 -0.245 0.184 -0.020 0.036 
27 87 0.015 3.205 0.043 -0.064 0.097 -0.110 -0.583 -0.022 0.050 
28 87 0.022 7.145 0.029 -0.061 0.081 -0.186 0.224 0.009 0.038 
29 87 0.013 4.073 0.031 -0.025 0.092 0.250 -1.052 -0.019 0.036 
30 87 0.019 6.666 0.027 -0.072 0.054 -0.837 0.392 0.002 0.039 
31 87 0.003 0.548 0.043 -0.079 0.088 0.573 -0.800 -0.032 0.032 
32 87 -0.029 -4.131 0.066 -0.146 0.061 -0.700 -0.711 -0.057 0.019 
33 87 0.021 3.964 0.048 -0.110 0.062 -0.940 -0.524 -0.027 0.054 
34 87 0.023 5.489 0.039 -0.034 0.086 0.163 -1.123 -0.005 0.063 
35 87 0.035 7.383 0.044 -0.080 0.075 -1.570 1.542 0.019 0.060 
36 87 0.019 5.819 0.031 -0.060 0.112 0.180 -0.155 0.004 0.056 
37 87 0.023 6.415 0.034 -0.069 0.061 -1.074 0.473 0.010 0.041 
42 87 0.022 6.101 0.033 -0.072 0.054 -1.265 1.074 0.002 0.043 
48 87 0.022 6.048 0.033 -0.060 0.112 -0.329 0.171 0.006 0.056 
49 87 0.009 2.309 0.037 -0.051 0.061 -0.407 -1.082 -0.018 0.041 
50 87 -0.004 -0.727 0.046 -0.092 0.070 0.158 -0.272 -0.030 0.010 
51 87 0.025 4.629 0.051 -0.064 0.097 -0.339 -0.876 -0.018 0.050 
52 87 0.015 3.349 0.042 -0.061 0.081 -0.136 -0.958 -0.031 0.048 
53 87 0.000 0.103 0.029 -0.025 0.059 1.025 -0.435 -0.022 0.018 
54 87 0.017 4.282 0.037 -0.072 0.054 -1.205 0.565 0.002 0.043 
55 87 -0.008 -1.803 0.040 -0.079 0.078 0.724 0.545 -0.032 -0.011 
56 87 -0.028 -3.644 0.071 -0.146 0.061 -0.530 -0.889 -0.064 0.019 
57 87 -0.010 -1.659 0.059 -0.110 0.062 -0.048 -1.345 -0.053 0.053 
58 87 0.033 7.478 0.042 -0.034 0.086 -0.181 -1.404 -0.005 0.080 
59 87 0.020 3.468 0.054 -0.080 0.075 -1.003 -0.463 0.007 0.059 
60 87 0.022 5.637 0.036 -0.060 0.112 -0.558 0.221 0.004 0.056 
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Table 5.5.6 Market benchmark based abnormal return 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.106 -0.276 0.366 0.356 1.531 -0.052 0.058 
2 87 0.009 1.000 0.081 -0.131 0.374 1.858 5.855 -0.037 0.029 
3 87 -0.008 -0.872 0.082 -0.292 0.293 0.165 2.536 -0.050 0.035 
4 87 0.012 1.343 0.086 -0.270 0.225 0.343 1.038 -0.042 0.056 
5 87 -0.002 -0.294 0.065 -0.158 0.255 0.928 3.072 -0.035 0.026 
6 87 0.000 0.015 0.074 -0.157 0.186 0.343 0.150 -0.045 0.042 
7 87 0.000 -0.035 0.098 -0.182 0.306 0.494 1.003 -0.056 0.055 
8 87 0.013 1.198 0.100 -0.323 0.324 0.207 2.155 -0.037 0.056 
9 87 -0.001 -0.086 0.080 -0.199 0.183 -0.323 0.192 -0.055 0.048 
10 87 -0.012 -1.357 0.084 -0.226 0.269 -0.085 0.895 -0.055 0.043 
11 87 0.007 0.747 0.086 -0.255 0.259 0.107 1.254 -0.035 0.048 
12 87 0.003 0.352 0.085 -0.246 0.242 -0.175 0.947 -0.041 0.058 
13 87 -0.024 -2.312 0.097 -0.276 0.438 0.915 5.199 -0.085 0.030 
18 87 0.011 0.988 0.103 -0.313 0.429 0.832 3.849 -0.040 0.053 
24 87 -0.015 -1.395 0.099 -0.303 0.242 -0.244 0.158 -0.080 0.049 
25 87 0.009 0.439 0.187 -0.554 1.251 3.507 23.579 -0.050 0.043 
26 87 0.012 1.173 0.098 -0.276 0.423 0.690 3.402 -0.037 0.061 
27 87 0.018 1.052 0.161 -0.504 0.926 2.237 13.271 -0.045 0.051 
28 87 -0.008 -0.594 0.126 -0.282 0.617 1.461 6.553 -0.074 0.059 
29 87 0.004 0.380 0.090 -0.258 0.328 0.540 3.362 -0.042 0.048 
30 87 -0.015 -1.531 0.089 -0.297 0.259 0.038 1.378 -0.071 0.034 
31 87 -0.016 -1.437 0.102 -0.276 0.318 0.413 2.032 -0.069 0.031 
32 87 -0.003 -0.326 0.094 -0.288 0.323 -0.067 1.898 -0.049 0.051 
33 87 -0.034 -3.137 0.101 -0.419 0.174 -1.099 3.330 -0.079 0.030 
34 87 -0.015 -1.354 0.102 -0.397 0.201 -0.505 1.479 -0.073 0.048 
35 87 -0.001 -0.071 0.116 -0.407 0.436 0.323 4.137 -0.068 0.046 
36 87 0.000 -0.020 0.112 -0.375 0.375 -0.045 1.683 -0.056 0.062 
37 87 0.026 1.374 0.177 -0.336 0.933 2.242 9.183 -0.046 0.063 
42 86 -0.006 -0.356 0.153 -0.495 0.634 0.629 3.805 -0.075 0.050 
48 85 -0.008 -0.581 0.128 -0.314 0.387 0.195 1.161 -0.070 0.054 
49 85 -0.012 -1.139 0.097 -0.274 0.340 0.978 2.955 -0.065 0.016 
50 85 0.005 0.353 0.134 -0.372 0.450 0.875 2.491 -0.079 0.063 
51 85 -0.022 -1.806 0.112 -0.396 0.271 -0.503 0.962 -0.094 0.048 
52 85 0.037 2.833 0.120 -0.328 0.399 0.406 1.003 -0.037 0.075 
53 85 0.021 1.763 0.111 -0.235 0.594 1.648 7.204 -0.057 0.081 
54 85 0.001 0.049 0.121 -0.380 0.359 0.437 1.161 -0.070 0.072 
55 84 -0.012 -0.859 0.130 -0.565 0.293 -1.462 5.792 -0.070 0.054 
56 84 -0.006 -0.431 0.128 -0.482 0.261 -1.003 3.953 -0.055 0.057 
57 84 0.003 0.329 0.091 -0.290 0.278 0.010 0.834 -0.053 0.064 
58 83 -0.041 -2.509 0.150 -0.829 0.272 -1.724 8.354 -0.113 0.041 
59 82 0.008 0.488 0.148 -0.342 0.825 2.024 10.768 -0.063 0.053 
60 82 -0.016 -1.170 0.121 -0.368 0.418 0.575 2.300 -0.080 0.026 
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Table 5.5.7 Market benchmark based cumulative abnormal return 
Month N Mean t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.106 -0.276 0.366 0.356 1.531 -0.052 0.058 
2 87 0.011 0.852 0.122 -0.265 0.469 0.885 2.127 -0.064 0.072 
3 87 0.003 0.219 0.149 -0.405 0.539 0.545 2.396 -0.093 0.081 
4 87 0.016 0.871 0.171 -0.538 0.633 0.584 3.135 -0.081 0.094 
5 87 0.014 0.664 0.195 -0.610 0.888 0.698 4.973 -0.083 0.123 
6 87 0.014 0.663 0.197 -0.576 0.923 1.015 5.989 -0.077 0.102 
7 87 0.014 0.580 0.219 -0.667 0.905 1.214 5.324 -0.097 0.119 
8 87 0.026 0.984 0.251 -0.545 0.883 0.807 2.016 -0.131 0.168 
9 87 0.026 0.993 0.241 -0.381 0.891 1.160 2.549 -0.122 0.144 
10 87 0.013 0.479 0.263 -0.540 0.964 1.097 2.635 -0.138 0.140 
11 87 0.020 0.718 0.264 -0.422 1.105 1.323 3.711 -0.147 0.136 
12 87 0.024 0.785 0.280 -0.592 1.114 0.771 2.318 -0.126 0.169 
13 87 0.000 -0.014 0.318 -0.742 1.552 1.233 6.009 -0.176 0.150 
14 87 0.024 0.682 0.334 -0.737 1.606 1.152 5.598 -0.138 0.170 
15 87 0.040 1.059 0.348 -0.849 1.688 1.230 5.891 -0.115 0.184 
16 87 0.038 1.062 0.336 -0.698 1.566 1.666 5.495 -0.143 0.149 
17 87 0.043 1.128 0.352 -0.630 1.547 1.560 4.264 -0.153 0.141 
18 87 0.054 1.246 0.401 -0.602 1.976 1.935 6.541 -0.163 0.158 
19 87 0.062 1.324 0.436 -0.732 2.113 1.908 6.382 -0.173 0.188 
20 87 0.085 1.848 0.428 -0.740 2.063 1.737 5.677 -0.150 0.220 
21 87 0.063 1.332 0.439 -0.654 1.972 1.421 3.920 -0.201 0.261 
22 87 0.041 0.832 0.454 -0.965 1.809 1.003 2.496 -0.248 0.269 
23 87 0.060 1.217 0.463 -1.098 1.911 1.051 3.104 -0.205 0.309 
24 87 0.046 0.858 0.496 -1.269 1.657 0.719 1.912 -0.270 0.321 
25 87 0.054 0.979 0.519 -1.220 1.680 0.741 1.901 -0.256 0.319 
26 87 0.067 1.134 0.549 -1.397 1.822 0.696 2.080 -0.243 0.319 
27 87 0.085 1.253 0.633 -1.549 2.676 1.281 4.510 -0.234 0.364 
28 87 0.077 1.088 0.660 -1.566 3.293 1.732 7.175 -0.267 0.372 
29 87 0.081 1.145 0.657 -1.445 3.364 1.793 7.532 -0.267 0.379 
30 87 0.066 0.929 0.663 -1.513 3.172 1.535 5.988 -0.280 0.361 
31 87 0.050 0.722 0.651 -1.543 2.912 1.456 5.323 -0.286 0.293 
32 87 0.047 0.661 0.664 -1.531 3.235 1.488 6.305 -0.323 0.299 
33 87 0.013 0.175 0.696 -1.892 3.373 1.347 6.595 -0.325 0.270 
34 87 -0.002 -0.024 0.698 -2.289 3.123 0.880 5.305 -0.356 0.307 
35 87 -0.003 -0.035 0.714 -2.612 3.262 0.626 6.095 -0.372 0.309 
36 87 -0.003 -0.037 0.736 -2.423 3.300 0.800 5.023 -0.421 0.296 
37 87 0.023 0.296 0.730 -1.490 3.277 1.407 4.560 -0.455 0.322 
38 87 0.019 0.244 0.717 -1.642 2.958 1.123 3.300 -0.420 0.345 
39 87 0.014 0.178 0.739 -1.726 2.979 0.994 3.021 -0.436 0.306 
40 87 0.020 0.252 0.757 -1.796 3.062 1.336 3.738 -0.457 0.215 
41 87 0.051 0.643 0.746 -1.608 3.082 1.305 3.550 -0.399 0.286 
42 86 0.040 0.451 0.820 -2.102 3.263 1.243 3.686 -0.377 0.248 
43 86 0.036 0.392 0.860 -2.476 3.126 1.109 3.625 -0.386 0.270 
44 86 0.046 0.487 0.882 -2.441 3.434 1.126 3.882 -0.396 0.310 
45 86 0.042 0.426 0.924 -2.716 3.794 0.975 4.307 -0.386 0.322 
46 85 0.023 0.215 0.978 -2.872 3.575 0.941 3.907 -0.452 0.370 
47 85 0.044 0.404 0.997 -2.707 3.744 1.182 3.816 -0.531 0.333 
48 85 0.036 0.322 1.020 -2.359 3.972 1.188 3.480 -0.505 0.370 
49 85 0.024 0.218 1.002 -2.040 3.953 1.390 3.665 -0.585 0.333 
50 85 0.029 0.262 1.013 -2.068 3.804 1.295 3.024 -0.598 0.347 
51 85 0.007 0.063 1.014 -2.278 3.407 1.146 2.415 -0.627 0.319 
52 85 0.044 0.398 1.012 -2.350 3.688 1.147 2.863 -0.637 0.415 
53 85 0.065 0.610 0.982 -2.207 3.689 1.294 2.955 -0.603 0.420 
54 85 0.066 0.603 1.004 -2.135 3.794 1.207 2.439 -0.608 0.532 
55 84 0.065 0.577 1.028 -2.361 3.699 0.985 1.989 -0.531 0.544 
56 84 0.059 0.521 1.032 -2.833 3.497 0.657 1.688 -0.563 0.600 
57 84 0.062 0.544 1.044 -2.712 3.600 0.703 1.587 -0.563 0.543 
58 83 0.015 0.125 1.087 -3.542 3.824 0.432 2.448 -0.614 0.544 
59 82 0.028 0.238 1.083 -2.717 4.074 0.722 2.495 -0.524 0.551 
60 82 0.013 0.108 1.083 -2.920 4.003 0.598 2.310 -0.571 0.570 
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5.6. Buy and Hold Return Results  
In this section we will discuss the Buy and Hold Return (BH) approach as an optimal 
technique to test events. Table 5.6.1 shows the result for the BH of adopter firms. As 
expected the BH of the EVA adopter is both highly skewed and leptokurtic and the 
matching firms are alike. The BH of both adopter and matching firms rapidly grows 
after the adoption date. The adopting firms show a remarkable enhancement in 
performance in year 10 where the BH was not less than one per cent in the worst 
circumstances. There needs to be concern and caution when interpreting such an 
increase because this profitability enhancement might be attributed to the whole market 
and not only for the adoption firms. Furthermore, the return mean is positive and 
significant for both the event set and matching set. The BH begins to increase in month 
30 where it reaches 106.3% and 92.1% for adopter and matching firms respectively.  In 
comparison, the adopter firms mean return grows faster than the matching firms. On the 
other hand, the benchmarking (S&P500) copies the adopter firms in growing return but 
skewness and kurtosis appear to a lesser extent. Adopter firms returns are more skewed 
and leptokurtic. 
Our first results regarding the BHAR, presented in Table 5.6.3, show the BHAR derived 
from an EVA adopter firm.  The BHAR increases from an insignificant +1.0% after 9 
months to a significant 36.4% after 27 months, becoming insignificant thereafter and 
continuing to increase to 37.4% after 41 months, 40.2% after 45 months, and then starts 
to  decline to reach the lowest return of 4.3% after 59 months. All returns are skewed 
and leptokurtic. It is worth noting that the adopter’s buy and hold return (BHAR) itself 
is highly skewed and leptokurtic throughout the period and that the matching firm is 
also skewed and leptokurtic, but to a lesser extent. Table 5.6.5 presents the results from 
a comparison with the benchmarking portfolio (S&P500).  Generally, the BHARs are 
smaller in value than those obtained with matching firms’ benchmarks (As seen in 
figure 5.6.2). Once again the BHAR has a positive and insignificant mean return 
through the hold period, it is positive at month one (3%), rising to the highest and 
insignificant mean return of 20.6% after 29 months, three years and one  month after the 
event date. Beyond 29 months the rate of decline accelerates, with abnormal returns 
reaching 18.4% after 4 years and -2.7% after 5 years. The skewness and kurtosis of the 
BHAR based on matching firms is greater than under the benchmark S&P500. The 
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difference being attributable to the new issue and rebalancing issue in the benchmark 
portfolio compared to the matching firm benchmark.  
Table 5.6.1 Summary Statistic for BH: EVA adopter BH returns 
Month N Mean t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.028 2.549 0.103 -0.266 0.376 0.347 1.679 -0.031 0.085 
2 87 0.043 3.186 0.126 -0.182 0.615 1.390 4.499 -0.053 0.102 
3 87 0.037 2.087 0.164 -0.336 0.808 1.611 6.259 -0.057 0.112 
4 87 0.066 3.110 0.197 -0.333 0.912 1.870 6.594 -0.046 0.163 
5 87 0.088 3.555 0.230 -0.378 1.352 2.116 10.178 -0.051 0.193 
6 87 0.096 3.490 0.256 -0.327 1.560 2.625 12.744 -0.046 0.186 
7 87 0.105 3.488 0.282 -0.382 1.536 2.198 8.461 -0.054 0.191 
8 87 0.111 3.573 0.291 -0.469 1.108 1.104 2.413 -0.065 0.239 
9 87 0.124 3.860 0.299 -0.438 1.258 1.351 3.205 -0.086 0.260 
10 87 0.130 3.610 0.335 -0.500 1.603 1.724 5.188 -0.097 0.254 
11 87 0.160 4.010 0.373 -0.391 2.125 2.320 9.259 -0.063 0.291 
12 87 0.183 4.297 0.398 -0.491 2.329 2.173 9.092 -0.065 0.344 
13 87 0.196 3.573 0.511 -0.509 3.922 4.603 32.534 -0.061 0.349 
18 87 0.371 4.269 0.810 -0.422 6.322 5.139 34.688 0.014 0.501 
24 87 0.461 5.285 0.814 -0.636 4.451 2.531 8.220 -0.005 0.530 
25 87 0.498 5.305 0.875 -0.637 4.353 2.631 8.206 0.009 0.616 
26 87 0.540 5.315 0.948 -0.708 4.925 2.818 9.613 0.044 0.682 
27 87 0.675 4.090 1.540 -0.725 10.147 4.436 22.867 0.059 0.681 
28 87 0.749 3.355 2.082 -0.738 17.176 6.343 46.911 0.074 0.732 
29 87 0.775 3.307 2.187 -0.752 18.886 6.965 56.093 0.112 0.819 
30 87 0.749 3.773 1.851 -0.763 15.118 5.952 43.263 0.072 0.835 
31 87 0.679 4.297 1.475 -0.774 10.176 4.339 23.159 0.080 0.827 
32 87 0.639 3.493 1.705 -0.744 14.000 6.078 45.044 0.035 0.732 
33 87 0.660 3.101 1.985 -0.865 16.882 6.728 53.215 -0.004 0.764 
34 87 0.619 3.652 1.582 -0.919 12.882 5.784 42.574 -0.045 0.751 
35 87 0.682 3.485 1.826 -0.952 15.824 6.859 56.049 0.016 0.843 
36 87 0.729 3.583 1.899 -0.943 16.118 6.461 50.980 0.008 0.922 
37 87 0.787 3.687 1.992 -0.887 16.765 6.326 48.976 -0.002 0.936 
42 86 0.915 4.119 2.060 -0.958 17.000 5.937 44.375 0.003 1.097 
48 85 1.095 4.857 2.079 -0.980 12.118 3.031 11.674 -0.092 1.328 
49 85 1.079 4.543 2.189 -0.974 14.412 3.654 17.713 -0.109 1.292 
50 85 1.114 4.441 2.312 -0.976 16.177 3.920 21.454 -0.141 1.280 
51 85 1.096 4.540 2.227 -0.980 15.471 3.805 20.627 -0.156 1.368 
52 85 1.166 4.868 2.208 -0.980 15.294 3.691 19.723 -0.115 1.496 
53 85 1.152 5.147 2.063 -0.980 13.353 3.160 14.381 -0.118 1.371 
54 85 1.175 5.664 1.913 -0.980 8.471 1.994 4.148 -0.117 1.490 
55 84 1.171 5.685 1.888 -0.981 8.192 1.844 3.377 -0.039 1.488 
56 84 1.109 5.366 1.893 -0.985 8.604 2.143 5.107 -0.047 1.487 
57 84 1.114 5.419 1.885 -0.985 8.706 1.970 4.402 -0.088 1.437 
58 83 1.065 5.506 1.763 -0.997 7.971 1.805 3.501 -0.046 1.657 
59 82 1.074 5.772 1.684 -0.995 6.529 1.565 2.191 -0.021 1.719 
60 82 1.063 5.902 1.631 -0.993 6.221 1.437 1.593 -0.008 1.647 
 
158 
 
Table 5.6.2 Summary Statistic for BH: Matching firm BH returns 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.005 0.535 0.078 -0.302 0.260 -0.246 3.375 -0.035 0.039 
2 87 0.016 0.980 0.156 -0.510 0.888 1.691 11.473 -0.068 0.071 
3 87 0.013 0.748 0.167 -0.671 0.386 -1.068 3.828 -0.044 0.111 
4 87 0.041 1.796 0.211 -0.648 0.605 -0.362 1.706 -0.040 0.148 
5 87 0.036 1.532 0.222 -0.607 0.683 -0.115 1.641 -0.051 0.159 
6 87 0.046 1.944 0.221 -0.638 0.606 -0.150 1.135 -0.058 0.159 
7 87 0.088 3.194 0.256 -0.673 0.753 -0.103 1.268 -0.011 0.219 
8 87 0.097 3.626 0.248 -0.476 0.903 0.509 1.352 -0.011 0.238 
9 87 0.113 4.007 0.263 -0.539 0.898 0.409 1.102 0.000 0.259 
10 87 0.115 3.846 0.280 -0.584 1.019 0.406 1.120 0.000 0.258 
11 87 0.116 3.782 0.286 -0.593 0.790 0.058 0.208 -0.014 0.249 
12 87 0.148 4.267 0.323 -0.710 0.943 0.128 0.334 0.000 0.327 
13 87 0.165 4.563 0.337 -0.661 1.255 0.317 0.744 0.000 0.354 
18 87 0.231 4.931 0.436 -0.839 1.563 0.621 1.004 0.000 0.426 
24 87 0.337 5.906 0.533 -0.742 1.976 0.693 0.644 0.000 0.596 
25 87 0.337 5.775 0.545 -0.742 2.348 0.854 1.546 0.000 0.638 
26 87 0.329 5.338 0.575 -0.742 3.000 1.296 4.377 0.000 0.642 
27 87 0.311 4.946 0.587 -0.742 3.019 1.359 4.378 0.000 0.580 
28 87 0.336 4.938 0.634 -0.742 2.952 1.334 3.094 0.000 0.635 
29 87 0.351 4.994 0.655 -0.780 2.874 1.235 2.535 -0.004 0.653 
30 87 0.376 5.216 0.673 -0.796 2.758 1.031 1.447 0.000 0.733 
31 87 0.424 5.204 0.761 -0.845 3.082 1.136 1.425 -0.023 0.843 
32 87 0.435 5.200 0.781 -0.832 3.107 1.170 1.283 0.000 0.757 
33 87 0.449 5.105 0.820 -0.814 3.205 1.217 1.515 -0.050 0.832 
34 87 0.465 5.156 0.841 -0.838 3.684 1.303 1.902 -0.049 0.812 
35 87 0.516 5.347 0.900 -0.842 3.909 1.475 2.662 -0.025 0.999 
36 87 0.510 5.574 0.853 -0.788 3.798 1.349 2.206 -0.030 1.032 
37 87 0.515 5.738 0.837 -0.793 3.190 1.090 1.060 -0.037 1.139 
42 87 0.561 5.790 0.903 -0.780 4.504 1.442 3.389 0.000 1.202 
49 87 0.781 4.433 1.642 -0.742 12.989 5.077 35.541 0.000 1.221 
50 87 0.816 4.277 1.780 -0.742 13.954 5.135 35.109 0.000 1.087 
51 87 0.813 4.325 1.753 -0.742 13.600 5.011 33.571 0.000 1.044 
52 87 0.793 3.944 1.876 -0.848 14.873 5.381 37.600 0.000 1.135 
53 87 0.765 4.063 1.757 -0.848 14.056 5.320 38.137 0.000 1.038 
54 87 0.787 3.719 1.973 -0.848 16.587 6.206 48.424 -0.026 1.060 
55 86 0.871 3.378 2.392 -0.760 20.709 6.916 56.699 0.000 1.045 
56 86 0.942 2.956 2.956 -0.742 26.357 7.675 65.914 0.000 1.080 
57 86 0.886 3.171 2.590 -0.742 22.647 7.202 59.930 0.000 0.962 
58 86 0.919 3.045 2.799 -0.742 24.881 7.582 64.746 0.000 1.023 
59 85 0.994 3.043 3.013 -0.742 26.733 7.621 65.063 0.000 1.299 
60 85 0.921 3.751 2.263 -0.742 19.239 6.512 51.889 0.000 1.255 
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Table 5.6.3 Summary Statistic for BHAR Matching firms  
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.024 1.599 0.138 -0.259 0.565 1.104 3.605 -0.061 0.084 
2 87 0.027 1.132 0.220 -0.973 0.921 -0.132 7.044 -0.083 0.123 
3 87 0.023 0.918 0.237 -0.484 0.815 0.753 1.094 -0.129 0.140 
4 87 0.025 0.872 0.270 -0.695 0.878 0.207 0.943 -0.138 0.176 
5 87 0.051 1.658 0.287 -0.723 0.758 0.085 0.199 -0.159 0.226 
6 87 0.050 1.599 0.291 -0.782 0.955 0.237 0.988 -0.137 0.229 
7 87 0.018 0.535 0.309 -0.792 1.056 0.335 1.485 -0.144 0.141 
8 87 0.015 0.427 0.324 -0.714 0.977 0.192 1.120 -0.164 0.194 
9 87 0.010 0.292 0.333 -0.951 0.880 -0.153 1.033 -0.177 0.178 
10 87 0.014 0.335 0.397 -1.031 1.311 0.308 2.038 -0.200 0.183 
11 87 0.044 0.979 0.423 -0.976 1.950 1.098 5.016 -0.196 0.234 
12 87 0.036 0.703 0.475 -1.408 2.252 0.718 5.566 -0.217 0.254 
13 87 0.031 0.512 0.562 -1.405 3.510 2.356 16.800 -0.178 0.261 
14 87 0.085 1.398 0.569 -1.168 3.576 2.580 15.777 -0.198 0.260 
15 87 0.117 1.746 0.627 -1.403 3.969 2.668 16.099 -0.225 0.294 
16 87 0.089 1.367 0.608 -1.255 3.261 1.786 8.584 -0.230 0.341 
17 87 0.106 1.670 0.594 -1.414 2.775 1.048 4.907 -0.177 0.400 
18 87 0.140 1.690 0.774 -1.513 4.759 2.789 15.563 -0.215 0.389 
19 87 0.148 1.578 0.875 -1.489 5.404 3.344 17.974 -0.240 0.410 
20 87 0.152 1.689 0.839 -1.282 5.156 3.060 16.422 -0.293 0.410 
21 87 0.109 1.357 0.746 -1.328 4.013 2.059 9.584 -0.328 0.375 
22 87 0.089 1.254 0.661 -1.324 2.741 1.189 4.315 -0.305 0.374 
23 87 0.130 1.735 0.699 -1.599 2.758 0.808 2.349 -0.350 0.444 
24 87 0.124 1.501 0.771 -1.508 2.941 1.003 2.920 -0.384 0.434 
25 87 0.161 1.732 0.865 -1.958 4.353 1.614 6.448 -0.373 0.468 
26 87 0.211 2.006 0.983 -2.545 4.765 1.761 7.079 -0.325 0.536 
27 87 0.364 2.234 1.522 -2.552 10.147 4.066 22.522 -0.332 0.532 
28 87 0.413 1.851 2.083 -2.406 17.176 6.363 49.871 -0.220 0.555 
29 87 0.425 1.780 2.224 -2.458 18.886 6.859 56.352 -0.262 0.624 
30 87 0.373 1.867 1.862 -1.939 15.118 6.027 46.440 -0.292 0.623 
31 87 0.255 1.598 1.488 -3.243 10.176 3.760 23.568 -0.376 0.586 
32 87 0.203 1.078 1.759 -2.849 14.000 5.716 44.580 -0.417 0.462 
33 87 0.211 0.954 2.061 -3.188 16.973 6.345 51.760 -0.429 0.522 
34 87 0.155 0.840 1.717 -2.995 13.120 4.982 38.066 -0.411 0.633 
35 87 0.166 0.772 2.008 -3.865 16.068 5.757 46.431 -0.350 0.610 
36 87 0.220 1.000 2.051 -4.177 16.293 5.611 44.399 -0.437 0.692 
37 87 0.272 1.229 2.065 -2.611 16.750 6.014 47.760 -0.476 0.535 
38 87 0.252 1.514 1.551 -2.077 11.219 4.220 28.896 -0.484 0.673 
39 87 0.282 1.729 1.522 -2.416 10.955 4.136 27.962 -0.332 0.684 
40 87 0.337 1.842 1.708 -2.397 12.632 4.539 31.268 -0.338 0.642 
41 87 0.374 1.945 1.792 -2.284 13.734 4.971 36.013 -0.317 0.824 
42 86 0.345 1.473 2.174 -3.385 17.064 5.518 41.645 -0.548 0.863 
43 86 0.338 1.484 2.111 -2.332 16.008 5.065 36.029 -0.532 0.918 
44 86 0.344 1.284 2.487 -2.343 20.262 6.204 49.114 -0.604 0.866 
45 86 0.402 1.100 3.386 -5.507 29.135 7.274 62.522 -0.633 0.879 
46 85 0.333 1.067 2.878 -10.460 21.550 4.291 37.375 -0.600 0.891 
47 85 0.397 1.492 2.452 -6.465 16.618 3.643 23.407 -0.480 0.861 
48 85 0.320 1.129 2.612 -13.214 12.276 0.104 13.804 -0.508 0.831 
49 85 0.278 0.977 2.623 -11.486 14.516 1.347 14.872 -0.675 0.858 
50 85 0.277 0.916 2.787 -12.276 16.393 1.471 17.361 -0.693 0.826 
51 85 0.260 0.889 2.694 -11.867 15.793 1.397 17.202 -0.641 0.849 
52 85 0.350 1.154 2.797 -13.399 15.620 0.637 16.466 -0.546 1.060 
53 85 0.362 1.297 2.574 -12.380 13.708 0.425 14.558 -0.469 0.914 
54 85 0.366 1.313 2.570 -15.072 8.731 -1.841 16.042 -0.641 1.062 
55 84 0.277 0.891 2.844 -18.917 6.992 -3.316 24.924 -0.592 1.031 
56 84 0.140 0.389 3.304 -24.639 7.792 -4.878 38.610 -0.599 0.976 
57 84 0.205 0.633 2.973 -20.608 7.884 -3.793 29.151 -0.697 1.009 
58 83 0.113 0.327 3.136 -22.890 6.510 -4.590 35.622 -0.726 0.969 
59 82 0.043 0.120 3.273 -24.640 5.886 -5.210 40.325 -0.687 0.958 
60 82 0.114 0.406 2.551 -17.096 4.834 -3.598 25.216 -0.761 1.078 
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Table 5.6.4 Summary Statistic for BH: Market returns 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25
th
 
Perc. 
75
th
 
Perc. 
1 87 0.026 8.810 0.027 -0.069 0.132 -0.549 4.995 0.010 0.033 
2 87 0.033 7.900 0.039 -0.070 0.174 0.039 1.500 0.001 0.061 
3 87 0.035 5.330 0.061 -0.121 0.205 0.071 -0.159 -0.032 0.076 
4 87 0.051 7.271 0.065 -0.064 0.191 -0.052 -1.185 -0.005 0.118 
5 87 0.072 9.583 0.070 -0.049 0.198 -0.067 -1.370 -0.004 0.145 
6 87 0.081 8.222 0.092 -0.073 0.255 -0.144 -1.360 -0.016 0.177 
7 87 0.092 7.947 0.109 -0.083 0.316 0.640 -1.043 0.017 0.224 
8 87 0.084 8.061 0.097 -0.141 0.362 0.599 -0.300 0.019 0.214 
9 87 0.102 7.944 0.120 -0.212 0.329 0.238 -0.641 0.002 0.265 
10 87 0.116 10.300 0.105 -0.197 0.266 -0.335 -0.045 0.013 0.207 
11 87 0.142 9.635 0.137 -0.137 0.318 -0.230 -1.378 0.003 0.237 
12 87 0.158 10.559 0.140 -0.130 0.341 -0.203 -1.344 0.032 0.270 
13 87 0.191 12.031 0.148 -0.144 0.385 -0.223 -1.380 0.052 0.319 
18 87 0.286 13.937 0.191 -0.250 0.531 -0.467 -0.837 0.168 0.437 
24 87 0.387 15.172 0.238 -0.334 0.659 -0.689 -0.409 0.180 0.576 
25 87 0.419 15.536 0.252 -0.352 0.728 -0.545 -0.272 0.193 0.592 
26 87 0.435 15.109 0.269 -0.363 0.722 -0.560 -0.461 0.180 0.704 
27 87 0.458 14.959 0.286 -0.358 0.789 -0.596 -0.490 0.183 0.737 
28 87 0.489 15.585 0.293 -0.306 0.805 -0.498 -0.663 0.230 0.802 
29 87 0.507 16.405 0.288 -0.274 0.847 -0.531 -0.494 0.274 0.771 
30 87 0.543 15.540 0.326 -0.326 0.927 -0.439 -0.707 0.282 0.841 
31 87 0.549 14.693 0.348 -0.380 1.078 -0.112 -0.617 0.324 0.819 
32 87 0.491 15.526 0.295 -0.377 0.958 -0.274 0.250 0.298 0.564 
33 87 0.527 15.059 0.327 -0.445 1.063 -0.349 0.578 0.341 0.651 
34 87 0.560 16.072 0.325 -0.397 0.991 -0.648 0.113 0.335 0.784 
35 87 0.617 16.292 0.353 -0.363 1.080 -0.558 -0.355 0.389 0.889 
36 87 0.652 16.021 0.379 -0.401 1.113 -0.465 -0.605 0.414 0.996 
37 87 0.689 16.778 0.383 -0.418 1.134 -0.605 -0.303 0.459 1.078 
42 87 0.819 15.855 0.482 -0.337 1.469 -0.468 -0.589 0.490 1.229 
48 87 0.919 15.529 0.552 -0.284 1.676 -0.444 -0.564 0.628 1.385 
49 87 0.936 15.691 0.557 -0.304 1.786 -0.413 -0.192 0.617 1.264 
50 87 0.929 15.689 0.552 -0.316 1.696 -0.560 -0.369 0.633 1.250 
51 87 0.990 14.986 0.616 -0.310 1.801 -0.438 -0.878 0.566 1.433 
52 87 1.017 15.229 0.623 -0.254 1.907 -0.402 -0.698 0.632 1.383 
53 87 1.007 15.955 0.588 -0.237 1.835 -0.515 -0.530 0.651 1.339 
54 87 1.056 15.178 0.649 -0.224 1.989 -0.429 -0.693 0.651 1.431 
55 87 1.040 15.268 0.635 -0.250 1.893 -0.611 -0.635 0.635 1.403 
56 87 0.974 14.594 0.623 -0.248 1.875 -0.344 -0.728 0.530 1.464 
57 87 0.959 14.410 0.621 -0.241 1.793 -0.604 -0.673 0.405 1.332 
58 87 1.022 14.629 0.651 -0.231 1.968 -0.420 -0.736 0.431 1.355 
59 87 1.054 15.040 0.654 -0.201 2.024 -0.345 -0.682 0.538 1.495 
60 87 1.113 14.512 0.715 -0.175 2.199 -0.222 -0.768 0.550 1.635 
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Table 5.6.5 Summary Statistic for BHAR Using the market portfolio as a benchmark 
Month N Mean t-stat 
St. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.106 -0.276 0.366 0.356 1.531 -0.052 0.058 
2 87 0.010 0.731 0.127 -0.268 0.534 1.129 3.344 -0.064 0.066 
3 87 0.002 0.125 0.160 -0.384 0.673 1.114 4.430 -0.101 0.072 
4 87 0.015 0.735 0.192 -0.524 0.826 1.356 5.424 -0.094 0.093 
5 87 0.016 0.645 0.226 -0.576 1.293 2.057 11.638 -0.092 0.115 
6 87 0.015 0.561 0.243 -0.582 1.444 2.615 14.408 -0.088 0.104 
7 87 0.013 0.446 0.269 -0.672 1.381 2.314 9.919 -0.126 0.118 
8 87 0.028 0.891 0.288 -0.616 1.122 1.332 3.516 -0.138 0.162 
9 87 0.021 0.683 0.290 -0.486 1.210 1.682 4.889 -0.146 0.140 
10 87 0.014 0.395 0.326 -0.632 1.471 1.883 5.973 -0.160 0.142 
11 87 0.019 0.492 0.356 -0.590 1.926 2.488 10.560 -0.179 0.132 
12 87 0.025 0.633 0.376 -0.673 2.062 2.128 9.543 -0.177 0.156 
13 87 0.005 0.092 0.497 -0.803 3.603 4.492 31.865 -0.228 0.149 
14 87 0.034 0.608 0.528 -0.800 3.754 4.198 28.362 -0.206 0.179 
15 87 0.058 0.906 0.594 -0.817 4.315 4.513 30.711 -0.186 0.172 
16 87 0.043 0.704 0.566 -0.772 3.790 3.898 22.625 -0.213 0.131 
17 87 0.049 0.791 0.579 -0.786 3.594 3.308 16.569 -0.221 0.134 
18 87 0.085 0.979 0.810 -0.777 5.908 4.886 31.881 -0.283 0.145 
19 87 0.115 1.135 0.941 -0.830 6.726 4.852 30.183 -0.282 0.164 
20 87 0.140 1.476 0.887 -0.850 6.273 4.597 27.909 -0.240 0.263 
21 87 0.101 1.150 0.819 -0.838 5.404 3.818 20.848 -0.311 0.223 
22 87 0.065 0.787 0.776 -0.941 4.643 3.053 14.250 -0.357 0.305 
23 87 0.089 0.987 0.845 -1.021 5.348 3.409 17.634 -0.330 0.349 
24 87 0.074 0.828 0.834 -1.150 3.937 2.246 7.192 -0.409 0.300 
25 87 0.078 0.810 0.901 -1.074 3.989 2.432 7.661 -0.443 0.293 
26 87 0.105 1.012 0.973 -1.116 4.517 2.665 9.128 -0.410 0.296 
27 87 0.217 1.300 1.560 -1.269 9.763 4.284 21.934 -0.440 0.319 
28 87 0.260 1.150 2.105 -1.235 16.774 6.230 45.791 -0.516 0.329 
29 87 0.268 1.133 2.208 -1.216 18.452 6.854 54.763 -0.570 0.381 
30 87 0.206 1.023 1.882 -1.262 14.680 5.815 41.726 -0.615 0.330 
31 87 0.130 0.805 1.512 -1.248 9.805 4.294 22.717 -0.619 0.265 
32 87 0.147 0.793 1.729 -1.308 13.602 5.933 43.666 -0.591 0.304 
33 87 0.133 0.618 1.999 -1.346 16.409 6.644 52.354 -0.689 0.291 
34 87 0.059 0.345 1.605 -1.392 12.370 5.588 40.718 -0.667 0.279 
35 87 0.065 0.332 1.837 -1.307 15.201 6.706 54.465 -0.697 0.305 
36 87 0.078 0.378 1.921 -1.448 15.530 6.293 49.386 -0.773 0.280 
37 87 0.098 0.454 2.016 -1.363 16.079 6.110 46.626 -0.809 0.241 
38 87 0.024 0.149 1.502 -1.388 10.511 4.405 27.646 -0.739 0.238 
39 87 0.011 0.065 1.517 -1.584 10.318 4.127 24.846 -0.742 0.233 
40 87 0.027 0.147 1.690 -1.534 11.907 4.570 28.741 -0.795 0.187 
41 87 0.071 0.378 1.742 -1.537 12.887 5.010 34.272 -0.806 0.239 
42 86 0.097 0.426 2.107 -1.858 16.102 5.535 39.715 -0.738 0.228 
43 86 0.101 0.460 2.035 -1.863 14.888 4.987 33.265 -0.804 0.277 
44 86 0.172 0.666 2.399 -1.758 19.248 6.199 47.755 -0.707 0.336 
45 86 0.261 0.752 3.220 -1.853 27.910 7.640 65.559 -0.706 0.328 
46 85 0.184 0.658 2.581 -1.892 20.392 6.005 45.316 -0.797 0.400 
47 85 0.206 0.816 2.325 -1.930 15.422 4.117 22.589 -0.891 0.401 
48 85 0.180 0.760 2.184 -2.228 11.037 2.923 10.436 -0.937 0.428 
49 85 0.146 0.591 2.280 -2.315 13.310 3.414 15.167 -0.989 0.345 
50 85 0.193 0.752 2.362 -2.237 14.927 3.635 18.299 -1.014 0.262 
51 85 0.115 0.466 2.279 -2.342 14.109 3.447 17.085 -0.983 0.376 
52 85 0.157 0.643 2.256 -2.353 13.911 3.383 16.504 -1.066 0.258 
53 85 0.153 0.669 2.113 -2.176 12.014 2.916 11.929 -1.065 0.253 
54 85 0.128 0.595 1.978 -2.173 7.040 1.851 3.273 -1.068 0.291 
55 84 0.144 0.679 1.941 -2.083 6.869 1.682 2.459 -1.100 0.346 
56 84 0.142 0.683 1.906 -2.053 7.140 1.845 3.566 -0.981 0.419 
57 84 0.165 0.799 1.896 -2.029 7.373 1.777 3.349 -1.007 0.601 
58 83 0.051 0.259 1.809 -2.376 6.871 1.639 2.767 -1.010 0.369 
59 82 0.041 0.206 1.785 -2.415 6.535 1.639 2.745 -1.013 0.441 
60 82 -0.027 -0.143 1.736 -2.492 5.608 1.361 1.634 -1.124 0.395 
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Clearly, as Figures 5.6.3 and 5.6.4 depict, there is a quite obvious difference between 
BHAR and CAR. CARs look more stable than BHAR when using matching firms to 
calculate the abnormality. On the other hand, the results based on the market benchmark 
are essentially the same and the produced curves are identical in most time periods. 
Even within BHAR itself. BHAR calculated using a matching firm appears greater than 
when using the benchmark market portfolio (S&P500) (Figure 5.6.4). Overall, the 
behaviour of the aggregate abnormal return, CAR and BHAR, clearly appear to be 
sensitive to the method adopted to gauge the abnormality. Furthermore, BHAR based 
on matching firms  grow faster than when based on the S&P500 benchmark especially 
after the adoption date where BHAR increased by more than 1.5 times. 
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5.7   Testing the Aggregate Abnormal Returns 
 
As discussed in the previous section the aggregate abnormal return, BHAR and CAR, is 
always highly skewed and leptokurtic and we suggest the wild bootstrapping (as 
discussed in methodology section) as a correction for these biases. This section will 
highlight the results of the bootstrap and the result of testing the null hypothesis that the 
aggregate abnormal returns, CAR and BHAR, are zero. The full version of the bootstrap 
test and tables are provided in Appendix (3). As the tables in the appendix show, in the 
vast majority of cases, the CARs are not significant. However, the results show that in 
two or three months the CAR appear to be significant (that is, the adopters have higher 
abnormal returns or the non-adopters have higher performance). Given that these are 
two or three out of sixty months, they represent the 5% tolerance and might be due to 
data mining (out of 60 tests, we usually expect 5% of these tests to be significant by 
chance alone).  
The graph below depicts the skewness-adjusted t-statistic for the holding periods (60 
months). The dotted and dashed lines are the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of the bootstrapped 
distribution. These can be interpreted at either the 5% critical value level for a one tail 
test, or the 10% critical value for a two tail test. The graphs below describe the two 
schemes of benchmarking: S&P500 portfolio and matching firms have a similar pattern 
but express different messages.  The four graphs have the same feature which is that 
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outperformance increases at around month 13 but there is then a slight variation with a 
different and insignificant range. For the BHAR-based market benchmark portfolio 
scheme the insignificancy remains hold throughout the holding period and the 
outperformance accelerates to reach the highest volume in month 20. Following this it is 
slightly volatile and reaches the lowest point of outperformance in month 39
 
after which 
it dramatically increases until month 45
 
where it then appears stable to the end of the 
holding period. Similarly, the BHAR based on matching firms copies its counterpart but 
the outperformance ceases from being significant at around  the 25 – 31 month and 37- 
42 month period. However, the aggregate BH return rapidly decreases after month 47 to 
reach close to zero as shown in Figure 5.7.2.   
In general, the results over the short term are relatively weak, especially for the first 12 
months. This could be due to the possibility that EVA adoption takes time to reveal its 
effect. Alternatively, the changes that managers undertake following EVA adoption may 
be strategic with an effect that can only be observed over the long term. 
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The CAR based on the matching benchmark provides a different story: the graph in 
Figure 5.7.4 shows that CAR behaviour becomes more erratic and is no longer 
significant beginning from around the period 25-31 months. The performance of the 
adopting firms is quite low, almost zero after the adoption date and sometimes 
underperforms the matching firms as depicted in Figure 5.7.4.  
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In general, the purpose of the current chapter is to investigate whether the adoption of 
EVA as a compensation and management plan will positively affect the performance of 
adopting companies. I compared the performance of adopting firms to that of selected 
matching firms and to the market index particularly the S&P500 portfolio. Then I used 
the two common aggregating methods to test the event of adopting EVA by different 
US firms namely the CAR and BHAR methods. The results obtained however, showed 
a slight improvement in the performance of companies adopting EVA within ten years 
from the date of adoption. This is implicitly in line with what Wallace (1997) concludes 
in this regard. Wallace indicated that adopting EVA will encourage managers to take 
decisions that will lead to efficiently using the firm’s assets to increase the wealth of 
shareholders and the value of firms through taking accurate decisions regarding the 
investing, financing and operating activities. This, in turn, will be reflected in the price 
of shares in the stock market, therefore improving the performances of these stocks. 
Nevertheless, I replicated the work of Wallace (1997) in chapter 6 and the result was 
inconsistent to some extent. 
Similarly, the results achieved is incompatible with that of Kleiman (1999) where he 
compares the performance of firms adopting EVA to the performance two set of 
matching firms, the industry peer and closest match peer. By comparing the median of 
abnormal return he found that EVA adopter’s show better performance after the 
adoption and outperform both the industry peer and closest peer match firms. The 
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adjusted market return increases from 2.8% to 28.8% through three year time period 
after the adoption for the industry peer and from 2.6% to 7.8% for the closest match 
peer. However, the increases in performance of the adopting firms are still quite low. 
the current research used the mean of CAR and BHAR to compare the performances of 
adopting firms to those matching firms and market benchmark portfolio (S&P500 
index) and the result revealed that EVA’s firms outperform those matching and S&P500 
portfolio and the CAR increases to reach 8.85% and 36.6% for matching firms and 
benchmark index respectively and the BHAR increases to 6.6% and 26.8% for the same 
order.  
Contrary to Wallace’s and my findings, Tortella and Brusco (2003) used 65 EVA 
adopter firms to analyse the market reaction to EVA adoption. They compared the daily 
abnormal return of adopting firms to that of the equally weighted index (EW) and value 
weighted index (VW) to test for any changes in performances after the adoption date. 
However, he used a window of 30 days prior to the adoption and 100 days post the 
adoption.  For both the equally weighted and value weighted index the results indicated 
that the daily cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is insignificant and negative 
for 14 days after the adoption date. Furthermore, they conclude that the market does not 
react properly to the evolution of EVA as a performance measure. In my opinion, 
because the process of adoption of EVA as a performance and management tool is of a 
long-term nature, it takes some years to complete the process, the daily stock price fails 
to reflect this information and the daily CAAR appear insignificant for much of the 
time.   
 5.8    Conclusion  
This chapter has described the research design and the methodology that was used to 
examine the EVA adoption event. Both the CAR and the BHAR approaches were 
adopted to conduct our study. The previous research has been extended by increasing 
the number of EVA adopter firms to 89 and the time horizon of the study to cover the 
firms’ performance during the period 1960-2012 was also extended. In addition wild 
bootstrapping and using the skewness adjusted t-statistic to enhance the statistical 
reliability of the event test statistics was adopted. By doing this all three moments of the 
parent distribution of the test statistic (Heteroscedasticity, skewness and kurtosis) were 
taken into account. Furthermore, the criterion to select the matching firms was carefully 
applied as was the problem of delisting.  
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The results obtained in this chapter are consistent with the previous studies’ results 
discussed in section 5.2. Regardless of the methodology approach , CAR or BHAR, the 
results of this chapter reveal that firms adopting EVA as a compensation plan and 
management tool outperform the market (S&P500) and matching firms (same sector) 
most of the time within holding period. The CAR results show that despite the 
benchmarking used the majority of adopter firms positively outperform the matching 
firms and the S&P500 portfolio and for a few months the adopter firms have a negative 
performance mainly in year one and year five of the 10 year estimated period. In 
general, CAR appears more stable and less skewed and leptokurtic. 
Regarding the BHAR approach the findings reveal that the mean return of the adopter 
firms is both positive and highly skewed and leptokurtic throughout the holding period. 
Generally, the results obtained from a comparison against the benchmarking portfolio 
(S&P500) are smaller in value than those obtained when compared to the matching 
firms’ benchmark. One interesting finding is that CAR is almost the same as BHAR 
when the S&P500 portfolio is used as a benchmark to calculate the aggregate returns. 
To sum up, irrespective of the aggregation approach used to measure the abnormal 
return, the adopter firms have a considerably low outperformance and this 
outperformance increased as the hold period increased. However, even with the positive 
performances most EVA adopter firms’ outperformance declines after the adoption and 
takes some time to return to negative performance when matching benchmarks are used. 
This might typically reflect the fact that the market might react poorly to the adoption 
announcement. Finally, by analysing the adopter firms’ performance we recognize that 
the adoption exists after a period of bad performances.     
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Chapter 6 
The Long-Term Effect of Economic Value Added  
Adoption on the Firm’s Business Decision 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The economic value added (EVA) metric has received considerable attention in the 
literature as the best performance measure with the ability to align managers’ interests 
with those of the shareholders. It is further claimed that adopting the EVA framework 
(e.g. as a management system, or as a compensation system) will encourage managers 
to use the firm’s resources more efficiently and make decisions that would help increase 
the firm’s value (Wallace, 1997; Balachandran, 2006). However, one interesting aspect 
of this new performance metric is that it is not all that new. Value added as a concept is 
age-old. It has its origins in the notion of economic profit, first mentioned in the 
literature a century ago.
30
  EVA, which specifically mentions residual income (RI), was 
adopted by General Motors and Matsushita in the 1920s and 1930s respectively (Young, 
1999). Officially, in the mid-1990s the American Institute of Certified Financial 
Accountants (AICPA)  recommended EVA as a type of measure that would enhance 
internal decision-making and would replace earnings per share (EPS), the traditional 
measure, in the regular stock and earnings report section (Zarowin, 1995). 
This chapter will extend what was started in chapter 5 where the EVA adoption event 
was tested using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR). The results thereof reveal that firms adopting EVA as a management and 
compensation system outperform the market portfolio, the S&P500 and the set of 
matching firms. In this chapter Wallace’s (1997) work will be reconsidered. I will 
investigate whether the adoption of EVA does indeed enhance the performance and the 
quality of strategic decisions of the firm. Specifically, the strategic decisions that the 
management will take in order to increase the value of the company and the wealth of 
shareholders include asset dispositions, acquisitions and capital expenditure, share 
repurchases, dividends and operating decisions. 
                                                             
30As Wallace (1997) stated, Alfred Marshall was the earliest to mention the residual income concept in 
1890.  
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The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 will discuss the work of Wallace 
(1997) who investigated the impact of EVA adoption on a firm’s performance. Section 
6.3 describes the data sources, sample selection and variable definitions. Section 6.4 
describes the methodology, and Section 6.5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 5.6 summarises the main conclusions. 
 
 6.2   The Wallace Study 
“You get what you pay for” (Wallace, 1997). 
In his seminal work, Wallace (1997) addressed the changes in profitability which a firm 
achieves when adopting EVA. He investigated whether the use of value added, 
particularly residual income, and bonus plans leads to decisions that are consistent with 
the economic incentives deeply embedded in those plans. Wallace claims that the 
“compensation plans provide one method to mitigate agency conflicts by providing 
incentives for managers to decisions that are in the best interest of the shareholders.” (p. 
277)  
Wallace (1997) used a sample of 40 firms that have adopted RI- based compensation 
plans to test whether the adoption of the RI framework will enhance and increase the 
action of these firms compared to the action of other selected firms still using traditional 
accounting-based compensation plans. His approach is therefore based on contrasting 
the adopters which he calls the treatment firms, with the non-adopters which he calls the 
control firms. The period of investigation extends to five years prior to the adoption and 
up to three years following the adoption date (event date); the majority of the 
investigated firms adopted an RI- based compensation plan in 1993 and 1994. 
Wallace begins his empirical research by discussing the consequences that a firm must 
face when switching to a residual income-based incentive. The focus of his work was on 
developing hypotheses to test investment decisions (e.g. asset dispositions, acquisition 
and capital expenditure), financing decisions (e.g. share repurchase, dividends) and 
operating decisions (e.g. asset turnover). 
The findings of Wallace (1997) were that all the adopters of EVA as a compensation 
plan show a significant increase in residual income. With respect to the decision 
variables the results also show that firms adopting an RI-based compensation plan 
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encourage managers to increase dispositions of assets and increase their payments to 
shareholders in the form of a repurchasing of shares and intensively utilize their assets. 
The results also support the axiom that “you get what you measure and reward” 
(Wallace, 1997, p.276). Finally, weak evidence suggests that the market does not appear 
to react to EVA adoption.   
The work of Wallace was replicated by many scholars (Kleiman, 1999, Lovata and 
Costigan, 2002, Hogan and Lewis, 2005 and Balachandran, 2006). One common feature 
of these papers is that they discuss the compensation and incentive plan from the agency 
conflict’s point of view. However, even though they have replicated Wallace’s work 
(1997) they have reached different conclusions. While Wallace claims that firms that 
adopt EVA decrease new investment, Kleiman claims that the manager’s behaviour has 
no obvious bias against new investment. Similarly, Hogan and Lewis find that firms that 
anticipate converting to the EVA compensation system would likely change their 
investment behaviour by reducing capital expenditure. Furthermore, to account for the 
pre-adoption performances they construct their own logistic model to select the optimal 
control-matched firms. Therefore, their control firms’ sample fall into four types: 
anticipated adopters, surprise adopters, anticipated non-adopters, and surprise non-
adopters. 
In this chapter, I show that Wallace’s approach needs to be reconsidered. I further 
extend the time horizon of study to cover the period from 1960 until 2012, and, more 
importantly, the number of sample firms is more than doubled to reach 89 EVA 
adopters. Extending the sample in both the time and the cross section dimensions will 
remove doubt that previous results may have been due to data limitation. However, a 
more important contribution in this study are the modifications introduced to the 
Wallace model, which are more appropriate in identifying the effect of EVA adoption 
before and after the adoption decision date.  
6.3   Sample selection 
In order to examine the impact of adopting the economic value added (EVA) on the 
performance of both the executive management and the company as a whole, a 
comprehensive sample of US EVA adopter firms from January 1960 to December 2012 
was collected using the Compustat and CRSP databases. The variables used in the 
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models in the current research were mainly extracted from balance sheets, income 
statements and cash flow statements. The sample was composed of firms adopting EVA 
during the period 1987-2001 as a compensation and management system. The selection 
procedures of the sample set and matching firms are discussed briefly in Chapter 5. The 
dependent variables are similar to that of Wallace (1997) and defined as described in the 
Compustat data base: 
- Dispositions: sale of plant, property and equipment (SPPE).31 
- New investment: acquisitions (AQC) plus capital expenditures (CAPX). 
- Purchases per share: purchases of common stock (PRSTKCC) divided by 
Common Shares Outstanding (CSHO). 
- Dividends per share: dividend available to common shareholders (DVC) divided 
by Common Shares Outstanding (CSHO). 
- Assets turnover: revenue (REVT) divided by average total assets (TA). 
- Inventory turnover: Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) divided by average Inventories 
total (INVT). 
- Accounts receivable turnover: revenue (REVT) divided by average accounts 
receivable total (AR). 
- Account payable turnover: Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) divided by average 
account payable trade (AP). 
- ∆Leverage: changes in debt for firms between periods. 
All the dependent variables are deflated by the initial total assets (TA) and used in 
levels rather than differences. 
6.4   Methodology 
The current research will use the same methodology as Wallace’s (1997) except that 
while Wallace’s sample consists of those firms adopting a residual income-based 
management system, we use only firms adopting EVA for incentive compensation 
purposes. Moreover, while Wallace used five-year returns to conduct his research, the 
current research uses the annual accounting data for the period 1960-2012 and focuses 
on the long-term effects of adopting EVA as management and compensation tools. 
Further, I will begin with Wallace’s model, discussing its drawbacks and provide simple 
                                                             
31 An abbreviation between brackets stands for COMPUSTAT Mnemonic. 
173 
 
numerical examples to show that the set up used by Wallace may lead to spurious 
results. Modifications that mitigate these problems are then proposed.  
The estimated event window that was used to examine the adopter firms’ behaviour is 
set between 30 months prior to the adoption date and 30 months after the adoption. As 
discussed in chapter 5, it is difficult to determine an accurate date for EVA’s adoption. I 
therefore consider the month of December in the earliest year that the company released 
the adoption of EVA as the event date. This approach is also adopted by Wallace 
(1997), Kleiman (1999) and Balachandran, 2006 
6.4.1   The Wallace Approach 
Wallace (1997) analysed the firms that adopted residual income-based compensation 
plans. However, only 23 firms in his sample applied the EVA approach (the rest 
adopted residual income plans). Thus, Wallace’s findings cannot be attributed to EVA 
alone. Rather, the effect found by Wallace should be associated with all residual income 
(RI) methods. Consequently it is not perfectly correct to generalize Wallace’s finding 
that the motif detected in the selected sample would likely exist for any randomly 
chosen firms to the EVA compensation scheme. 
Another limitation in Wallace is that he did not account for the pre-adoption operating 
performance. In other words, he compares the adopter firms with matching firms after 
adoption but fails to compare the adopter firm before and after adoption. Barber and 
Lyon (1996) show that the failure to capture past performance leads to biased test 
statistics. It is true that Wallace considered the difference in variables between the pre- 
and post-adoption years. However, this does not make the comparison of the two 
periods (before and after adoption) explicit. Wallace’s (1997) approach stated that: 
                                                               
 
where   refers to the difference between the mean of a particular variable before the 
adoption date and the average of the same variables after (and including) the adoption 
year. He uses increasing sample sizes for the pre- and post-adoption periods in order to 
assess possible differences between the short and longer term effects.       is an 
indicator variable, it equals 1 for firms adopting EVA and 0 for the matching firm, 
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            is the change leverage where leverage is defined as debt divided by 
whatever the total assets are in each period (Wallace p.286). Finally,         refers to 
the change in stock ownership of the top management and board of directors.  
Wallace uses this as a control variable. However, this variable is endogenous because of 
the possible feedback effect between top managers’ stock ownership and performance. 
In other words, while a change in management ownership can indeed affect a firm’s 
behaviour (such as investment decisions), the opposite is also true (i.e. a firm’s 
behaviour can induce a change in management stock ownership). In this study we 
propose a better control which is both exogenous to the firm, possibly correlated with a 
firm’s behaviour, and common to both treatment and control firms: namely, the market 
performance. Indeed, during market downturns, businesses are affected and this is 
reflected in the accounting fundamentals. The opposite is expected during market 
expansions. Thus, we propose the following model as equivalent to Wallace’s model: 
                                                               
      
where                 is the change in market performance over the same period. 
6.4.2   A Modified Approach (MODIF1) 
One apparent problem in the empirical results of Wallace (1997) is the very low 
adjusted R-square. Although some of the results are found to be significant (i.e., 
repurchase, turnover, and residual income), the low associated R-square suggests that 
the dummy (Type) as well as the other control variables do not explain a significant 
portion of the variability of the changes in these accounting variables.  
The current research suspect that the problem lies in working with changes in variables 
rather than levels. Taking differences essentially takes out most of the existing cross-
sectional variability. For example, suppose two variables X and Y are related by 
            
However if both Y and X were random walks,  
           
and 
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where    and    are disturbance terms, working with differences implies the following 
model 
             
this, in turn, implies 
           
Thus the model is expressed in terms of purely random variables on both sides. Of 
course, the accounting variables used by Wallace may not be a purely random walk, but 
taking differences is likely to remove most of the existing variation in the variables. 
One possible solution is to work with levels rather than differences. The following 
model controls for the level in the dependent variable (rather than changes) using size 
(TA), leverage (Debt) and market wide performance (MI). It is assumed that for each 
firm the level of a dependent variable after adoption is a function of the level of that 
variable before adoption (high level firms are more likely to continue to be high level 
and vice versa).  
The proposed model is of the following form: 
    
          
                 
        
         
       
             (6.3) 
where ‘+’ refers to the post event (adoption) period, ‘-‘ refers to the pre event period, 
     is the dependent variable, D is a type (adopter=1) dummy, TA is total assets, Debt 
is debt, and MI is the S&P500 market index. All variables are calculated as averages of 
pre- and post- event periods. 
The difference between treatment (adopters) and control firms (non-adopters) is 
captured by two parameters,    captures the difference in the level of the dependent 
variable, while    captures the difference in the linear relationship (slope) between the 
pre- and post- performance. 
6.4.3   A Test based on Direct Use of the Control Firm. (MODIF2) 
In both Wallace’s model and the above modification of that model the contrast between 
treatment firms and control firms is holistic. This means that the regressions above 
compare the average adopter firm with the average non-adopter firm. Although firms 
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are matched at the selection level, they are not matched (one-to-one) at the estimation 
level. 
At first sight, it indeed makes no difference whether one takes the mean of differences 
or the difference of the means. The following example demonstrates this. We assume 10 
treatment firms and 10 control firms. The treatment firms’ performance goes from 1 to 
10, while the control firms’ performance goes from 10 to 1. It is clear that whether one 
computes the mean of the differences (abnormal performance) or the difference of the 
means it makes no difference (they are zero in both instances). 
Performance 
Abnormal 
Performance 
 
Size 
Treatment Firm Control Firm 
1 10 -9 1 
2 9 -7 2 
3 8 -5 3 
4 7 -3 4 
5 6 -1 5 
6 5 1 6 
7 4 3 7 
8 3 5 8 
9 2 7 9 
10 1 9 9 
Mean=5.5 Mean=5.5 Mean = 0  
 
However, in a regression the two arrangements lead to different outcomes. Suppose 
abnormal performance was related to a control variable, such as size. This is depicted in 
the above table, where size increases from 1 to 9. The last firm has a size of 9 to avoid 
having a perfect relationship.  
If we regress abnormal performance against size, we would obtain a nearly perfect fit 
with an Adjusted-   of more than 99%. 
                                     
                                                                    
 
If we were to adopt Wallace’s approach we would stack the treatment and control 
performances together and then use a dummy variable (Type) to expectantly capture the 
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difference between the two types of performances. The data would be arranged as 
follows:  
Firm No. Performance Type Size 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 1 2 
3 3 1 3 
4 4 1 4 
5 5 1 5 
6 6 1 6 
7 7 1 7 
8 8 1 8 
9 9 1 9 
10 10 1 9 
11 10 0 1 
12 9 0 2 
13 8 0 3 
14 7 0 4 
15 6 0 5 
16 5 0 6 
17 4 0 7 
18 3 0 8 
19 2 0 9 
20 1 0 9 
 
A regression using the above specification gives an Adjusted-   of nearly zero, while 
both type and size coefficients are zero.  
                              
                                                  
 
This approach does indeed suggest that the average performance of both types is 5.5. It 
also suggests no difference between the performances of the two types. However, the 
fact that    is zero would cast doubt on the regression as a whole. We would not be able 
to determine whether the lack of significance is due to the actual lack of difference 
between the two types of firms or simply due to the lack of fit of the whole regression. 
More importantly, the Wallace specification completely misses the role of Size in 
determining the difference between the two types of firms. 
If we define the average abnormal performance in the post-adoption period as  
   
                        
                      
  
and the pre-adoption period as: 
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Similarly, if I defines abnormal asset and abnormal debt as the difference between the 
assets and debts between the treatment and control firms, respectively, that is, 
      
              
            
  
and   
        
                
              
  
Then we propose the following model: 
   
         
          
            
     
If there is no effect resulting from the adoption, then the abnormal performance before 
the event should be equal on average to the abnormal performance after the event. Any 
possible change in abnormal performance could be due to the control variables 
(abnormal TA and abnormal debt). Thus, the parameter of interest is   , and the null 
hypothesis of no effect is        . However, we can operationalize the testing of this 
hypothesis by subtracting    
  from both sides of the equation to obtain 
   
     
         
          
            
                   
where         . Thus, testing          is equivalent to testing        . 
Table 6.4.1 presents summary statistics of the investigated potential investment 
decisions (the dependent and independent/control variables employed in models (6.2), 
(6.3) and (6.4)). The mean values of disposition per share for adopter firms are 27.581 
and 27.739 for the matching firms. Reflecting overall expectations of negative 
disposition per share after EVA adoption, standard deviation in particular for matching 
firms is higher than the corresponding adopting firms. Interestingly, the mean new 
investment is 344.580 for adopting firms, whereas the mean new investment is 266.953 
for matching firms, which indicates that adopting firms operate with a considerable 
balance of new investment rather than decreasing their expenditure on new projects. In 
addition it is worth noting that both adopters and matching firms are operating with a 
considerable leverage level. However, note that the distribution of all the potential 
decisions is highly skewed to the right as indicated by the large standard deviations. For 
most numbers the mean of adopting firms is even higher than the number for the 
matching firms. 
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In the following section the current research revisit Wallace’s investigation of a number 
of investing, financial and operating decisions using the models proposed above.  
  
Table 6.4.1 Selected descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent 
variables 
 
Variables* 
Adopter Firms Control Firms 
N Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
N Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Disposition 1933 27.581 93.887 2083 27.739 157.730 
New Investment 3411 344.580 1236.029 3453 266.953 754.665 
Purchases 3464 2.036 105.029 3585 3.068 144.384 
Dividends 3441 47.038 1434.123 3573 21.017 708.013 
Asset Turnover 3331 1.328 0.988 3555 1.210 0.814 
Inventory Turnover 3206 10.617 29.528 3417 10.366 19.180 
AR Turnover 3245 10.554 21.940 3425 16.946 177.069 
AP Turnover 2886 11.882 10.317 3186 11.591 24.589 
Debt 3423 1930.364 5704.894 3628 1846.283 5582.607 
Note: Statistics are based on annual accounting data from 1960 to 2012. Sample sizes 
represent firm-years. All figures are in a thousand US dollars. Disposition is sale of plant, 
property and equipment. New investment is acquisitions plus capital expenditures. 
Purchases per share are purchases of common stock divided by Common Shares 
Outstanding. Dividends are dividends available to common shareholders divided by 
Common Shares Outstanding. Assets turnover is revenue divided by average total 
assets. Inventory turnover calculated as cost of goods sold divided by average 
inventories total. Accounts Receivable (AR) Turnover is defined as revenue divided 
by average accounts receivable total. Accounts Payable (AP) Turnover is the cost of 
goods sold divided by average account payable trade, and Debt is the company total 
debt. 
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6.5    Empirical Results  
I began my analysis with the regression for equation (6.2), which is similar to that of 
Wallace (1997) except that               replaces        as a control variable. 
Table 6.5.1 summarises the results for dispositions and new investment decisions for the 
period of five years before and five years after adoption (10 year window). The effect is 
captured by the ‘Type’ coefficients. Contrary to Wallace’s finding, the adoption seems 
to have no effect on dispositions and new investment; both coefficients (-0.001 and 
0.005 respectively) are insignificant and of the opposite sign to those of Wallace. Thus, 
over a ten-year window dispositions show no significant change, whereas in Wallace 
they increased by 0.01 and were statistically significant. A similar insignificant effect is 
found for new investment (a negative effect is found in Wallace although it is only 
significant at the 10% level). Note that the adjusted-   is only 2% for dispositions (9% 
in Wallace) but 23% for new investment (1% in Wallace). This reversal of explanatory 
power of Wallace’s specification seems erratic since extending the sample should 
improve the coefficient of determination in both cases. This may well be due to the 
possible spuriousness induced by used differences rather than levels as discussed 
earlier. The difference cannot be attributed to the replacement of ‘ownership’ in 
Wallace by ‘market return’ in this model. Both variables are insignificant in all cases. 
However, the only significant variable is leverage, which seems to explain nearly 23% 
of the variability of new investment (in Wallace leverage is insignificant). On the other 
hand leverage is insignificant for disposition, which explained the low adjusted-   (in 
Wallace it is significant, explaining about 9% of the variability of new investment).  
Table 6.5.2 shows the results of testing the modified version of Wallace (1997), which 
uses levels rather than differences (see equation 6.3).  Three noteworthy results emerge 
from this table. First, the adjusted    is quite high as predicted. It moves from 2% to 
85% for disposition decisions and from 23.6% to 84.77% for new investment decisions. 
This means that our modified model is better at capturing the variation of performances 
between treatment and control firms than Wallace’s model. Second, the dummy variable 
that is assumed to capture the difference in the level of the dependent variable is 
insignificant for both the dispositions and new investment decisions.  
However, this does not mean the absence of the adoption effect. Indeed, for 
dispositions, the interaction variable is significant and has a positive coefficient. The 
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marginal effect is therefore obtained by taking partial derivatives of equation 6.3, 
yielding,  
     
 
   
           
  
Thus, adopter firms seem to increase dispositions (relative to control firms), but 
interestingly this increase is not constant and is a multiple of the pre-event level of 
disposition. In other words, firms with higher dispositions before adoption will increase 
dispositions more than those with lower pre-event dispositions.  
For new investments, the effect is totally absent. Neither the control, nor the dummy 
variables are significant, indicating no difference between the treatment and control 
firms. The high coefficient of determination is exclusively due to the lagged dependent 
variable. The lagged dependent variable coefficient is highly significant and 
considerably greater than unity (coefficient=1.346). This means that there has been an 
overall increase in new investment by both adopter and non-adopter firms. However, in 
contradistinction to dispositions, the interaction term is insignificant (coefficient=0.021, 
p-value=0.822). This means that there is no difference in new investment decisions 
between adopters and non-adopters. We can speculate that this positive trend in new 
investment could be due either to economic growth or inflation (or both). 
However, I think the new compensation plan that takes into account the time period 
needed to repay managers their remuneration will encourage the management to rethink 
of their investment strategy and start focusing more on positive projects regardless of 
their cash inflow timing. Consequently, I think that the time- horizon agency cost 
conflict is mitigated because it is already addressed by the new compensation system 
where payment period extends to cover a few years following the investment decision. 
Thus, managers will be more accountable for the quality of their decisions.  
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Table 6.5.1 Investing decisions (Wallace’s Model, Equation 6.2) 
        
 
Independent Variables 
            Constant                                 ADJ-  
  
Dispositions 
    
2.00% 
Coefficient 0.002 -0.001 0.010 -0.011 
t-statistics 1.048 -0.281 1.076 -0.911 
p-value 0.297 0.779 0.284 0.364 
New investment 
    
23.60% 
Coefficient 0.004 0.005 0.251 0.026 
t-statistics 0.502 0.412 6.889 0.520 
p-value 0.616 0.681 0.000 0.604 
Results are reported for Equation (6.2):                                                     ε  where             changes in the 
dependent variable,       is an indicator variable, for a firm adopting EVA equal to 1 and 0 matching firm,             is the change leverage where 
leverage is defined as debt divided by whatever the total assets are in each period and ε  is the error terms. Asset disposition and new investment are the 
dependent variables. 
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Table 6.5.2 Investing decisions (New Model, Equation 6.3) 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
    
  Constant Type     
           
     
       
     
  ADJ-    
 
Dispositions 
       
85.00% 
Coefficient 0.687 3.106 1.016 0.299 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
t-statistics 0.054 0.458 10.046 2.534 0.401 0.269 -0.102 
p-value 0.957 0.648 0.000 0.013 0.689 0.788 0.919 
New investment  
       
84.77% 
Coefficient -74.182 -10.620 1.346 0.021 -0.005 -0.014 0.110 
t-statistics -0.661 -0.179 10.298 0.226 -0.522 -0.567 1.031 
p-value 0.509 0.858 0.000 0.822 0.603 0.572 0.304 
Results reported for the modified version of Wallace (1997). Equation (6.3):     
          
                 
        
         
  
     
    , where ‘+’ refers to the post event (adoption) period, ‘-‘ refers to the pre- event period,      is the dependent variable, D is a type 
(adopter=1) dummy, TA is total assets, Debt is debt, and MI is the S&P500 market index. All variables are calculated as averages of pre- and 
post- event periods. Asset disposition and new investment are the dependent variables. 
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Table 6.5.3 shows the results obtained from running equation 6.4, which uses 
abnormal dependent and independent variables. The models explain a fairly good 
proportion of variability in abnormal dispositions and abnormal new investments 
(the adjusted-   are 30.62% and 48.34% respectively). As discussed earlier,    the 
coefficient of lagged performance is the parameter of interest and we are testing for 
the null hypothesis that there is no effect (   :      ) of adoption on firm 
performance. The result shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis for 
dispositions. Consequently, the adoption of EVA, contrary to Wallace, has not 
changed the disposition of assets (like with like, abnormal dispositions before 
adoption are not different from abnormal dispositions after adoption). The growth or 
decline in abnormal dispositions is mostly explained by the differential size and 
differential leverage. In the first case, the coefficient of       
  equals -0.035 and is 
highly significant, implying that larger adopter firms have decreased dispositions. 
On the other hand, more leveraged adopter firms have increased their dispositions 
relative to non-adopters (the coefficient of         
  is 0.065 and significant at the 
1% level). 
On the other hand, the current research reject the null hypothesis that there are no 
effects of adoption on new investment decisions. The coefficient of lagged abnormal 
new investment,    equals -0.966 and is highly significant. This is clear evidence that 
abnormal new investment has decreased significantly after adoption. This result is 
much stronger statistically than Wallace’s negative impact which is found to be 
weakly significant with a p-value of 0.09. The control variables are also significant 
(but size is only weakly significant). First, while abnormal size has a negative impact 
on dispositions, it has a positive effect on new investments. This is expected since 
larger firms have greater ability to invest in absolute terms. However, abnormal 
leverage has a significant coefficient but with an unexpected sign. Thus, while 
abnormally high leveraged firms see higher abnormal dispositions they 
(unexpectedly) also see higher abnormally new investment. 
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Table 6.5.3 Investing decisions (New Model, Equation 6.4) 
  
 
Independent Variables 
   
     
  Constant    
        
          
  ADJ-    
 
Dispositions 
    
30.62% 
Coefficient 9.074 0.104 -0.035 0.065 
t-statistics 1.133 0.971 -3.120 3.179 
p-value 0.265 0.338 0.004 0.003 
New investment 
    
48.34% 
Coefficient 43.806 -0.966 0.020 0.070 
t-statistics 1.339 -7.378 1.954 3.575 
p-value 0.185 0.000 0.055 0.001 
Results reported for the modified version of Wallace (1997). Equation (6.4):    
     
         
          
  
          
    , where    
  is the abnormal performance after the adoption,    
  is the abnormal performance before the 
adoption,       
  is the abnormal total asset after the adoption,         
 
 is the abnormal debt after the adoption and    is the 
error terms. Asset disposition and new investment are the dependent variables. 
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Tables 6.5.4, 6.5.5 and 6.5.6 show the results for the Wallace model (equation 6.2), 
the level model (equation 6.3), and the abnormal performance model (equation 6.4), 
respectively. The tables show the results for repurchase and dividends decisions and 
show different results regarding what happens to financing decisions after the 
adoption of the EVA compensation plan over a ten-year window. Table 6.5.4 shows 
a pattern similar to investment decision in Table 6.5.1. Contrary to Wallace’s 
findings, the effect that is captured by the ‘type’ coefficient shows that EVA’s 
adoption has no effect on repurchases and dividends decisions; the coefficients for 
repurchases and dividends (0.0004 and -0.009 respectively) are both insignificant. 
While the results of Table 6.5.4 suggest that no significant change in repurchases or 
dividends is found after the adoption of EVA, Wallace reports a high and significant 
increase in repurchase by 1.11. However, our result agrees with Wallace for 
dividends (the coefficient in Wallace was 0.17 but statistically insignificant). The 
adjusted-    is quite low, only 2.39% for repurchase (8% in Wallace) and 1.88% for 
dividends (-0.000 in Wallace). This confirms the inappropriateness of Wallace’s 
specification. Like Wallace, neither of the other variables (           
and              ) are statistically significant on conventional levels.  
Table 6.5.5 describes the results after running the modified version of Wallace 
(1997) as given by equation 6.3. The effect of working with levels is quite clear. The 
Adjusted-   are much higher than in the Wallace model (increasing from 2.39% to 
14.20% for repurchase decisions and from 1.88% to 64.06% for dividends 
decisions). This means the new modified model is certainly an improvement on the 
Wallace model.  
For repurchases, two out of the three control variables are significant. The 
performance of the market seems to play no role on repurchase behaviour. However, 
Leverage reduces repurchases while size has the opposite effect. More importantly, 
the dummy variables coefficient is positive and highly significant whereas the 
interaction term is insignificant (although the coefficient seems large and negative at 
-0.172, the p-value is very high). Since the interaction term is insignificant, the effect 
of adoption on repurchases is fully reflected in the type dummy coefficient, that is, 
EVA adopters on average increase their repurchases by 0.262 million dollars. 
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For dividends, the results are different. While size and leverage are significant and 
have nearly identical effect, the market index is significant but negative, which 
suggests that high markets see relatively lower levels of dividends. However, a more 
interesting finding is that now both the type dummy and the interaction variables are 
significant. However, while the dummy coefficient is positive (0.364), the interaction 
coefficient is negative. Hence the adoption effect is complex. We can see this effect 
through the marginal effect simply by taking partial derivatives of equation 6.3. This 
yield  
     
 
   
          
                  
  
for dividends.  
Thus the firms with relatively high dividends before adoption tend to reduce 
dividends after adoption and vice versa. Specifically, those with pre-adoption 
dividends of less than 0.734 tend to increase their dividends after adoption.  
The above results for repurchases are consistent with Wallace (1997) and Kleiman 
(1999). However, while Wallace reported insignificant effects for dividends, the 
results of Table 6.5.5 show that the effect is significant but depends on the prior 
dividend policy of the firm. This seems to be partly consistent with the agency 
theory concept which states that a manager is not in favour of giving shareholders 
any promises regarding the amount of the dividend they intend to pay in the future 
because from the shareholders’ point of view any increase in the amount of the 
dividend the manager promises to pay will become an obligation in the future. To 
alleviate the consequences of minimizing dividends in their relation with 
shareholders the manager will focus on the repurchasing of shares to enhance the 
share prices movement in the stock market and as a result any shareholder seeking 
extra cash can easily perform the selling of these shares at a better price.  The results 
so far only confirm the second conclusion relating to increasing repurchases by 
managers. However, the first part of the theory, namely that managers are reluctant 
to increase dividends, is not supported. Some managers (with low historical 
dividends) may actually increase dividends after adopting EVA, while others (whose 
historical dividends were high) will decrease them. 
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In the third model, the results in Table 6.5.6 are obtained from running equation 6.4. 
The adjusted-   is extremely high for dividends (=99.86%) and reasonably high for 
repurchases (=32.14%). This means that the models explain a very good proportion 
of variability in abnormal repurchases and abnormal dividends. The coefficient of 
lagged performance,  , is the parameter of interest. Contrary to Wallace, the results 
show a fall in abnormal repurchase and dividends. The null hypotheses (         
for repurchases and dividends are strongly rejected; both coefficients (-0.695 and -
0.998 respectively) are significant and negative, implying the reversal of the effect 
found in Wallace. Thus, our result suggests that while repurchases seem to increase 
in Wallace’s study, this study suggest the opposite. Furthermore, while EVA 
adoption has no effect on dividends, this study finds strong and negative effect. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the control variable        and          
(0.00002, -0.00005 respectively) for repurchase are small and insignificant. This 
implies that the difference in either size or leverage between adopter and control firm 
does not explain the change in abnormal repurchases and abnormal dividends across 
the pre- and post-adoption periods. The same conclusion applies to the dividends 
case. The coefficients of the abnormal size and abnormal leverage are insignificant.  
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Table 6.5.4 Financing decisions (Wallace’s Model, Equation 6.2) 
  
  Independent Variables 
            Constant                                 ADJ-  
  
Repurchase         
2.39% 
Coefficient -0.00004 0.00037 0.00036 0.00125 
t-statistics -0.19449 1.447 0.475 1.207 
p-value 0.84604 0.150 0.635 0.229 
Dividends         
1.88% 
Coefficient -0.001 -0.009 0.036 0.002 
t-statistics -0.089 -1.035 1.423 0.059 
p-value 0.929 0.302 0.157 0.953 
Results are reported for Equation (6.2):                                                        where 
           refers to changes in the dependent variable,       is an indicator variable, for a firm adopting EVA equal to 1 
and 0 matching firm,             is the change leverage where leverage is defined as debt divided by whatever the total 
assets in each period are and    is the error terms. Repurchase and dividend per share are the dependent variables. 
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Table 6.5.5 Financing decisions (New Model, Equation 6.3) 
 
 
Independent Variables 
    
  Constant Type     
           
     
       
     
  Adjusted-   
Repurchase 
       
14.20% 
Coefficient 0.260 0.262 0.371 -0.172 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
t-statistics 0.850 1.614 3.991 -0.978 2.731 -2.377 0.003 
p-value 0.396 0.009 0.000 0.350 0.007 0.019 0.693 
Dividends 
       
64.06% 
Coefficient 0.947 0.364 0.493 -0.496 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001 
t-statistics 4.997 3.869 14.206 -14.284 3.475 -2.793 -4.512 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 
Results reported for the modified version of Wallace (1997). Equation (6.3):     
          
                 
        
         
  
     
    , where ‘+’ refers to the post-event (adoption) period, ‘-‘ refers the pre-event period,      is the dependent variable, D is a type 
(adopter=1) dummy, TA is total assets, Debt is debt, and MI is the S&P500 market index. All variables are calculated as averages of pre- and 
post- event periods. Repurchase per share and dividends per share are the dependent variables. 
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Table 6.5.6 Financing decisions (New Model, Equation 6.4) 
 
 
Independent Variables 
   
     
  Constant    
        
          
  Adjusted-   
Repurchase 
    
32.14% 
Coefficient 0.14652 -0.69497 0.00002 -0.00005 
t-statistics 1.116 -5.788 0.638 -0.586 
p-value 0.268 0.000 0.525 0.560 
Dividends 
    
99.86% 
Coefficient -0.03141 -0.99844 0.00001 -0.00002 
t-statistics -0.288 -230.614 0.346 -0.249 
p-value 0.774 0.000 0.731 0.804 
Results reported for the modified version of Wallace (1997). Equation (6.4):    
     
         
          
  
          
    , where    
  is the abnormal performance after the adoption,    
  is the abnormal performance before 
the adoption,       
  is the abnormal total asset after the adoption,         
  is the abnormal debt after the adoption 
and    is the error terms. Share repurchases and dividends are the dependent variables. 
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Turning to operating decisions, Table 6.5.7 shows the result obtained from running 
equation 6.2 in which         is replaced by                as a control 
variable. The table shows the results for Asset, Inventory, Accounts Receivable, and 
Accounts Payable turnovers. 
The first note is that, similar to Wallace, the coefficients of determination are quite 
low, suggesting overall inadequacy of the Wallace model. The only weakly 
significant variable is the market return with a p-value of 7.5%. The remaining 
variables are all insignificant including the ‘Type’ dummies, which are all highly 
insignificant. In Wallace, the adoption has a positive effect for Asset turnover and 
Accounts receivable (although both coefficients are only significant at the 10% level 
respectively).  
Thus, partly negating Wallace’s results and using the same model, we find no effect 
of EVA adoption on the four operating decisions considered by Wallace, whereas he 
finds increased asset turnover and accounts receivable turnover.  
The change in operating decisions seems extremely hard to explain using Wallace’s 
model. The most convincing explanation seems to be made by the change in market 
return (              ), which seems to explain 2.84% of the variability of 
assets turnover (in Wallace the adjusted-   = 11%). The remaining coefficients of 
determination are nearly zero (and all negative in Wallace), which confirms the 
possibility that we are trying to estimate mainly random variation as discussed 
previously. 
When the model is modified, using levels rather than differences, the results change 
substantially. First, the adjusted-   for all dependent variables are high suggesting 
that, the explanatory variables capture a good proportion of the variability in the 
level of the four turnover variables. In all cases, none of the control variables is 
significant, indicating that the explanatory power of the four models is due to a 
lagged dependent variable and/or the type dummy.  
The results of Wallace are reversed in three out of four cases. First, for asset 
turnover, the coefficients of the type dummy and the interaction terms are both 
insignificant. Thus, there seems to be no EVA effect for this type of operating 
decisions (it is positive and significant in Wallace (Table 5, p.291)).  
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Second, for inventory turnover, Wallace finds no effect, whereas here the coefficient 
of the interaction term is positive and significant (although the type dummy is 
insignificant). This suggests a marginal effect of  
     
 
   
                         
  
In other words, the effect of EVA adoption is proportional to pre-adoption levels of 
inventory turnovers. Thus high inventory turnover adopter firms will see their 
inventory turnover increase by more than low pre-adoption inventory turnover firms.  
Third, for A/R turnover, Wallace finds a positive effect (albeit weakly significant). 
In this study, the results show strong statistical significance of both type dummy and 
interaction variables. The marginal effect is  
     
 
   
                           
  
This suggests that the behaviour can vary from positive to negative, depending on 
the level of pre-event AR turnover. For low turnover firms, there is a tendency to 
increase AR turnover following adoption of EVA. On the other hand, if turnover is 
more than 8.69 (=12.31/1.416) before adoption the firm will tend to reduce its AR 
turnover after adoption and vice versa. 
The final operating decision is accounts payable turnover. Here the results are in line 
with Wallace as neither dummy nor interaction term coefficient is significant.  
The results in Table 6.5.9 show a different story. In comparison to Wallace’s finding, 
our modified version (equation 6.4) explains a very high proportion of variability in 
abnormal asset turnover, inventory turnover, and AR turnover (the adjusted-   are 
54.66%, 38.19%, and 93.70% and 17.00% respectively), although the AP turnover 
has a lower adjusted-   (17%). As discussed earlier,  , the coefficient of lagged 
performance (   
   is the parameter of interest and we are testing for the null 
hypothesis that there is no effect (          of EVA adoption on firm 
performance. The result shows that we strongly reject the null hypothesis for all 
turnovers. Thus the adoption of EVA has affected the operating decisions the 
managers take in regard to turnovers. The effects are similar for asset turnover, AR 
turnover and AP turnover. In these three operating decision variables, none of the 
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control variables is significant. The coefficients of the lagged performance (   
   in 
all three cases are negative and highly significant. This suggests that these turnovers 
are significantly reduced after the adoption of EVA compared with matching control 
firms. The biggest reduction is in AR turnover (coefficient=-0.960). In contrast 
Wallace finds a positive, rather than negative, effect of EVA adoption on asset 
turnover and AR turnover, and finds no effect on AP turnover. 
The results for inventory turnover are quite different. Here, the effect is positive (the 
coefficient for lagged performance=0.544) and highly significant. Therefore adopters 
clearly increase their inventory turnover following the adoption of EVA. The control 
variables are also highly significant but with opposing signs. The abnormal size 
(      
 ) has a coefficient of -0.004 with p-value of nearly zero, whereas the 
abnormal leverage (         
 ) has a positive coefficient (=0.007) which is 
significant at the 1% level.  
In contrast to this positive effect, Wallace finds that EVA adoption has no significant 
effect on inventory turnover. 
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Table 6.5.7 Operating decisions   (Wallace’s Model, Equation 6.2) 
 
Independent Variables 
            Constant                                 ADJ-  
  
Asset Turnover +/- + + 
 
2.84% 
Coefficient -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.012 
t-statistics -2.928 0.875 0.723 1.792 
p-value 0.004 0.383 0.471 0.075 
Inventory Turnover +/- + + 
 
0.95% 
Coefficient 0.014 -0.018 0.001 0.14 
t-statistics 0.612 -0.549 0.013 1.054 
p-value 0.542 0.584 0.99 0.293 
AR Turnover +/- + + 
 
1.56% 
Coefficient -0.014 -0.023 0.066 0.097 
t-statistics -0.787 -0.905 0.878 0.925 
p-value 0.432 0.367 0.381 0.356 
AP Turnover +/- - - 
 
0.67% 
Coefficient -0.01 -0.003 -0.022 0.011 
t-statistics -1.657 -0.317 -0.936 0.327 
p-value 0.099 0.752 0.351 0.744 
Results are reported for the Equation (6.2):                                                        where            is the 
change in the dependent variable,       is an indicator variable, for firms adopting EVA equal to 1 and 0 matching firm,             is the change 
leverage where leverage is defined as debt divided by whatever the total assets are in each period and    are the error terms. The turnovers are the 
dependent variables. 
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Table 6.5.8 Operating decisions (New Model, Equation 6.3) 
  
 
Independent Variables 
    
  Constant Type     
           
     
       
     
  Adjusted-    
Asset Turnover 
       
85.24% 
Coefficient 0.128 0.084 0.831 -0.048 -5.00E-05 8.00E-05 -2.00E-05 
t-statistics 1.244 1.042 20.044 -0.876 -0.840 0.630 -0.014 
p-value 0.215 0.299 0.000 0.383 0.402 0.530 0.889 
Inventory Turnover 
       
57.24% 
Coefficient 0.668 -2.921 0.846 0.608 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
t-statistics 0.114 -0.838 3.819 2.464 0.836 -0.969 0.543 
p-value 0.910 0.403 0.000 0.015 0.404 0.334 0.588 
AR Turnover 
       
44.77% 
Coefficient -5.482 12.310 1.510 -1.416 -1.70E-04 3.80E-04 0.002 
t-statistics -1.541 5.975 10.264 -9.509 -0.513 0.577 0.708 
p-value 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.608 0.565 0.480 
AP Turnover 
       
57.06% 
Coefficient 3.445 -0.538 0.759 -0.036 -1.00E-04 1.00E-04 -0.001 
t-statistics 1.481 -0.303 6.943 -0.289 -0.515 0.321 -0.384 
p-value 0.141 0.762 0.000 0.773 0.607 0.748 0.702 
Results reported for the modified version of Wallace (1997). Equation (6.3):     
          
                 
        
  
       
       
     . where ‘+’ refers to the post-event (adoption) period, ‘-‘refers to the pre-event period,      is the dependent 
variable, D is a type (adopter=1) dummy, TA is total assets, Debt is debt, and MI is the S&P500 market index. All variables are 
calculated as averages of pre- and post- event periods. Turnovers are the dependent variables. 
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Table 6.5.9 Operating decisions (New Model, Equation 6.4) 
 
Independent Variables 
   
     
  Constant    
        
          
  ADJ-    
 
Asset Turnover 
    
54.66% 
Coefficient 0.049 -0.461 -3.802E-07 -3.523E-07 
t-statistics 1.341 -9.242 -0.045 -0.021 
p-value 0.184 0.000 0.964 0.838 
Inventory Turnover 
    
38.19% 
Coefficient 1.922 0.544 -0.004 0.007 
t-statistics 0.772 3.275 -5.537 5.116 
p-value 0.443 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR Turnover 
    
93.70% 
Coefficient -0.650 -0.960 -0.00001 0.00009 
t-statistics -0.432 -31.810 0.021 0.104 
p-value 0.667 0.000 0.984 0.918 
AP Turnover 
    
17.00% 
Coefficient -0.997 -0.372 -0.00004 0.00007 
t-statistics -0.896 -3.736 -0.126 0.115 
p-value 0.373 0.000 0.900 0.909 
Results reported for the modified version of Wallace (1997). Equation (6.4):    
     
         
          
            
    , 
where    
  is the abnormal performance after the adoption,    
  is the abnormal performance before the adoption,       
  is the 
abnormal total asset after the adoption,         
  is the abnormal debt after the adoption and    is the error terms. Turnovers are the 
dependent variables. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have examined the long-term effects of adopting economic value 
added (EVA) as compensation and management tools on top management potential 
decisions that a manager chooses in order to increase the shareholder wealth and better 
align the interest of managers and shareholder. The current research chose a set of 
decisions that we expect (as Wallace also did) will increase the company value and 
shareholder wealth. These decisions are the investing decisions (e.g. asset disposition 
and new investment decisions), financing decisions (e.g. share repurchase and dividends 
decisions) and operating decisions (e.g. asset turnover, inventory turnover, AR turnover 
and AP turnover). In this context Wallace (1997) claims that managers would increase 
asset disposition and turnover, repurchases per share, dividends, inventory turnover and 
receivable turnover and decrease new investment and payables turnover. 
The model by Wallace is modified in several ways. First it is modified by introducing 
the market return index (S&P500) as a control variable to replace the change in 
ownership in Wallace’s original model. Second, a model is proposed that uses levels 
rather than differences. Third, a modified model is proposed that uses abnormal 
measures of dependent and independent variables. These two modifications are 
arguably better able to capture any significant effect in the EVA adopter firms’ 
performances after the adoption date. The findings are summarised in Table 6.6.1. 
The table reveals two sets of results. The first set is not surprising and is related to 
econometric considerations regarding model selection. The second set, which is related 
to firm behaviour, is surprising as only a single prediction by Wallace is matched by 
this study’s selected model (see New Investment under “Abnormal Measures Model”).  
With regard to the econometric considerations, we note that the empirical findings are 
sensitive to both the choice of model and the sample size. First, in Wallace’s study, 5 
out 8 cases are significant, but in this study’s extended sample, none of the variables is 
significant (see “Wallace Model” column in Table 6.6.1) even though the same model 
was employed (although we have not matched Wallace’s model perfectly, it is unlikely 
that the replacement of the ownership variable used in Wallace by the market return has 
had any impact since they are both insignificant). 
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We contend that Wallace’s model was simply attempting to regress some control 
variables on dependent variables that are dominated by noise. The consistently low 
adjusted coefficients of determination confirm the suspicion that Wallace’s regression is 
probably spurious.  
The first modification adopted here is to use levels rather than differences. The 
explanatory power of the 8 regressions is improved significantly, but that is expected in 
models using levels. Nevertheless, the results do not match all Wallace’s predictions. 
There are only two agreements (dispositions and repurchases) where EVA adoption is 
found to have a positive impact. In two cases (new investment and asset turnover) the 
impact is significant in Wallace but insignificant here. In the other two cases (dividends 
and inventory turnover) it is the opposite. Only in the final case (AP turnover) are the 
two models similar (i.e. insignificant). Although, the level model is more credible 
statistically and although it leads to some interesting firm behaviour for dividends and 
AR turnover (in that the EVA adoption impact could be both negative and positive), it 
still suffers from a major shortcoming.  
The problem with the model in levels is that it still fails to match the treatment firm with 
the control firm on a one-to-one basis. So the results produced by this specification 
contrast the average treatment firm with the average control firm. This is only 
appropriate in the special case where the difference between each treatment and control 
firm cannot be explained by a control variable such as leverage or size, otherwise, as 
was demonstrated earlier in the chapter, the results can be totally spurious. 
A model that solves these issues and one that is robust to the extent that the differential 
between treatment and control behavioural is dependent on some control variable is the 
last modification, which is labelled “abnormal measures model” in Table 6.6.1. This is 
the preferred model upon which the empirical and economic interpretation will be 
based. 
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Table 6.6.1 Summary of Results 
Variable  
(Predicted Sign) 
Wallace 
Study 
Wallace 
Model 
Non-Matching 
using Levels 
Abnormal 
Measures 
Model 
Dispositions (+) Positive nr Positive nr 
New investment (-) Negative nr nr Negative 
Repurchases (+) Positive nr Positive Negative 
Dividends (+) Nr nr Positive/Negative Negative 
Asset Turnover (+) Positive nr nr Negative 
Inventory Turnover  (+) Nr nr Positive Positive 
AR Turnover (+) Positive nr Positive/Negative Negative 
AP Turnover (-) Nr nr nr Negative 
nr = no significant relationship 
Turning to the second set of results, and using the selected model (last column in Table 
6.6.1) the note is that only one of Wallace’s conclusions is matched. The new 
investment was predicted and found to be negative by Wallace and this study is in line 
with that finding. An explanation of the negative impact of EVA adoption on new 
investment might include the possibility that when adopting EVA as a compensation 
plan and management tool, the criterion managers used to choose among alternative 
investments (projects) change, in such a way that the selected new investments have the 
ability to earn more than the embedded cost of debt financing. Thus, in order to increase 
firm value by generating more earnings, managers will avoid over-investing, 
particularly in those investments that might earn less than the opportunity cost of capital 
finance.  
In the remaining seven variables, there is no agreement with Wallace. While Wallace 
finds a positive effect for dispositions, this study finds no significant effect. A possible 
reason for this discrepancy might refer to the nature of the assets adopter firm owned 
and to the attractiveness of these assets for other companies. Some outside firms may 
believe that the adopter firm assets are in the most efficient user’s hands and may be 
willing to offer a price that is high enough to tempt the adopter firm to sell the asset. 
However, it is also possible that other firms may believe the opposite. The result of this 
study is consistent with a mixed response by firms such that some adopter firms 
increased their dispositions while others decreased them. The insignificant results 
suggest that the two effects are cancelled out.  
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In repurchases and dividends, Wallace finds a positive effect while it is negative here. A 
possible reason is that managers, in order to maximize their own personal benefit, begin 
retaining free cash flows. One reason for this retention is to insulate the firm from the 
capital market that serves as a monitoring instrument by subjecting any extra capital 
needs of the firm to impartial scrutiny. To avoid capital market monitoring, managers 
will only use the existing cash reserves that have been accumulated to finance new 
projects (contrary to the results I achieved) rather than paying it out to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1993). A possible, more interesting, reason for managers to avoid paying out 
cash flow is the desire to maximize the firm size.
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 Further, managers have more of a 
tendency towards preventing shareholders from getting more cash than discouraging 
them from redirecting capital to a more productive use. Moreover, firms are reluctant to 
increase dividends payment particularly when they are unsure about the availability of 
future free cash flows and whether they can sustain the same payout ratio (dividends are 
sticky). Moreover, firms are more likely to prefer to finance share repurchases from the 
excess cash they generate from non-recurring items rather than using the free cash flow 
they generate from core activities (Miller and Rock, 1985). However, the stated purpose 
of the long-term incentives scheme is to align the interests of managers with that of 
shareholders. To the extent that these long-term compensation plans encourage 
managers to develop growth opportunities, a significant fall in dividends (relative to 
control firms) can only be accepted if it is accompanied by a significant increase in new 
investments. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Both new investments and 
dividends/repurchases have fallen in relative terms.  
When examining the measures of turnovers, asset turnover, accounts receivable 
turnover, and inventory turnover the result obtained showed decreases in asset turnover 
and both the accounts receivable and account payables turnovers, and also showed an 
increase in inventory turnover. Wallace found a positive accounts receivable and asset 
turnover and a negative account payables turnover and reported a insignificant 
relationship for inventory turnover. However, as discussed before, some managers have 
some tendency to increase the firm size through accumulating sub-optimal assets, which 
would lead to an increase in the asset base, asset turnover, and accounts receivable. At 
the same time, we would expect accounts payable to decrease following the adoption.  
                                                             
32 Murphy (1985) documents a positive correlation between total management compensation 
and firm size. 
202 
 
Overall, it is hard to choose between any of the proposed two models as a candidate for 
detecting abnormal performance. While the Wallace-Level model has interesting 
findings, it may be spurious. On the other hand, while the Abnormal-Measure model is 
more robust statistically, the results are hard to explain.  
Thus, there are both econometric and empirical implications. Econometrically, more 
elaborate simulation studies may be required to establish the performance of matching 
and non-matching models. Empirically, the results may be sensitive to several factors. 
First, it is possible that an important factor is missing from the model. The models in 
this study use size and leverage as firm characteristics and market return as a market 
wide control factor. Other characteristics such as firm age and industry may be 
influential. Second, the matching procedure may not produce accurate benchmarks. 
Following previous studies, the SIC code was used here to match treatment and control 
firms. This could possibly be improved by increasing the number of matching 
characteristics to include firm characteristics such as size, leverage and systematic risk 
(beta). 
Elsewhere, the effective corporate governance suggests that boards should strive to 
align executive and board remuneration with the longer-term interests of the company 
and its shareholders and the long-term incentive schemes are alike. Recently, 
compensation policies which emphasise long-term profitability only and bonus pay-outs 
have been tied to the current performance with sufficient care for future risk and 
revenue profiles. Thus, the focus of the firms’ manager is to increase the shareholder 
wealth and to increase the firm value. To my knowledge I think this is the correct reason 
for the bias in the returns obtained as indicated by the proposed models.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
  
7.1  Introduction  
This chapter aims to highlight the main results and findings of the research, draw 
conclusions and research contributions and implications. In addition, the chapter 
highlights the research limitations and provides insight and direction for potential future 
research. 
7.2  Main research findings  
The long-standing debate about the superiority of performance measures in explaining 
the variation in stock price and stock return performances and what motivates 
researchers and investors to select from these measures has by no means been resolved 
through this study as further research is still called for. However, previous researchers 
(i.e. US and UK studies) had attempted to use different methodologies and different 
proxies for the accounting variables to explain the association between a selected 
performance measure and stock return (price) performances. Furthermore, most of that 
research replicates the work of Biddle et al., (1997) where the focus in methodology 
were on the traditional evaluation components of the Ohlson (1995) model. Thus, the 
results they obtained were mixed and contradictory regarding the superiority of 
performance metrics.   
The current research attempts to overcome these contradictions within the results 
obtained utilising different research strategies by first, extending the methodology of 
Biddle et al. by introducing the book value (BV) as a major explanatory variable with 
other performance measures into the price and return valuation model as a determinate 
of the share price (Ohlson, 1995). Second, applying the same methodology over the 
extending period 1960 to 2012 and finally using the same definition and calculation of 
the variables used to conduct this research. Further, I have adopted the most popular 
evaluation method: the price and return model. 
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This study aimed to fill the apparent gaps in the literature. The overarching objective 
was to examine the association of a set of performances, namely the net income 
available to common (NI), earnings before interest, tax and amortization and 
depreciation (EBIDA), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), earnings before 
extraordinary items (EBEI), net cash flows from operations (CFO), cash value added 
(CVA) and economic value added (EVA), with stock price (return) performances. I then 
extended the research to test for the incremental information of these variables. 
Subsequently, the main performance measures, the net income (NI) and the economic 
value added, were decomposed into the main components to examine whether the 
components contained more value than the original measures. 
The problem addressed in chapters 6 and 7 is “How will the adoption of economic value 
added (EVA) affect the long-term performance of adopting firms regarding the 
investing, financing and operating decisions?”  In order to address this issue I used the 
commonly used aggregation method, the cumulated average abnormal return (CAAR) 
and buy-hold abnormal return (BHAR), to test for any changes in treatment firms’ 
performances after adoption. Then, in order to examine the long-term adoption effects, I 
extended the work of Wallace (1997) in several ways. First it was modified by 
introducing the market return index (S&P500) as a control variable to replace the 
change in ownership in Wallace’s original model. Second, a model is proposed that uses 
levels rather than differences. Third, a modified model is proposed that uses abnormal 
measures of dependent and independent variables. 
The key findings and related conclusions in response to research questions and 
objectives as outlined in the introduction, literature, and methodology chapters can be 
classified into three categories as presented below. 
7.2.1 Findings for the value relevance and incremental information 
content of performance measures 
The result obtained with regard to value relevance showed that the adjusted-    , the 
criterion I used to gauge the value relevance of performance measures, increased rapidly 
after the incorporation of BV into the price model as an explanatory variable. This 
means that our extended model is better at capturing the variation of stock performances 
than the Biddle et al. model (in Wallace it is significant, explaining about 9.04% of the 
205 
 
variability of stock performance in the best case where it is significant and explains 
about 79.82% of the variability of stock performance when applying our extended 
model). When applying the price model, the CFO has the highest explanatory power 
among the other variables (adjusted-    =79.82%).  The remaining performance 
measures are in the following order with regard to their value relevance: EBITDA 
(adjusted-    =77.90%), EVA (adjusted-    =77.32%), EBIT (adjusted-    =77.30%), 
(NI and EBEI (adjusted-    =76.55%) and CVA (adjusted-    =76.00%).  
In addition the results show that EBITDA (adjusted-    =15.14%) is the dominant  
variable when we used the return model following earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) but the adjusted-   is quite low compared to that  obtained by the price model. 
With regard to the incremental information content, the result indicates that there is 
significant evidence regarding the incremental information content existing between 
pairwise measures. The best combination exists between CFO and NOPAT (adjusted- 
  = 82.01%). The lowest exists when NI is paired with EBEI (  =76.55%). One 
interesting result is that NI still has the ability to outperform EVA as its explanatory 
power increases by 0.67% when paired with NI. 
One interesting finding is that the adjusted-   obtained from the original return model 
by Biddle et al., is similar to that of the extended version of the return model where the 
book value (BV) is introduced as a dependent variable. This might indicate that unlike 
the price model, the book value (BV) adds little to other variables information content. 
Moreover, the changes in earnings before extraordinary items (EBIT) have the highest 
adjusted-   (14.76%) when adopting the extended version of Biddle et al., and earnings 
before interest depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) had the highest adjusted-   
(13.37%) when adopting the normal return model.  
7.2.2   Findings for the main components of NI and EVA   
The results obtained provide empirical evidence on the incremental information content 
of EVA and NI components with regard to explaining the variation in stock 
performances. All NI components are significant and positively associated with the 
share price performances at the 0.05 level except for ΔAP which has a significant and 
negative sign. In support of the incremental information content of NI components, 
there is strong evidence regarding the increases in adjusted-   after decomposition into 
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cash flows and accruals. It increases from 76.55% (for NI alone) to 82.70% (after 
decomposition).  The increase in    by 6.15% indicates that jointly, cash flow and 
accrual components significantly outperform NI in explaining changes in price 
performances. This is consistent with Wilson (1986 and 1987) and Garrod et al. (2000) 
who claim that decomposing NI (earnings) into main components, the cash flows and 
accruals, will enhance the model’s ability to explain the stock performance’s volatility.     
Turning to EVA components the adjusted-    has increased by 2.91% after the 
decomposition which indicates that EVA’s components together significantly 
outperform EVA in explaining changes in price performances. The best results are 
achieved when accruals (ACCR) are separately paired with the capital charge 
(CAPCHG) and after tax interest (ATINT).  Interestingly, the traditional performance 
measures still have the ability to compete and outperform the value added measures.   
7.2.3 Findings for the effects of adopting economic value added (EVA)  
The results that have been obtained after the application of the CAR and BHAR 
aggregation method indicate that firms adopting EVA as a compensation plan and 
management tool outperform the market (S&P500) and controlling firms (same sector) 
most of the time within the hold period. The CAR results show that despite the 
benchmarking used, the majority of adopter firms positively outperform the matching 
firms and the S&P500 portfolio and after a few months the adopter firms have a 
negative performance mainly in year one and year five of the ten year estimated period.  
Regarding the BHAR approach the findings reveal that the results obtained from a 
comparison against the benchmarking portfolio (S&P500) are smaller in value than 
those obtained when compared to the matching firms’ benchmark. One interesting 
finding is that CAR is almost the same as BHAR when the S&P500 portfolio is used as 
a benchmark to calculate the aggregate returns. 
To sum up, regardless of the aggregation approach used to measure the abnormal return, 
the adopter firms have a considerably low outperformance and this outperformance 
increased as the hold period increased. However, even with the positive performances 
most EVA adopter firms’ outperformance declines after the adoption and takes some 
time to return to negative performance when matching benchmarks are used. This might 
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typically reflect the fact that the market might react poorly to the adoption 
announcement.  
Although I have proposed three modified versions of Wallace (1997) to examine the 
long-term effects of adopting economic value added (EVA) compensation plan on top 
management investing decisions (e.g. asset disposition and new investment decisions), 
financing decisions (e.g. share repurchase and dividends decisions) and operating 
decisions (e.g. asset turnover, inventory turnover, AR turnover and AP turnover). The 
result shows that the adjusted-  , of the modified versions used is quite high. Thus, my 
modified models are arguably better able to capture any significant effect in the EVA 
adopter firms’ performances after the adoption date. 
The results obtained from the Wallace model indicate that none of the firms’ potential 
decisions is significantly affected by EVA adoption.  In addition I contend that 
Wallace’s model, where the market return index (S&P500) replaces the change in 
ownership as a control variable in Wallace’s original model, was simply attempting to 
regress some control variables on dependent variables that are dominated by noise. The 
consistently low adjusted coefficients of determination confirm the suspicion that 
Wallace’s regression is probably spurious. 
For the second modified version, where variables are used in levels rather in 
differences, the adjusted-   is significantly improved for all decisions; only the new 
investment and asset turnovers are insignificant, the disposition and repurchases are the 
only decisions that are in agreement with Wallace’s original model. The remaining 
variables, dividends and inventory decisions, are both significant and in opposite 
directions. The AP turnover is insignificant in both the original and the extended 
version model. Finally, the EVA adoption impact could be both negative and positive 
on dividends and AR turnover decisions.  
Turning to the third model result, when applying the abnormal measures model 
(abnormal measures of dependent and independent variables) we expect the matching 
problem inherent in the levels model (the second modification of Wallace model) will 
be demolished. I note that the new investment decision is the only variable that matched 
Wallace’s conclusion. The remaining decisions are significant but inconsistent with the 
direction of the Wallace model. However, the only insignificant variable is the 
disposition decision. 
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 7.3  Research conclusion  
With regard to the value relevance of selected performance measures, the general 
conclusion is that all the selected performance measures (in whatever way the 
evaluation model has been used) have a significant effect on the variation in stock return 
(price) performances. The CFO and EBITDA are superior among the investigated 
performance measures, particularly the value added measures (i.e. economic value 
added (EVA) and cash value added (CVA)). Two results are worth noting. First, there is 
strong UK evidence of the superiority of accruals in explaining changes in stock 
performances and its ability to increase the value relevancy of NI when the latter is 
decomposed into cash flows and main accruals components. Second, the cash value 
added (CVA) (the performance measure that is used the first time to address the UK 
data), is highly significant and has the ability to explain 76.0% of the variation in UK 
stock performances.    
Regarding the incremental information content, all the performance measures in this 
research have incremental information beyond each other. The best compensation was 
between CFO and NOPAT. To this end it is better to use a combination of performance 
measures to examine firm performances. 
In terms of decomposing, we conclude that decomposing NI into its main components, 
the cash flows and accruals, increases the explanatory power of the former and 
improves the quality of earnings. The increase in    (6.15%) could be considered a 
good indicator of the quality of the earnings released by the UK firm. Similarly, there 
are some gains from decomposing EVA into its main components. The increases in 
adjusted    (the explanatory power) and all the EVA components are significant at the 
conventional level. 
In regard to the adoption of EVA as a performance incentive scheme and management 
tool effect this research concludes that EVA firms have outperformed the matching 
firms and the market portfolio S&P500 index through the holding periods but the 
market was weak in its response to the adoption announcement. In addition, the current 
research conclude that adopting EVA as a management tool significantly affects the 
adopting firm’s potential investment, financial and operating decisions. The new 
investment decision is the only one in the direction of Wallace (1997). In general, the 
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results obtained regarding the long-term effects of EVA adoption are mixed regardless 
of the modified model applied.  
7.4    Research contributions and recommendations  
In order to draw attention to the main contributions of the current research, they were 
divided into two main aspects: the contribution to the United Kingdom literature, 
particularly the performance measures field, and the contribution to the US literature by 
testing the consequences and the effects of adopting economic value added (EVA) as a 
compensation scheme and as a management tool on firms’ performances and 
management behaviour. Firstly, in the UK there is a lack of studies that examine the 
association between performance measures and the variation in stock price (return) 
performances in general. Therefore, this research will employ UK data for the period  
1960 to 2012 and adopt a unified econometrics model to examine and test the 
association of a set of performance measures, (being the focus of past literature), and the 
variation in annual stock price performances. This, as intended, will eliminate the 
controversies embedded in the findings of previous UK studies regarding the use of 
different samples and econometric models in conducting their research. 
In addition, the research will provide some statistical information about the value 
relevance of cash value added (CVA), the performance measures that are being used for 
the first time to examine UK data. Furthermore, the net income available to common 
(NI) and economic value added (EVA), the measures that are most vulnerable to 
criticism in the literature, are decomposed into their main items to test whether these 
components can convey more information about a firm’s performance rather than the 
original measures. 
Secondly, there will be a contribution to the US literature in terms of the modification I 
have done to Wallace’s (1997) model design. In order to test the impact of adopting 
EVA as a performance incentive scheme and management tool on the performance of 
adopter firms the current research modified Wallace’s work in three ways. First it is 
modified by replacing the change in ownership in Wallace’s original model with the 
market return index (S&P500) as a control variable. Second, I proposed a model that 
uses variables in levels rather than differences. Third, a modified model is proposed that 
uses abnormal measures of dependent and independent variables. 
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Finally, based on the results of running our test against the proposed models, this study 
recommended that: 
 Firms and investors in the UK should be familiar with the logical meaning of the 
economic value added (EVA) and cash value added (CVA) as  new performance 
measures to evaluate managers’ performances and the performances of firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange Market. As seen early in chapter 5 (EVA 
adopter) there are five UK companies that have announced their adoption of the 
EVA concept. 
 As different performance measures reveal incremental information beyond each 
other, investors again should not rely heavily on one performance measure to 
evaluate the top management and firm’s performance, and the probability of 
there being no significant relationship holds between stock prices and what the 
financial statement contains This might refer to the fact that investors are 
unaware of the importance of these figures that are disclosed and what they 
mean. Consequently this study suggests that we should do our best to steer 
investor attentions towards the importance of these figures disclosed in financial 
statements and their ability to provide us with the best indicator about the 
intactness of firms’ performances.   
7.5   Research limitations  
This study, as with much research, has a number of limitations. These limitations 
appeared during the different stages of the research. In the first stage, the stage of the 
formulation of the research’s questions and its objectives, there was a scarcity of UK 
academic studies that investigated the association between stock market performance 
and different performance measures, and particularly studies that used the price model 
to discuss the aforementioned association. Furthermore, none of these studies discussed 
the association between cash value added (CVA) and stock price (return) performances. 
In the second stage, that  of data collection, there were many firms that had not  released 
accounting and financial information (i.e. share price and firms’ Betas) even though 
they were listed on the  London Stock Exchange (LSE) since the 1960s or even before 
that.. Moreover, the mnemonic code that is used by the DataStream software engine as a 
firms’ ID to trace all released accounting information in different time periods was 
different to that used by the LSE and other databases.  The most difficult problem to 
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address regarding the mnemonic code was that most firms (UK and US firms) have 
different mnemonic codes within the same data software (e.g. DataStream, CRSP and 
Compustat). The research attempted to deal with this limitation through the adoption of 
a firm’s name (each time) to trace the accounting and financial information with a 
miscellaneous database.  In addition I manually calculated some variables that would 
enable me to calculate the main variables of the study, such as the firm’s Beta. 
To sum up, regardless of the aforementioned limitations the current research achieved 
its objectives by providing a complete image of the value relevancy of the selected 
performance measures and successfully designed a modification model that best 
captures the consequences of adopting EVA regarding a managers’ and firms’ 
behaviour after the adoption. 
Another possibly significant limitation is the change in the accounting standards that the 
British system experienced. Due to time limitations, the possible effect of the 
accounting standards change has not been addressed in this thesis. However, it would be 
interesting to extend the present research to include the move of the accounting standard 
from the UK-GAAP to IFRS. 
This thesis focused on the US and the UK markets as case studies. This choice was 
driven partly by the fact that these countries have similar financial and accounting 
systems as well as being amongst the largest markets in the world. However, the results 
may not be generalised to other countries that have different accounting systems. 
Therefore, it may be useful to extend the present work to include other developed and 
developing markets for the purpose of assessing the various accounting measures in 
different accounting systems and financial environments. 
One limitation related to the adoption of EVA by firms is the endogeneity inherent in 
the adoption of EVA. Specifically, firms that adopt EVA also adopt other changes 
within the firm. Therefore, the effect (or lack of it) of EVA adoption found in this study 
could be only partially due to EVA. However, the use of control firms to contrast them 
with the adopting or treatment firms has probably mitigated this effect. 
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7.6   Future research  
Future studies should include replicating similar price and return evaluation models 
using different UK sectors to see whether these results regarding the value relevance of 
performance metrics continue to hold for UK data regardless of the sector in which the 
company operates. As already noted, the economic value added (EVA) has been 
calculated using the economic definition of EVA that is similar to the residual income 
(RI) concept mentioned early in the literature and which ignored the accounting 
adjustment recommended by Stern & Stewart Co. Therefore, in order to examine the 
value relevance of these accounting adjustments, it is suggested that the same research 
would likely apply to the UK accounting adjustments that have been applied to both net 
operating profits after tax (NOPAT) and the invested capital (IC).  
Finally, the three models I have proposed to replace Wallace’s (1997) original model 
are considered to be a platform and a starting point for any research conducted  in the 
future into the impact of adopting EVA on managers’ and firms’ performances after the 
adoption date. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Full 60 months event period for all cases 
Summary statistics for adopter firm return 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.028 2.549 0.103 -0.266 0.376 0.347 1.679 -0.031 0.085 
2 87 0.016 1.729 0.087 -0.161 0.444 1.962 7.116 -0.035 0.042 
3 87 -0.007 -0.697 0.090 -0.284 0.332 0.401 2.201 -0.068 0.045 
4 87 0.028 3.007 0.087 -0.281 0.235 0.124 1.395 -0.017 0.068 
5 87 0.018 2.509 0.068 -0.145 0.230 0.281 0.717 -0.025 0.053 
6 87 0.008 0.924 0.077 -0.177 0.208 0.283 0.129 -0.039 0.053 
7 87 0.010 0.833 0.109 -0.215 0.324 0.363 0.331 -0.059 0.074 
8 87 0.007 0.599 0.113 -0.469 0.343 -0.795 3.365 -0.040 0.073 
9 87 0.015 1.615 0.087 -0.216 0.198 -0.278 -0.008 -0.033 0.070 
10 87 0.002 0.252 0.075 -0.231 0.160 -0.382 0.537 -0.035 0.051 
11 87 0.028 2.762 0.095 -0.214 0.300 0.260 0.649 -0.028 0.082 
12 87 0.018 2.000 0.083 -0.188 0.260 -0.197 0.615 -0.030 0.066 
13 87 0.004 0.380 0.105 -0.327 0.479 0.513 4.981 -0.048 0.054 
14 87 0.035 3.460 0.094 -0.278 0.333 -0.342 2.329 -0.001 0.080 
15 87 0.022 2.427 0.083 -0.164 0.280 0.324 0.395 -0.027 0.067 
16 87 0.020 1.745 0.109 -0.291 0.647 2.309 12.548 -0.035 0.049 
18 87 0.027 2.434 0.105 -0.273 0.484 1.296 4.925 -0.027 0.054 
19 87 0.022 1.885 0.111 -0.210 0.521 1.466 4.889 -0.037 0.076 
20 87 0.008 0.777 0.097 -0.320 0.358 0.126 2.394 -0.045 0.059 
21 87 -0.002 -0.166 0.097 -0.396 0.275 -0.287 2.704 -0.052 0.054 
22 87 -0.009 -0.925 0.088 -0.278 0.235 0.104 1.341 -0.058 0.040 
23 87 0.047 4.563 0.096 -0.226 0.292 -0.259 0.141 -0.009 0.118 
24 87 0.003 0.313 0.090 -0.247 0.220 -0.059 -0.145 -0.074 0.061 
25 87 0.031 1.636 0.179 -0.543 1.200 3.270 22.470 -0.027 0.064 
26 87 0.022 2.074 0.099 -0.206 0.403 0.769 2.926 -0.033 0.068 
27 87 0.033 1.869 0.165 -0.407 0.934 2.592 12.668 -0.038 0.067 
28 87 0.014 1.016 0.130 -0.308 0.631 1.122 5.422 -0.045 0.073 
29 87 0.017 1.657 0.096 -0.280 0.316 -0.022 2.444 -0.036 0.065 
30 87 0.005 0.509 0.087 -0.242 0.299 0.257 1.603 -0.038 0.063 
31 87 -0.013 -1.157 0.106 -0.307 0.395 0.536 3.025 -0.066 0.043 
32 87 -0.033 -2.527 0.120 -0.434 0.342 -0.521 1.906 -0.076 0.029 
33 87 -0.014 -1.158 0.109 -0.473 0.237 -1.246 4.010 -0.050 0.049 
34 87 0.008 0.690 0.110 -0.402 0.281 -0.478 1.829 -0.042 0.078 
35 87 0.034 2.356 0.136 -0.487 0.495 -0.232 4.345 -0.033 0.094 
36 87 0.019 1.613 0.109 -0.319 0.393 0.230 1.717 -0.044 0.081 
37 87 0.049 2.609 0.176 -0.295 0.968 2.486 10.111 -0.033 0.082 
38 87 -0.006 -0.491 0.107 -0.313 0.189 -0.503 0.060 -0.073 0.064 
39 87 0.009 0.772 0.112 -0.243 0.329 0.508 0.880 -0.067 0.072 
40 87 0.030 2.075 0.134 -0.192 0.600 2.189 6.450 -0.037 0.076 
41 87 0.040 3.309 0.113 -0.187 0.607 1.722 6.799 -0.014 0.072 
42 86 0.016 0.963 0.150 -0.520 0.609 0.447 3.843 -0.054 0.071 
43 86 -0.006 -0.379 0.137 -0.385 0.728 1.398 9.621 -0.070 0.057 
44 86 -0.021 -1.725 0.112 -0.436 0.251 -0.729 2.314 -0.080 0.041 
45 86 0.000 0.019 0.146 -0.798 0.414 -1.782 10.485 -0.045 0.069 
46 85 0.008 0.563 0.136 -0.265 0.545 0.847 2.155 -0.084 0.079 
47 85 0.054 3.020 0.164 -0.395 0.821 1.447 5.582 -0.027 0.100 
48 85 0.014 0.994 0.128 -0.265 0.391 0.351 1.198 -0.058 0.074 
49 85 -0.003 -0.262 0.096 -0.257 0.375 0.844 3.273 -0.070 0.041 
50 85 0.000 -0.016 0.134 -0.393 0.430 0.681 2.207 -0.077 0.065 
51 85 0.003 0.239 0.109 -0.360 0.368 0.213 1.678 -0.078 0.065 
52 85 0.052 4.204 0.114 -0.251 0.437 0.499 0.929 -0.020 0.121 
53 85 0.022 1.769 0.115 -0.254 0.599 1.434 6.462 -0.041 0.073 
54 85 0.017 1.299 0.120 -0.340 0.383 0.598 1.488 -0.060 0.061 
55 84 -0.020 -1.268 0.143 -0.644 0.309 -1.241 5.425 -0.080 0.058 
56 84 -0.032 -2.207 0.132 -0.536 0.315 -0.610 2.925 -0.094 0.021 
57 84 -0.008 -0.809 0.095 -0.343 0.250 -0.232 1.994 -0.071 0.042 
58 83 -0.009 -0.514 0.153 -0.811 0.311 -1.607 8.262 -0.078 0.076 
59 82 0.028 1.632 0.154 -0.335 0.900 2.204 12.396 -0.035 0.075 
60 82 0.006 0.432 0.118 -0.429 0.422 0.295 3.540 -0.052 0.048 
224 
 
Summary statistic for market returns (S&P500) 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 25th Perc. 75th Perc. 
1 87 0.026 8.810 0.027 -0.069 0.132 -0.549 4.995 0.010 0.033 
2 87 0.007 2.183 0.032 -0.092 0.070 0.051 0.333 -0.029 0.036 
3 87 0.001 0.258 0.035 -0.064 0.097 -0.132 -0.921 -0.043 0.027 
4 87 0.016 6.122 0.024 -0.031 0.077 0.007 0.186 0.009 0.028 
5 87 0.020 7.852 0.024 -0.025 0.092 0.283 0.878 0.012 0.036 
6 87 0.008 2.647 0.026 -0.048 0.054 0.124 -1.054 -0.017 0.023 
7 87 0.010 2.434 0.039 -0.046 0.088 0.058 -0.883 -0.012 0.032 
8 87 -0.006 -0.966 0.053 -0.146 0.061 -1.520 1.510 -0.024 0.034 
9 87 0.016 3.766 0.039 -0.082 0.062 -0.315 -1.362 -0.027 0.054 
10 87 0.014 3.499 0.038 -0.218 0.080 -2.402 15.396 -0.005 0.026 
11 87 0.021 4.466 0.045 -0.085 0.075 -0.501 -1.055 -0.013 0.059 
12 87 0.015 5.407 0.025 -0.022 0.112 0.899 1.989 0.010 0.017 
13 87 0.028 9.606 0.027 -0.069 0.071 -1.441 3.024 0.024 0.041 
14 87 0.010 2.757 0.033 -0.092 0.070 0.034 0.047 -0.020 0.036 
15 87 0.007 1.519 0.040 -0.064 0.097 0.048 -0.686 -0.043 0.027 
16 87 0.022 7.583 0.027 -0.061 0.077 -0.455 0.409 0.012 0.038 
17 87 0.021 6.984 0.029 -0.025 0.092 -0.177 -0.751 0.004 0.036 
18 87 0.016 5.375 0.029 -0.072 0.054 -0.726 -0.028 0.002 0.043 
19 87 0.014 3.004 0.044 -0.079 0.088 0.037 -1.098 -0.016 0.032 
20 87 -0.015 -2.534 0.055 -0.146 0.061 -1.121 0.626 -0.057 0.019 
21 87 0.020 4.491 0.042 -0.110 0.062 -0.877 -0.375 -0.027 0.053 
22 87 0.013 3.571 0.035 -0.034 0.086 0.453 -0.536 -0.005 0.026 
23 87 0.027 5.845 0.043 -0.080 0.075 -1.055 0.072 0.018 0.059 
24 87 0.018 5.871 0.028 -0.060 0.112 0.680 1.983 0.010 0.017 
25 87 0.023 6.738 0.031 -0.069 0.071 -1.151 1.137 0.010 0.041 
26 87 0.010 2.206 0.040 -0.092 0.070 -0.245 0.184 -0.020 0.036 
27 87 0.015 3.205 0.043 -0.064 0.097 -0.110 -0.583 -0.022 0.050 
28 87 0.022 7.145 0.029 -0.061 0.081 -0.186 0.224 0.009 0.038 
29 87 0.013 4.073 0.031 -0.025 0.092 0.250 -1.052 -0.019 0.036 
30 87 0.019 6.666 0.027 -0.072 0.054 -0.837 0.392 0.002 0.039 
31 87 0.003 0.548 0.043 -0.079 0.088 0.573 -0.800 -0.032 0.032 
32 87 -0.029 -4.131 0.066 -0.146 0.061 -0.700 -0.711 -0.057 0.019 
33 87 0.021 3.964 0.048 -0.110 0.062 -0.940 -0.524 -0.027 0.054 
34 87 0.023 5.489 0.039 -0.034 0.086 0.163 -1.123 -0.005 0.063 
35 87 0.035 7.383 0.044 -0.080 0.075 -1.570 1.542 0.019 0.060 
36 87 0.019 5.819 0.031 -0.060 0.112 0.180 -0.155 0.004 0.056 
37 87 0.023 6.415 0.034 -0.069 0.061 -1.074 0.473 0.010 0.041 
38 87 -0.001 -0.262 0.043 -0.092 0.070 -0.083 0.105 -0.032 0.009 
39 87 0.014 2.784 0.047 -0.064 0.097 -0.147 -0.873 -0.043 0.039 
40 87 0.023 6.019 0.036 -0.061 0.081 -0.540 -0.286 0.009 0.058 
41 87 0.009 2.596 0.033 -0.025 0.092 0.534 -1.114 -0.022 0.036 
42 87 0.022 6.101 0.033 -0.072 0.054 -1.265 1.074 0.002 0.043 
43 87 -0.001 -0.247 0.046 -0.079 0.078 0.682 -0.599 -0.032 0.032 
44 87 -0.031 -4.710 0.061 -0.146 0.061 -0.580 -0.486 -0.057 0.018 
45 87 0.005 0.787 0.056 -0.110 0.062 -0.489 -1.166 -0.029 0.054 
46 87 0.026 5.796 0.042 -0.034 0.086 -0.070 -1.354 -0.005 0.063 
47 87 0.033 7.032 0.044 -0.080 0.075 -1.581 1.777 0.019 0.059 
48 87 0.022 6.048 0.033 -0.060 0.112 -0.329 0.171 0.006 0.056 
49 87 0.009 2.309 0.037 -0.051 0.061 -0.407 -1.082 -0.018 0.041 
50 87 -0.004 -0.727 0.046 -0.092 0.070 0.158 -0.272 -0.030 0.010 
51 87 0.025 4.629 0.051 -0.064 0.097 -0.339 -0.876 -0.018 0.050 
52 87 0.015 3.349 0.042 -0.061 0.081 -0.136 -0.958 -0.031 0.048 
53 87 0.000 0.103 0.029 -0.025 0.059 1.025 -0.435 -0.022 0.018 
54 87 0.017 4.282 0.037 -0.072 0.054 -1.205 0.565 0.002 0.043 
55 87 -0.008 -1.803 0.040 -0.079 0.078 0.724 0.545 -0.032 -0.011 
56 87 -0.028 -3.644 0.071 -0.146 0.061 -0.530 -0.889 -0.064 0.019 
57 87 -0.010 -1.659 0.059 -0.110 0.062 -0.048 -1.345 -0.053 0.053 
58 87 0.033 7.478 0.042 -0.034 0.086 -0.181 -1.404 -0.005 0.080 
59 87 0.020 3.468 0.054 -0.080 0.075 -1.003 -0.463 0.007 0.059 
60 87 0.022 5.637 0.036 -0.060 0.112 -0.558 0.221 0.004 0.056 
  
225 
 
Market benchmark based abnormal return 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 25th Perc. 75th Perc. 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.106 -0.276 0.366 0.356 1.531 -0.052 0.058 
2 87 0.009 1.000 0.081 -0.131 0.374 1.858 5.855 -0.037 0.029 
3 87 -0.008 -0.872 0.082 -0.292 0.293 0.165 2.536 -0.050 0.035 
4 87 0.012 1.343 0.086 -0.270 0.225 0.343 1.038 -0.042 0.056 
5 87 -0.002 -0.294 0.065 -0.158 0.255 0.928 3.072 -0.035 0.026 
6 87 0.000 0.015 0.074 -0.157 0.186 0.343 0.150 -0.045 0.042 
7 87 0.000 -0.035 0.098 -0.182 0.306 0.494 1.003 -0.056 0.055 
8 87 0.013 1.198 0.100 -0.323 0.324 0.207 2.155 -0.037 0.056 
9 87 -0.001 -0.086 0.080 -0.199 0.183 -0.323 0.192 -0.055 0.048 
10 87 -0.012 -1.357 0.084 -0.226 0.269 -0.085 0.895 -0.055 0.043 
11 87 0.007 0.747 0.086 -0.255 0.259 0.107 1.254 -0.035 0.048 
12 87 0.003 0.352 0.085 -0.246 0.242 -0.175 0.947 -0.041 0.058 
13 87 -0.024 -2.312 0.097 -0.276 0.438 0.915 5.199 -0.085 0.030 
14 87 0.025 2.526 0.092 -0.285 0.297 -0.177 2.136 -0.023 0.071 
15 87 0.015 1.828 0.077 -0.170 0.187 0.025 -0.199 -0.040 0.062 
16 87 -0.001 -0.111 0.109 -0.303 0.609 2.219 11.310 -0.067 0.038 
17 87 0.004 0.491 0.083 -0.238 0.252 0.118 1.260 -0.041 0.053 
18 87 0.011 0.988 0.103 -0.313 0.429 0.832 3.849 -0.040 0.053 
19 87 0.008 0.801 0.096 -0.175 0.489 1.898 6.995 -0.047 0.044 
20 87 0.023 2.477 0.087 -0.174 0.359 0.490 2.191 -0.032 0.072 
21 87 -0.022 -2.196 0.094 -0.367 0.222 -0.219 1.531 -0.077 0.032 
22 87 -0.022 -2.110 0.098 -0.358 0.217 -0.432 1.630 -0.073 0.048 
23 87 0.020 1.957 0.095 -0.187 0.281 0.281 0.087 -0.046 0.068 
24 87 -0.015 -1.395 0.099 -0.303 0.242 -0.244 0.158 -0.080 0.049 
25 87 0.009 0.439 0.187 -0.554 1.251 3.507 23.579 -0.050 0.043 
26 87 0.012 1.173 0.098 -0.276 0.423 0.690 3.402 -0.037 0.061 
27 87 0.018 1.052 0.161 -0.504 0.926 2.237 13.271 -0.045 0.051 
28 87 -0.008 -0.594 0.126 -0.282 0.617 1.461 6.553 -0.074 0.059 
29 87 0.004 0.380 0.090 -0.258 0.328 0.540 3.362 -0.042 0.048 
30 87 -0.015 -1.531 0.089 -0.297 0.259 0.038 1.378 -0.071 0.034 
31 87 -0.016 -1.437 0.102 -0.276 0.318 0.413 2.032 -0.069 0.031 
32 87 -0.003 -0.326 0.094 -0.288 0.323 -0.067 1.898 -0.049 0.051 
33 87 -0.034 -3.137 0.101 -0.419 0.174 -1.099 3.330 -0.079 0.030 
34 87 -0.015 -1.354 0.102 -0.397 0.201 -0.505 1.479 -0.073 0.048 
35 87 -0.001 -0.071 0.116 -0.407 0.436 0.323 4.137 -0.068 0.046 
36 87 0.000 -0.020 0.112 -0.375 0.375 -0.045 1.683 -0.056 0.062 
37 87 0.026 1.374 0.177 -0.336 0.933 2.242 9.183 -0.046 0.063 
38 87 -0.004 -0.410 0.100 -0.319 0.250 -0.117 0.811 -0.051 0.046 
39 87 -0.005 -0.424 0.103 -0.251 0.256 0.011 0.584 -0.056 0.050 
40 87 0.006 0.450 0.132 -0.251 0.523 1.629 4.550 -0.060 0.046 
41 87 0.031 2.621 0.110 -0.165 0.632 2.155 9.971 -0.021 0.068 
42 86 -0.006 -0.356 0.153 -0.495 0.634 0.629 3.805 -0.075 0.050 
43 86 -0.003 -0.243 0.132 -0.374 0.739 1.807 11.544 -0.065 0.051 
44 86 0.010 0.922 0.100 -0.290 0.308 -0.028 1.510 -0.038 0.053 
45 86 -0.004 -0.270 0.132 -0.745 0.361 -1.858 11.344 -0.052 0.051 
46 85 -0.019 -1.379 0.128 -0.244 0.527 0.974 2.818 -0.105 0.064 
47 85 0.021 1.244 0.155 -0.315 0.746 1.544 5.396 -0.061 0.061 
48 85 -0.008 -0.581 0.128 -0.314 0.387 0.195 1.161 -0.070 0.054 
49 85 -0.012 -1.139 0.097 -0.274 0.340 0.978 2.955 -0.065 0.016 
50 85 0.005 0.353 0.134 -0.372 0.450 0.875 2.491 -0.079 0.063 
51 85 -0.022 -1.806 0.112 -0.396 0.271 -0.503 0.962 -0.094 0.048 
52 85 0.037 2.833 0.120 -0.328 0.399 0.406 1.003 -0.037 0.075 
53 85 0.021 1.763 0.111 -0.235 0.594 1.648 7.204 -0.057 0.081 
54 85 0.001 0.049 0.121 -0.380 0.359 0.437 1.161 -0.070 0.072 
55 84 -0.012 -0.859 0.130 -0.565 0.293 -1.462 5.792 -0.070 0.054 
56 84 -0.006 -0.431 0.128 -0.482 0.261 -1.003 3.953 -0.055 0.057 
57 84 0.003 0.329 0.091 -0.290 0.278 0.010 0.834 -0.053 0.064 
58 83 -0.041 -2.509 0.150 -0.829 0.272 -1.724 8.354 -0.113 0.041 
59 82 0.008 0.488 0.148 -0.342 0.825 2.024 10.768 -0.063 0.053 
60 82 -0.016 -1.170 0.121 -0.368 0.418 0.575 2.300 -0.080 0.026 
  
226 
 
Summary statistic for matching firms return 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th Perc. 
1 87 0.005 0.535 0.078 -0.302 0.260 -0.246 3.375 -0.035 0.039 
2 87 0.012 0.780 0.145 -0.297 1.006 3.703 25.593 -0.047 0.054 
3 87 0.000 -0.014 0.117 -0.611 0.430 -1.728 11.232 -0.023 0.048 
4 87 0.024 2.301 0.097 -0.167 0.372 0.957 1.599 -0.029 0.064 
5 87 0.000 -0.031 0.108 -0.263 0.497 1.211 5.151 -0.043 0.036 
6 87 0.014 1.450 0.090 -0.250 0.311 0.452 1.768 -0.034 0.058 
7 87 0.038 3.028 0.118 -0.206 0.556 1.894 5.809 -0.021 0.076 
8 87 0.022 1.511 0.136 -0.313 0.914 3.418 21.616 -0.020 0.047 
9 87 0.015 1.871 0.074 -0.176 0.226 -0.102 0.668 -0.025 0.061 
10 87 0.002 0.172 0.089 -0.247 0.502 1.808 11.220 -0.037 0.035 
11 87 0.001 0.111 0.081 -0.396 0.145 -1.529 5.858 -0.022 0.051 
12 87 0.024 2.490 0.089 -0.438 0.269 -1.077 8.266 -0.012 0.064 
13 87 0.017 1.905 0.085 -0.143 0.311 0.982 1.526 -0.027 0.062 
14 87 -0.008 -0.713 0.111 -0.382 0.350 -0.094 2.230 -0.064 0.046 
15 87 -0.001 -0.072 0.115 -0.244 0.571 1.149 6.240 -0.058 0.044 
16 87 0.031 3.262 0.087 -0.175 0.329 0.362 1.250 -0.013 0.083 
17 87 0.019 1.394 0.128 -0.392 0.583 0.569 4.594 -0.041 0.068 
18 87 0.018 2.008 0.084 -0.231 0.238 0.020 0.809 -0.035 0.073 
19 87 0.025 2.112 0.111 -0.400 0.514 0.884 6.542 -0.017 0.057 
20 87 0.001 0.110 0.104 -0.200 0.514 1.957 7.594 -0.061 0.035 
21 87 0.044 2.251 0.182 -0.184 1.500 6.138 48.676 -0.016 0.079 
22 87 -0.001 -0.125 0.107 -0.267 0.439 0.971 3.185 -0.063 0.045 
23 87 0.021 1.797 0.109 -0.201 0.545 1.576 5.896 -0.042 0.052 
24 87 0.014 1.464 0.091 -0.357 0.249 -0.568 3.281 -0.033 0.068 
25 87 0.000 0.047 0.087 -0.256 0.154 -0.848 0.686 -0.023 0.049 
26 87 -0.008 -0.805 0.094 -0.388 0.195 -1.191 3.455 -0.039 0.051 
27 87 -0.011 -0.922 0.114 -0.439 0.337 -0.408 2.640 -0.059 0.040 
28 87 0.013 1.188 0.104 -0.272 0.383 0.546 2.365 -0.027 0.064 
29 87 0.011 0.817 0.129 -0.395 0.406 -0.357 2.738 -0.027 0.073 
30 87 0.017 1.759 0.089 -0.244 0.252 0.011 0.829 -0.026 0.062 
31 87 0.020 1.611 0.113 -0.306 0.623 1.682 9.072 -0.026 0.072 
32 87 0.014 1.178 0.114 -0.206 0.385 0.574 0.999 -0.051 0.065 
33 87 0.004 0.418 0.094 -0.179 0.415 0.977 3.401 -0.049 0.046 
34 87 0.025 1.003 0.234 -0.224 2.000 7.133 60.273 -0.044 0.044 
35 87 0.036 2.628 0.127 -0.228 0.604 1.986 7.062 -0.019 0.076 
36 87 0.013 1.289 0.096 -0.251 0.338 0.753 2.362 -0.041 0.062 
37 87 0.008 0.646 0.119 -0.318 0.352 0.100 1.359 -0.036 0.071 
38 87 -0.019 -1.827 0.097 -0.264 0.283 -0.244 0.999 -0.064 0.030 
39 87 -0.004 -0.363 0.100 -0.241 0.375 0.986 2.589 -0.058 0.030 
40 87 0.005 0.422 0.115 -0.304 0.331 0.778 2.091 -0.048 0.029 
41 87 0.012 1.383 0.084 -0.188 0.356 0.594 2.499 -0.030 0.050 
42 87 0.072 1.876 0.358 -0.317 3.227 8.100 71.735 0.000 0.089 
43 87 0.014 1.193 0.108 -0.244 0.306 0.176 0.795 -0.034 0.063 
44 87 0.009 0.498 0.164 -0.421 0.647 1.394 4.242 -0.074 0.046 
45 87 0.015 0.718 0.196 -0.304 1.406 4.739 30.777 -0.059 0.035 
46 87 0.008 0.507 0.143 -0.509 0.680 0.874 6.899 -0.040 0.052 
47 87 0.032 2.771 0.109 -0.298 0.367 0.503 1.560 -0.022 0.074 
48 87 0.031 2.106 0.137 -0.216 0.773 2.635 11.500 -0.028 0.058 
49 87 0.015 1.314 0.103 -0.286 0.485 1.074 4.960 -0.040 0.048 
50 87 0.014 1.090 0.117 -0.286 0.596 1.291 6.501 -0.039 0.068 
51 87 0.007 0.575 0.107 -0.282 0.344 0.506 1.475 -0.038 0.036 
52 87 -0.025 -2.161 0.108 -0.412 0.250 -0.587 2.089 -0.074 0.025 
53 87 -0.004 -0.378 0.103 -0.488 0.223 -1.418 5.534 -0.034 0.048 
54 87 0.010 0.920 0.097 -0.234 0.393 0.972 3.520 -0.032 0.042 
55 86 0.003 0.236 0.099 -0.261 0.310 0.523 1.764 -0.053 0.039 
56 86 0.014 1.144 0.112 -0.197 0.567 1.898 7.247 -0.045 0.049 
57 86 -0.001 -0.098 0.125 -0.382 0.395 0.065 2.282 -0.050 0.038 
58 86 0.014 1.393 0.094 -0.291 0.407 0.610 3.651 -0.041 0.068 
59 85 0.025 2.504 0.093 -0.180 0.306 0.450 0.741 -0.024 0.082 
60 85 0.006 0.604 0.094 -0.270 0.283 0.086 1.305 -0.032 0.055 
  
227 
 
Matching firm based abnormal returns (AR) 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 1 87 0.024 1.599 0.138 -0.259 0.565 1.104 3.605 -0.061 0.084 
2 87 0.004 0.233 0.159 -0.761 0.530 -0.685 6.788 -0.046 0.063 
3 87 -0.007 -0.453 0.134 -0.360 0.509 0.711 2.756 -0.068 0.045 
4 87 0.004 0.310 0.122 -0.305 0.401 0.288 0.763 -0.090 0.090 
5 87 0.019 1.443 0.120 -0.403 0.318 -0.513 1.788 -0.045 0.091 
6 87 -0.006 -0.514 0.115 -0.380 0.233 -0.504 0.659 -0.075 0.074 
7 87 -0.029 -1.849 0.144 -0.601 0.324 -0.479 2.117 -0.123 0.052 
8 87 -0.015 -0.703 0.196 -1.190 0.302 -3.336 17.218 -0.052 0.076 
9 87 0.000 0.020 0.110 -0.271 0.263 -0.071 -0.176 -0.084 0.074 
10 87 0.000 0.030 0.120 -0.561 0.291 -0.960 4.838 -0.057 0.054 
11 87 0.027 2.337 0.109 -0.207 0.347 0.744 0.764 -0.041 0.066 
12 87 -0.006 -0.419 0.131 -0.416 0.531 -0.179 4.303 -0.049 0.057 
13 87 -0.013 -1.131 0.107 -0.361 0.233 -0.543 1.182 -0.071 0.051 
14 87 0.043 2.627 0.153 -0.402 0.404 -0.180 0.374 -0.041 0.147 
15 87 0.022 1.619 0.130 -0.326 0.389 0.078 0.830 -0.056 0.088 
16 87 -0.010 -0.662 0.143 -0.343 0.553 0.740 2.201 -0.074 0.064 
17 87 0.007 0.374 0.165 -0.789 0.425 -1.095 5.212 -0.071 0.119 
18 87 0.009 0.656 0.133 -0.377 0.431 0.214 1.075 -0.067 0.083 
19 87 -0.003 -0.164 0.156 -0.494 0.479 0.142 2.219 -0.084 0.076 
20 87 0.007 0.514 0.125 -0.412 0.335 -0.397 1.247 -0.059 0.072 
21 87 -0.046 -2.077 0.205 -1.546 0.235 -4.755 33.449 -0.094 0.053 
22 87 -0.007 -0.473 0.143 -0.505 0.263 -0.733 1.358 -0.074 0.071 
23 87 0.026 1.823 0.132 -0.442 0.334 -0.341 1.044 -0.062 0.100 
24 87 -0.011 -0.900 0.117 -0.295 0.286 -0.079 -0.205 -0.092 0.071 
25 87 0.031 1.492 0.193 -0.586 1.096 1.886 10.732 -0.071 0.102 
26 87 0.030 2.271 0.123 -0.315 0.442 0.525 2.012 -0.043 0.082 
27 87 0.044 2.221 0.186 -0.345 0.934 1.475 5.798 -0.047 0.135 
28 87 0.001 0.050 0.167 -0.479 0.631 0.452 2.678 -0.103 0.094 
29 87 0.006 0.355 0.150 -0.442 0.391 -0.044 0.909 -0.086 0.078 
30 87 -0.012 -0.887 0.126 -0.364 0.328 -0.328 0.815 -0.049 0.070 
31 87 -0.033 -2.186 0.140 -0.585 0.445 -0.093 3.718 -0.101 0.034 
32 87 -0.047 -2.785 0.157 -0.588 0.342 -0.857 1.392 -0.117 0.061 
33 87 -0.018 -1.159 0.143 -0.473 0.316 -0.915 2.029 -0.069 0.062 
34 87 -0.017 -0.632 0.252 -1.926 0.421 -5.049 38.721 -0.089 0.106 
35 87 -0.001 -0.075 0.173 -0.615 0.546 -0.571 3.054 -0.071 0.079 
36 87 0.006 0.377 0.139 -0.409 0.358 -0.387 0.768 -0.074 0.092 
37 87 0.041 1.853 0.207 -0.493 0.968 1.144 4.721 -0.055 0.111 
38 87 0.013 0.834 0.149 -0.323 0.335 -0.167 -0.410 -0.079 0.113 
39 87 0.013 0.809 0.152 -0.554 0.333 -0.536 1.545 -0.068 0.109 
40 87 0.025 1.339 0.171 -0.314 0.696 1.456 3.667 -0.070 0.076 
41 87 0.028 1.739 0.149 -0.543 0.685 0.671 5.823 -0.046 0.077 
42 86 -0.057 -1.385 0.384 -3.144 0.682 -6.126 50.025 -0.110 0.065 
43 86 -0.020 -1.184 0.159 -0.385 0.644 0.723 2.696 -0.105 0.060 
44 86 -0.026 -1.321 0.185 -0.684 0.491 -0.799 2.885 -0.095 0.057 
45 86 -0.014 -0.505 0.249 -1.406 0.532 -2.736 12.373 -0.061 0.118 
46 85 0.001 0.066 0.188 -0.594 0.509 -0.179 1.148 -0.119 0.120 
47 85 0.020 0.975 0.185 -0.490 0.821 1.196 4.294 -0.074 0.106 
48 85 -0.019 -0.892 0.192 -0.809 0.442 -1.386 4.719 -0.061 0.101 
49 85 -0.018 -1.112 0.150 -0.560 0.399 -0.198 2.153 -0.087 0.060 
50 85 -0.014 -0.784 0.167 -0.637 0.411 -0.330 1.971 -0.096 0.064 
51 85 -0.007 -0.452 0.153 -0.448 0.354 -0.470 1.557 -0.086 0.078 
52 85 0.078 4.579 0.158 -0.246 0.583 0.612 0.774 -0.017 0.165 
53 85 0.024 1.443 0.150 -0.325 0.536 0.729 1.273 -0.076 0.098 
54 85 0.011 0.706 0.149 -0.487 0.365 -0.258 1.267 -0.057 0.089 
55 84 -0.021 -1.174 0.167 -0.660 0.432 -0.644 3.457 -0.077 0.040 
56 84 -0.048 -2.641 0.166 -0.643 0.299 -0.871 1.714 -0.143 0.046 
57 84 -0.007 -0.488 0.134 -0.450 0.403 -0.189 1.329 -0.071 0.078 
58 83 -0.026 -1.354 0.174 -0.851 0.444 -1.224 6.419 -0.114 0.061 
59 82 0.004 0.214 0.160 -0.331 0.823 1.348 7.517 -0.085 0.080 
60 82 0.003 0.178 0.145 -0.429 0.421 0.207 0.865 -0.084 0.083 
 
228 
 
Summary Statistic for BH: EVA adopter BH returns 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 25th Perc. 75th Perc. 
1 87 0.028 2.549 0.103 -0.266 0.376 0.347 1.679 -0.031 0.085 
2 87 0.043 3.186 0.126 -0.182 0.615 1.390 4.499 -0.053 0.102 
3 87 0.037 2.087 0.164 -0.336 0.808 1.611 6.259 -0.057 0.112 
4 87 0.066 3.110 0.197 -0.333 0.912 1.870 6.594 -0.046 0.163 
5 87 0.088 3.555 0.230 -0.378 1.352 2.116 10.178 -0.051 0.193 
6 87 0.096 3.490 0.256 -0.327 1.560 2.625 12.744 -0.046 0.186 
7 87 0.105 3.488 0.282 -0.382 1.536 2.198 8.461 -0.054 0.191 
8 87 0.111 3.573 0.291 -0.469 1.108 1.104 2.413 -0.065 0.239 
9 87 0.124 3.860 0.299 -0.438 1.258 1.351 3.205 -0.086 0.260 
10 87 0.130 3.610 0.335 -0.500 1.603 1.724 5.188 -0.097 0.254 
11 87 0.160 4.010 0.373 -0.391 2.125 2.320 9.259 -0.063 0.291 
12 87 0.183 4.297 0.398 -0.491 2.329 2.173 9.092 -0.065 0.344 
13 87 0.196 3.573 0.511 -0.509 3.922 4.603 32.534 -0.061 0.349 
14 87 0.237 4.105 0.538 -0.419 4.031 4.238 28.366 -0.037 0.406 
15 87 0.268 4.121 0.606 -0.485 4.641 4.617 31.271 -0.027 0.434 
16 87 0.279 4.543 0.574 -0.378 4.166 4.081 24.532 0.003 0.433 
17 87 0.311 5.009 0.580 -0.344 3.936 3.417 17.727 0.000 0.444 
18 87 0.371 4.269 0.810 -0.422 6.322 5.139 34.688 0.014 0.501 
19 87 0.417 4.148 0.939 -0.438 7.095 5.007 31.622 0.056 0.439 
20 87 0.417 4.367 0.891 -0.438 6.634 4.706 28.838 0.054 0.480 
21 87 0.408 4.638 0.821 -0.484 5.725 3.871 21.006 -0.002 0.572 
22 87 0.388 4.724 0.767 -0.537 5.047 3.320 16.077 -0.002 0.542 
23 87 0.453 5.047 0.837 -0.589 5.780 3.634 19.158 0.005 0.574 
24 87 0.461 5.285 0.814 -0.636 4.451 2.531 8.220 -0.005 0.530 
25 87 0.498 5.305 0.875 -0.637 4.353 2.631 8.206 0.009 0.616 
26 87 0.540 5.315 0.948 -0.708 4.925 2.818 9.613 0.044 0.682 
27 87 0.675 4.090 1.540 -0.725 10.147 4.436 22.867 0.059 0.681 
28 87 0.749 3.355 2.082 -0.738 17.176 6.343 46.911 0.074 0.732 
29 87 0.775 3.307 2.187 -0.752 18.886 6.965 56.093 0.112 0.819 
30 87 0.749 3.773 1.851 -0.763 15.118 5.952 43.263 0.072 0.835 
31 87 0.679 4.297 1.475 -0.774 10.176 4.339 23.159 0.080 0.827 
32 87 0.639 3.493 1.705 -0.744 14.000 6.078 45.044 0.035 0.732 
33 87 0.660 3.101 1.985 -0.865 16.882 6.728 53.215 -0.004 0.764 
34 87 0.619 3.652 1.582 -0.919 12.882 5.784 42.574 -0.045 0.751 
35 87 0.682 3.485 1.826 -0.952 15.824 6.859 56.049 0.016 0.843 
36 87 0.729 3.583 1.899 -0.943 16.118 6.461 50.980 0.008 0.922 
37 87 0.787 3.687 1.992 -0.887 16.765 6.326 48.976 -0.002 0.936 
38 87 0.715 4.519 1.475 -0.915 11.206 4.643 29.900 -0.009 1.066 
39 87 0.733 4.627 1.477 -0.927 10.941 4.358 26.717 0.001 1.057 
40 87 0.788 4.465 1.645 -0.927 12.625 4.812 31.386 -0.013 1.034 
41 87 0.840 4.578 1.712 -0.913 13.706 5.279 37.324 -0.024 1.101 
42 86 0.915 4.119 2.060 -0.958 17.000 5.937 44.375 0.003 1.097 
43 86 0.917 4.245 2.004 -0.974 15.934 5.372 37.590 -0.052 1.093 
44 86 0.918 3.596 2.368 -0.975 20.177 6.594 52.404 -0.029 1.030 
45 86 1.023 2.948 3.217 -0.984 28.941 7.877 68.521 -0.124 1.127 
46 85 0.992 3.606 2.536 -0.986 21.353 6.407 50.264 -0.131 1.209 
47 85 1.069 4.382 2.249 -0.975 16.471 4.436 26.593 -0.111 1.279 
48 85 1.095 4.857 2.079 -0.980 12.118 3.031 11.674 -0.092 1.328 
49 85 1.079 4.543 2.189 -0.974 14.412 3.654 17.713 -0.109 1.292 
50 85 1.114 4.441 2.312 -0.976 16.177 3.920 21.454 -0.141 1.280 
51 85 1.096 4.540 2.227 -0.980 15.471 3.805 20.627 -0.156 1.368 
52 85 1.166 4.868 2.208 -0.980 15.294 3.691 19.723 -0.115 1.496 
53 85 1.152 5.147 2.063 -0.980 13.353 3.160 14.381 -0.118 1.371 
54 85 1.175 5.664 1.913 -0.980 8.471 1.994 4.148 -0.117 1.490 
55 84 1.171 5.685 1.888 -0.981 8.192 1.844 3.377 -0.039 1.488 
56 84 1.109 5.366 1.893 -0.985 8.604 2.143 5.107 -0.047 1.487 
57 84 1.114 5.419 1.885 -0.985 8.706 1.970 4.402 -0.088 1.437 
58 83 1.065 5.506 1.763 -0.997 7.971 1.805 3.501 -0.046 1.657 
59 82 1.074 5.772 1.684 -0.995 6.529 1.565 2.191 -0.021 1.719 
60 82 1.063 5.902 1.631 -0.993 6.221 1.437 1.593 -0.008 1.647 
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Summary Statistic for BH: Match firm BH returns 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.005 0.535 0.078 -0.302 0.260 -0.246 3.375 -0.035 0.039 
2 87 0.016 0.980 0.156 -0.510 0.888 1.691 11.473 -0.068 0.071 
3 87 0.013 0.748 0.167 -0.671 0.386 -1.068 3.828 -0.044 0.111 
4 87 0.041 1.796 0.211 -0.648 0.605 -0.362 1.706 -0.040 0.148 
5 87 0.036 1.532 0.222 -0.607 0.683 -0.115 1.641 -0.051 0.159 
6 87 0.046 1.944 0.221 -0.638 0.606 -0.150 1.135 -0.058 0.159 
7 87 0.088 3.194 0.256 -0.673 0.753 -0.103 1.268 -0.011 0.219 
8 87 0.097 3.626 0.248 -0.476 0.903 0.509 1.352 -0.011 0.238 
9 87 0.113 4.007 0.263 -0.539 0.898 0.409 1.102 0.000 0.259 
10 87 0.115 3.846 0.280 -0.584 1.019 0.406 1.120 0.000 0.258 
11 87 0.116 3.782 0.286 -0.593 0.790 0.058 0.208 -0.014 0.249 
12 87 0.148 4.267 0.323 -0.710 0.943 0.128 0.334 0.000 0.327 
13 87 0.165 4.563 0.337 -0.661 1.255 0.317 0.744 0.000 0.354 
14 87 0.151 4.048 0.349 -0.710 1.165 0.448 0.592 -0.016 0.314 
15 87 0.151 3.765 0.373 -0.758 1.167 0.658 1.108 -0.044 0.307 
16 87 0.190 4.411 0.403 -0.726 1.379 0.495 0.762 0.000 0.361 
17 87 0.205 4.695 0.407 -0.790 1.250 0.468 0.597 0.000 0.374 
18 87 0.231 4.931 0.436 -0.839 1.563 0.621 1.004 0.000 0.426 
19 87 0.269 5.341 0.471 -0.903 1.690 0.533 0.639 0.000 0.513 
20 87 0.265 5.315 0.465 -0.903 1.477 0.522 0.593 0.000 0.515 
21 87 0.300 5.770 0.484 -0.758 1.713 0.621 0.551 0.000 0.540 
22 87 0.300 5.413 0.516 -0.823 2.306 1.036 2.360 0.000 0.480 
23 87 0.323 5.370 0.561 -0.726 3.021 1.589 5.472 0.000 0.468 
24 87 0.337 5.906 0.533 -0.742 1.976 0.693 0.644 0.000 0.596 
25 87 0.337 5.775 0.545 -0.742 2.348 0.854 1.546 0.000 0.638 
26 87 0.329 5.338 0.575 -0.742 3.000 1.296 4.377 0.000 0.642 
27 87 0.311 4.946 0.587 -0.742 3.019 1.359 4.378 0.000 0.580 
28 87 0.336 4.938 0.634 -0.742 2.952 1.334 3.094 0.000 0.635 
29 87 0.351 4.994 0.655 -0.780 2.874 1.235 2.535 -0.004 0.653 
30 87 0.376 5.216 0.673 -0.796 2.758 1.031 1.447 0.000 0.733 
31 87 0.424 5.204 0.761 -0.845 3.082 1.136 1.425 -0.023 0.843 
32 87 0.435 5.200 0.781 -0.832 3.107 1.170 1.283 0.000 0.757 
33 87 0.449 5.105 0.820 -0.814 3.205 1.217 1.515 -0.050 0.832 
34 87 0.465 5.156 0.841 -0.838 3.684 1.303 1.902 -0.049 0.812 
35 87 0.516 5.347 0.900 -0.842 3.909 1.475 2.662 -0.025 0.999 
36 87 0.510 5.574 0.853 -0.788 3.798 1.349 2.206 -0.030 1.032 
37 87 0.515 5.738 0.837 -0.793 3.190 1.090 1.060 -0.037 1.139 
38 87 0.463 5.658 0.763 -0.787 2.940 0.947 0.819 -0.050 0.893 
39 87 0.450 5.575 0.754 -0.810 2.694 0.917 0.586 -0.012 0.962 
40 87 0.450 5.648 0.744 -0.826 2.543 0.819 0.303 -0.039 0.972 
41 87 0.466 5.641 0.771 -0.803 2.923 0.947 0.763 -0.023 0.998 
42 87 0.561 5.790 0.903 -0.780 4.504 1.442 3.389 0.000 1.202 
43 87 0.570 6.051 0.878 -0.742 3.367 1.033 0.846 -0.016 0.923 
44 87 0.567 5.900 0.896 -0.742 3.580 1.220 1.512 -0.007 0.956 
45 87 0.615 5.215 1.099 -0.742 6.543 2.379 9.168 0.000 0.909 
46 87 0.644 4.132 1.455 -0.743 11.669 5.288 38.386 0.000 0.989 
47 87 0.656 5.249 1.166 -0.765 7.888 3.138 16.464 0.000 1.138 
48 87 0.756 4.000 1.764 -0.742 14.755 6.048 46.662 0.000 1.054 
49 87 0.781 4.433 1.642 -0.742 12.989 5.077 35.541 0.000 1.221 
50 87 0.816 4.277 1.780 -0.742 13.954 5.135 35.109 0.000 1.087 
51 87 0.813 4.325 1.753 -0.742 13.600 5.011 33.571 0.000 1.044 
52 87 0.793 3.944 1.876 -0.848 14.873 5.381 37.600 0.000 1.135 
53 87 0.765 4.063 1.757 -0.848 14.056 5.320 38.137 0.000 1.038 
54 87 0.787 3.719 1.973 -0.848 16.587 6.206 48.424 -0.026 1.060 
55 86 0.871 3.378 2.392 -0.760 20.709 6.916 56.699 0.000 1.045 
56 86 0.942 2.956 2.956 -0.742 26.357 7.675 65.914 0.000 1.080 
57 86 0.886 3.171 2.590 -0.742 22.647 7.202 59.930 0.000 0.962 
58 86 0.919 3.045 2.799 -0.742 24.881 7.582 64.746 0.000 1.023 
59 85 0.994 3.043 3.013 -0.742 26.733 7.621 65.063 0.000 1.299 
60 85 0.921 3.751 2.263 -0.742 19.239 6.512 51.889 0.000 1.255 
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Summary Statistic for BH: Market returns 
Month N MEAN t-stat St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
25th 
Perc. 
75th 
Perc. 
1 87 0.026 8.810 0.027 -0.069 0.132 -0.549 4.995 0.010 0.033 
2 87 0.033 7.900 0.039 -0.070 0.174 0.039 1.500 0.001 0.061 
3 87 0.035 5.330 0.061 -0.121 0.205 0.071 -0.159 -0.032 0.076 
4 87 0.051 7.271 0.065 -0.064 0.191 -0.052 -1.185 -0.005 0.118 
5 87 0.072 9.583 0.070 -0.049 0.198 -0.067 -1.370 -0.004 0.145 
6 87 0.081 8.222 0.092 -0.073 0.255 -0.144 -1.360 -0.016 0.177 
7 87 0.092 7.947 0.109 -0.083 0.316 0.640 -1.043 0.017 0.224 
8 87 0.084 8.061 0.097 -0.141 0.362 0.599 -0.300 0.019 0.214 
9 87 0.102 7.944 0.120 -0.212 0.329 0.238 -0.641 0.002 0.265 
10 87 0.116 10.300 0.105 -0.197 0.266 -0.335 -0.045 0.013 0.207 
11 87 0.142 9.635 0.137 -0.137 0.318 -0.230 -1.378 0.003 0.237 
12 87 0.158 10.559 0.140 -0.130 0.341 -0.203 -1.344 0.032 0.270 
13 87 0.191 12.031 0.148 -0.144 0.385 -0.223 -1.380 0.052 0.319 
14 87 0.202 12.310 0.153 -0.162 0.417 -0.077 -1.161 0.063 0.284 
15 87 0.210 11.994 0.164 -0.210 0.487 0.100 -0.794 0.073 0.326 
16 87 0.237 12.989 0.170 -0.184 0.501 -0.091 -1.011 0.103 0.376 
17 87 0.262 14.522 0.168 -0.192 0.473 -0.331 -0.948 0.144 0.377 
18 87 0.286 13.937 0.191 -0.250 0.531 -0.467 -0.837 0.168 0.437 
19 87 0.303 14.480 0.195 -0.310 0.549 -0.430 -0.292 0.164 0.513 
20 87 0.277 16.430 0.157 -0.306 0.460 -0.885 1.458 0.205 0.420 
21 87 0.307 14.701 0.195 -0.382 0.538 -0.777 0.948 0.169 0.497 
22 87 0.323 15.717 0.192 -0.329 0.536 -0.835 0.635 0.163 0.485 
23 87 0.363 14.394 0.236 -0.291 0.648 -0.535 -0.678 0.119 0.551 
24 87 0.387 15.172 0.238 -0.334 0.659 -0.689 -0.409 0.180 0.576 
25 87 0.419 15.536 0.252 -0.352 0.728 -0.545 -0.272 0.193 0.592 
26 87 0.435 15.109 0.269 -0.363 0.722 -0.560 -0.461 0.180 0.704 
27 87 0.458 14.959 0.286 -0.358 0.789 -0.596 -0.490 0.183 0.737 
28 87 0.489 15.585 0.293 -0.306 0.805 -0.498 -0.663 0.230 0.802 
29 87 0.507 16.405 0.288 -0.274 0.847 -0.531 -0.494 0.274 0.771 
30 87 0.543 15.540 0.326 -0.326 0.927 -0.439 -0.707 0.282 0.841 
31 87 0.549 14.693 0.348 -0.380 1.078 -0.112 -0.617 0.324 0.819 
32 87 0.491 15.526 0.295 -0.377 0.958 -0.274 0.250 0.298 0.564 
33 87 0.527 15.059 0.327 -0.445 1.063 -0.349 0.578 0.341 0.651 
34 87 0.560 16.072 0.325 -0.397 0.991 -0.648 0.113 0.335 0.784 
35 87 0.617 16.292 0.353 -0.363 1.080 -0.558 -0.355 0.389 0.889 
36 87 0.652 16.021 0.379 -0.401 1.113 -0.465 -0.605 0.414 0.996 
37 87 0.689 16.778 0.383 -0.418 1.134 -0.605 -0.303 0.459 1.078 
38 87 0.691 15.818 0.407 -0.428 1.285 -0.362 -0.390 0.470 1.011 
39 87 0.722 14.760 0.456 -0.423 1.399 -0.139 -0.835 0.468 1.089 
40 87 0.761 15.406 0.461 -0.376 1.421 -0.254 -0.711 0.498 1.168 
41 87 0.770 16.571 0.433 -0.344 1.375 -0.473 -0.399 0.516 1.114 
42 87 0.819 15.855 0.482 -0.337 1.469 -0.468 -0.589 0.490 1.229 
43 87 0.819 15.760 0.485 -0.326 1.440 -0.644 -0.493 0.469 1.157 
44 87 0.748 16.384 0.426 -0.314 1.144 -0.964 -0.189 0.494 1.084 
45 87 0.765 15.713 0.454 -0.337 1.214 -1.060 0.021 0.537 1.083 
46 87 0.811 15.653 0.483 -0.285 1.392 -0.756 -0.346 0.548 1.213 
47 87 0.868 16.160 0.501 -0.280 1.534 -0.601 -0.396 0.536 1.255 
48 87 0.919 15.529 0.552 -0.284 1.676 -0.444 -0.564 0.628 1.385 
49 87 0.936 15.691 0.557 -0.304 1.786 -0.413 -0.192 0.617 1.264 
50 87 0.929 15.689 0.552 -0.316 1.696 -0.560 -0.369 0.633 1.250 
51 87 0.990 14.986 0.616 -0.310 1.801 -0.438 -0.878 0.566 1.433 
52 87 1.017 15.229 0.623 -0.254 1.907 -0.402 -0.698 0.632 1.383 
53 87 1.007 15.955 0.588 -0.237 1.835 -0.515 -0.530 0.651 1.339 
54 87 1.056 15.178 0.649 -0.224 1.989 -0.429 -0.693 0.651 1.431 
55 87 1.040 15.268 0.635 -0.250 1.893 -0.611 -0.635 0.635 1.403 
56 87 0.974 14.594 0.623 -0.248 1.875 -0.344 -0.728 0.530 1.464 
57 87 0.959 14.410 0.621 -0.241 1.793 -0.604 -0.673 0.405 1.332 
58 87 1.022 14.629 0.651 -0.231 1.968 -0.420 -0.736 0.431 1.355 
59 87 1.054 15.040 0.654 -0.201 2.024 -0.345 -0.682 0.538 1.495 
60 87 1.113 14.512 0.715 -0.175 2.199 -0.222 -0.768 0.550 1.635 
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Appendix No. 2: The full version of the bootstrap test tables 
BOOTSTRAPPING CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR): Matching firms 
 
 
 
I N TSTAT mean1 F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Mean A FA-1% FA-99% FA-5% FA-95% Adj-SK-t mean1b F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
1 87 1.599 -0.016 -2.313 2.19 -1.584 1.622 0.004 -2.51 2.139 -1.814 1.598 1.719 -0.015 -2.562 2.358 -1.655 1.691 
2 87 1.16 0.053 -2.319 2.362 -1.676 1.699 -0.055 -2.202 2.165 -1.589 1.523 1.163 0.058 -2.549 2.73 -1.797 1.891 
3 87 0.801 0.006 -2.315 2.34 -1.724 1.604 -0.064 -2.445 2.17 -1.823 1.671 0.83 0.006 -2.381 2.422 -1.765 1.662 
4 87 0.881 -0.025 -2.455 2.318 -1.772 1.654 -0.041 -2.523 2.372 -1.791 1.61 0.908 -0.025 -2.552 2.442 -1.835 1.72 
5 87 1.452 0.006 -2.223 2.356 -1.715 1.66 -0.036 -2.621 2.357 -1.82 1.686 1.481 0.008 -2.294 2.4 -1.696 1.649 
6 87 1.284 0.057 -2.312 2.385 -1.658 1.648 -0.024 -2.332 2.3 -1.752 1.59 1.298 0.059 -2.335 2.427 -1.707 1.672 
7 87 0.276 -0.03 -2.374 2.367 -1.654 1.697 -0.033 -2.392 2.221 -1.758 1.583 0.28 -0.031 -2.462 2.423 -1.704 1.709 
8 87 -0.183 0.033 -2.431 2.418 -1.718 1.674 0.015 -2.363 2.458 -1.672 1.739 -0.187 0.033 -2.427 2.419 -1.732 1.669 
9 87 -0.18 -0.004 -2.365 2.337 -1.654 1.68 0.057 -2.197 2.497 -1.535 1.798 -0.186 -0.006 -2.394 2.351 -1.639 1.671 
10 87 -0.145 0.054 -2.217 2.413 -1.595 1.777 -0.006 -2.277 2.221 -1.603 1.643 -0.151 0.054 -2.26 2.423 -1.618 1.794 
11 87 0.595 0.028 -2.413 2.357 -1.608 1.681 -0.052 -2.38 2.482 -1.714 1.623 0.596 0.029 -2.512 2.406 -1.621 1.708 
12 87 0.388 -0.086 -2.425 2.34 -1.768 1.667 0.116 -2.074 2.357 -1.487 1.74 0.38 -0.088 -2.536 2.497 -1.829 1.739 
13 87 0.07 -0.06 -2.166 2.078 -1.508 1.486 0.033 -2.36 2.187 -1.678 1.643 0.068 -0.062 -2.267 2.146 -1.545 1.51 
14 87 1.058 0.038 -2.279 2.582 -1.724 1.789 -0.046 -2.155 2.454 -1.738 1.601 1.068 0.038 -2.313 2.68 -1.755 1.818 
15 87 1.526 -0.063 -2.495 2.261 -1.659 1.558 0.016 -2.368 2.146 -1.653 1.649 1.543 -0.065 -2.594 2.268 -1.668 1.585 
16 87 1.303 0.012 -2.262 2.508 -1.659 1.682 -0.017 -2.462 2.293 -1.823 1.744 1.326 0.012 -2.258 2.516 -1.656 1.709 
17 87 1.429 0.026 -2.522 2.656 -1.753 1.746 0.027 -2.524 2.388 -1.686 1.694 1.439 0.025 -2.495 2.688 -1.759 1.76 
18 87 1.502 0.014 -2.442 2.296 -1.689 1.679 -0.043 -2.477 2.351 -1.768 1.591 1.543 0.014 -2.613 2.398 -1.72 1.706 
19 87 1.319 0.06 -2.255 2.408 -1.575 1.71 -0.08 -2.357 2.1 -1.736 1.522 1.387 0.063 -2.396 2.638 -1.615 1.751 
20 87 1.454 -0.031 -2.47 2.203 -1.732 1.669 -0.024 -2.368 2.262 -1.623 1.526 1.521 -0.029 -2.601 2.327 -1.753 1.735 
21 87 0.674 -0.021 -2.442 2.274 -1.711 1.652 -0.045 -2.539 2.315 -1.845 1.623 0.683 -0.021 -2.514 2.29 -1.708 1.67 
22 87 0.527 -0.013 -2.369 2.199 -1.666 1.568 0.013 -2.319 2.342 -1.736 1.801 0.526 -0.013 -2.433 2.224 -1.692 1.604 
23 87 1.044 0.03 -2.397 2.622 -1.632 1.679 0.024 -2.283 2.347 -1.63 1.67 1.037 0.03 -2.47 2.695 -1.635 1.677 
24 87 0.754 0.012 -2.257 2.143 -1.629 1.564 -0.046 -2.46 2.304 -1.62 1.575 0.757 0.012 -2.285 2.224 -1.659 1.596 
25 87 1.272 0.02 -2.222 2.299 -1.716 1.627 -0.037 -2.547 2.431 -1.834 1.753 1.302 0.02 -2.229 2.437 -1.758 1.651 
26 87 1.708 -0.025 -2.352 2.282 -1.755 1.681 -0.071 -2.487 2.234 -1.684 1.587 1.768 -0.024 -2.429 2.352 -1.751 1.712 
27 87 2.157 -0.02 -2.337 2.457 -1.645 1.535 0.001 -2.286 2.268 -1.745 1.607 2.365 -0.019 -2.568 2.653 -1.753 1.641 
28 87 2.07 0.023 -2.444 2.292 -1.731 1.71 -0.091 -2.31 2.051 -1.798 1.535 2.315 0.027 -2.863 2.661 -1.888 1.936 
29 87 2.104 0.014 -2.504 2.341 -1.677 1.721 -0.069 -2.309 2.278 -1.715 1.607 2.36 0.017 -2.831 2.758 -1.885 1.889 
30 87 1.984 -0.039 -2.257 2.24 -1.715 1.616 -0.028 -2.414 2.157 -1.681 1.571 2.192 -0.038 -2.562 2.563 -1.873 1.751 
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BOOTSTRAPPING CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR): Matching firms (Continued) 
I N TSTAT mean1 F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Mean A FA-1% FA-99% FA-5% FA-95% Adj-SK-t mean1b F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
31 87 1.48 0.007 -2.272 2.429 -1.65 1.658 0.024 -2.257 2.208 -1.678 1.63 1.533 0.008 -2.563 2.655 -1.788 1.78 
32 87 0.819 -0.018 -2.333 2.097 -1.648 1.662 -0.07 -2.377 2.035 -1.688 1.493 0.865 -0.022 -2.71 2.368 -1.826 1.818 
33 87 0.541 0.009 -2.315 2.357 -1.704 1.624 -0.1 -2.357 2.037 -1.693 1.421 0.572 0.011 -2.679 2.708 -1.876 1.778 
34 87 0.312 -0.024 -2.232 2.177 -1.655 1.601 -0.019 -2.349 2.178 -1.636 1.636 0.329 -0.026 -2.519 2.475 -1.79 1.716 
35 87 0.279 0.009 -2.2 2.275 -1.564 1.687 0.023 -2.324 2.132 -1.615 1.6 0.291 0.011 -2.527 2.569 -1.713 1.819 
36 87 0.343 -0.064 -2.144 2.213 -1.66 1.613 -0.052 -2.212 2.172 -1.672 1.508 0.354 -0.067 -2.435 2.52 -1.795 1.752 
37 87 0.847 -0.032 -2.462 2.322 -1.691 1.683 -0.036 -2.188 2.182 -1.505 1.508 0.879 -0.033 -2.742 2.654 -1.851 1.763 
38 87 1.022 0.034 -2.233 2.381 -1.576 1.625 -0.011 -2.417 2.16 -1.71 1.577 1.049 0.036 -2.437 2.656 -1.679 1.719 
39 87 1.173 -0.03 -2.33 2.25 -1.751 1.63 0.046 -2.376 2.399 -1.569 1.727 1.198 -0.033 -2.509 2.391 -1.853 1.704 
40 87 1.424 0.001 -2.357 2.359 -1.751 1.644 -0.056 -2.437 2.135 -1.812 1.646 1.467 -0.002 -2.579 2.536 -1.848 1.68 
41 87 1.757 -0.086 -2.355 2.258 -1.759 1.579 -0.046 -2.292 2.263 -1.729 1.708 1.843 -0.091 -2.551 2.421 -1.864 1.64 
42 86 0.821 -0.026 -2.181 2.249 -1.584 1.623 0.012 -2.421 2.25 -1.625 1.607 0.838 -0.026 -2.309 2.443 -1.651 1.68 
43 86 0.585 0.007 -2.227 2.255 -1.69 1.692 -0.002 -2.27 2.271 -1.685 1.679 0.598 0.008 -2.331 2.429 -1.742 1.782 
44 86 0.314 -0.053 -2.414 2.099 -1.675 1.525 -0.02 -2.299 2.152 -1.63 1.516 0.326 -0.057 -2.635 2.254 -1.765 1.542 
45 86 0.171 0.008 -2.504 2.298 -1.729 1.729 0.068 -2.226 2.38 -1.506 1.666 0.178 0.008 -2.813 2.572 -1.853 1.84 
46 85 0.116 0.007 -2.314 2.397 -1.625 1.534 -0.037 -2.146 2.16 -1.687 1.617 0.118 0.008 -2.546 2.634 -1.707 1.619 
47 85 0.28 0.008 -2.121 2.251 -1.684 1.614 -0.051 -2.453 2.368 -1.773 1.549 0.285 0.009 -2.207 2.419 -1.777 1.706 
48 85 0.119 0.044 -2.307 2.492 -1.6 1.74 0.023 -2.372 2.331 -1.717 1.58 0.119 0.046 -2.515 2.662 -1.694 1.803 
49 85 -0.026 -0.046 -2.64 2.27 -1.71 1.7 -0.014 -2.242 2.241 -1.679 1.546 -0.024 -0.047 -2.657 2.336 -1.784 1.774 
50 85 -0.14 -0.028 -2.198 2.294 -1.637 1.62 -0.011 -2.467 2.479 -1.683 1.779 -0.136 -0.025 -2.332 2.452 -1.715 1.717 
51 85 -0.2 0.045 -2.185 2.227 -1.6 1.606 -0.031 -2.134 2.227 -1.642 1.622 -0.196 0.047 -2.329 2.409 -1.63 1.669 
52 85 0.42 0.053 -2.273 2.484 -1.626 1.631 0.057 -2.085 2.39 -1.589 1.702 0.421 0.053 -2.468 2.643 -1.677 1.701 
53 85 0.626 -0.024 -2.444 2.403 -1.739 1.7 -0.034 -2.361 2.167 -1.743 1.578 0.629 -0.023 -2.597 2.63 -1.801 1.797 
54 85 0.718 -0.031 -2.323 2.156 -1.738 1.601 0.031 -2.208 2.307 -1.637 1.724 0.711 -0.032 -2.436 2.322 -1.795 1.679 
55 84 0.408 0.011 -2.202 2.491 -1.687 1.649 0.025 -2.244 2.155 -1.631 1.64 0.401 0.012 -2.351 2.69 -1.778 1.719 
56 84 0.033 0.035 -2.216 2.251 -1.652 1.613 0.013 -2.236 2.272 -1.56 1.764 0.022 0.034 -2.319 2.43 -1.732 1.691 
57 84 -0.022 -0.008 -2.433 2.204 -1.624 1.632 -0.024 -2.32 2.433 -1.671 1.688 -0.03 -0.009 -2.657 2.293 -1.688 1.682 
58 83 -0.275 0.034 -2.293 2.261 -1.568 1.706 0.054 -2.42 2.232 -1.634 1.694 -0.285 0.033 -2.47 2.363 -1.599 1.817 
59 82 -0.262 0.009 -2.347 2.613 -1.651 1.761 0.08 -2 2.323 -1.522 1.688 -0.272 0.011 -2.493 2.821 -1.729 1.84 
60 82 -0.245 0.071 -2.239 2.327 -1.624 1.755 0.048 -2.091 2.181 -1.453 1.676 -0.254 0.072 -2.404 2.48 -1.672 1.813 
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BOOTSTRAPPING CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR): Market benchmark 
 
I N TSTAT mean1 F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Mean A FA-1% FA-99% FA-5% FA-95% Adj-SK-t mean1b F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
1 87 0.222 -0.029 -2.274 2.636 -1.681 1.607 -0.019 -2.254 2.294 -1.624 1.664 0.229 -0.029 -2.396 2.695 -1.742 1.661 
2 87 1 0.038 -2.365 2.46 -1.633 1.707 -0.125 -2.543 2.033 -1.878 1.427 1.1 0.045 -2.699 2.767 -1.737 1.853 
3 87 -0.872 -0.01 -2.271 2.612 -1.707 1.594 0.038 -2.146 2.164 -1.607 1.582 -0.864 -0.01 -2.417 2.789 -1.735 1.662 
4 87 1.343 0.016 -2.339 2.218 -1.582 1.654 -0.005 -2.246 2.194 -1.611 1.649 1.371 0.017 -2.359 2.31 -1.58 1.66 
5 87 -0.294 -0.044 -2.333 2.287 -1.716 1.676 -0.083 -2.536 2.06 -1.842 1.505 -0.274 -0.046 -2.457 2.445 -1.798 1.697 
6 87 0.015 0.046 -2.312 2.384 -1.621 1.751 0.019 -2.361 2.203 -1.704 1.611 0.021 0.048 -2.299 2.388 -1.634 1.773 
7 87 -0.035 0.001 -2.514 2.142 -1.625 1.637 0.008 -2.329 2.321 -1.761 1.774 -0.026 0.003 -2.587 2.179 -1.626 1.677 
8 87 1.198 0.059 -2.442 2.373 -1.701 1.684 -0.003 -2.273 2.216 -1.667 1.683 1.212 0.061 -2.573 2.511 -1.728 1.753 
9 87 -0.086 0.041 -2.26 2.438 -1.585 1.736 -0.032 -2.462 2.286 -1.639 1.569 -0.091 0.041 -2.317 2.383 -1.591 1.729 
10 87 -1.357 -0.007 -2.139 2.209 -1.603 1.501 0.019 -2.254 2.348 -1.619 1.771 -1.364 -0.009 -2.197 2.245 -1.615 1.503 
11 87 0.747 0.042 -2.41 2.454 -1.598 1.669 0.026 -2.27 2.38 -1.689 1.742 0.751 0.043 -2.434 2.564 -1.626 1.684 
12 87 0.352 0.033 -2.462 2.481 -1.806 1.736 0.073 -2.146 2.42 -1.562 1.713 0.348 0.033 -2.562 2.559 -1.822 1.731 
13 87 -2.312 -0.029 -2.22 2.196 -1.717 1.607 -0.049 -2.171 2.018 -1.706 1.529 -2.121 -0.027 -2.426 2.433 -1.833 1.745 
14 87 2.526 0.02 -2.401 2.396 -1.648 1.75 -0.044 -2.315 2.16 -1.654 1.572 2.483 0.021 -2.54 2.532 -1.683 1.764 
15 87 1.828 0.007 -2.197 2.263 -1.629 1.625 0.031 -2.311 2.264 -1.587 1.689 1.831 0.007 -2.226 2.25 -1.637 1.627 
16 87 -0.111 0.045 -2.312 2.23 -1.688 1.649 -0.125 -2.456 1.942 -1.795 1.509 -0.07 0.051 -2.726 2.617 -1.916 1.89 
17 87 0.491 0.032 -2.216 2.475 -1.56 1.579 0.027 -2.422 2.38 -1.744 1.688 0.494 0.033 -2.315 2.503 -1.56 1.618 
18 87 0.988 0.016 -2.353 2.394 -1.733 1.681 -0.041 -2.32 2.09 -1.685 1.519 1.032 0.019 -2.588 2.594 -1.816 1.722 
19 87 0.801 -0.024 -2.461 2.311 -1.724 1.701 -0.078 -2.598 2.071 -1.878 1.511 0.879 -0.022 -2.805 2.67 -1.873 1.845 
20 87 2.477 0.015 -2.317 2.53 -1.612 1.77 0.041 -2.256 2.24 -1.673 1.675 2.593 0.02 -2.427 2.648 -1.647 1.846 
21 87 -2.196 -0.004 -2.286 2.235 -1.731 1.632 0.035 -2.485 2.293 -1.607 1.7 -2.237 -0.003 -2.361 2.197 -1.784 1.666 
22 87 -2.11 0.034 -2.207 2.489 -1.67 1.681 0.032 -2.337 2.376 -1.639 1.806 -2.187 0.035 -2.261 2.599 -1.696 1.712 
23 87 1.957 -0.013 -2.177 2.33 -1.639 1.578 0.025 -2.48 2.387 -1.76 1.715 2 -0.012 -2.21 2.325 -1.629 1.586 
24 87 -1.395 0.019 -2.346 2.316 -1.68 1.684 0.021 -2.387 2.31 -1.584 1.687 -1.416 0.018 -2.353 2.324 -1.675 1.692 
25 87 0.439 0.042 -2.183 2.21 -1.651 1.661 -0.137 -2.179 1.862 -1.778 1.381 0.525 0.054 -2.904 2.821 -2.067 2.08 
26 87 1.173 0.012 -2.109 2.266 -1.613 1.634 -0.055 -2.426 2.1 -1.735 1.55 1.219 0.015 -2.255 2.389 -1.661 1.736 
27 87 1.052 -0.01 -2.249 2.246 -1.702 1.687 -0.144 -2.375 1.78 -1.851 1.377 1.18 -0.009 -2.808 2.742 -1.982 1.974 
28 87 -0.594 0.011 -2.398 2.441 -1.743 1.671 -0.094 -2.325 2.187 -1.83 1.456 -0.55 0.012 -2.749 2.726 -1.897 1.8 
29 87 0.38 0.064 -2.195 2.76 -1.631 1.717 -0.057 -2.364 2.295 -1.603 1.646 0.392 0.07 -2.427 3.088 -1.682 1.796 
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BOOTSTRAPPING CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR): Market benchmark (Continued) 
I    N TSTAT mean1 F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Mean A FA-1% FA-99% FA-5% FA-95% Adj-SK-t mean1b F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
30 87 -1.531 0.017 -2.357 2.191 -1.659 1.654 -0.003 -2.361 2.285 -1.622 1.698 -1.527 0.017 -2.419 2.318 -1.687 1.688 
31 87 -1.437 -0.018 -2.433 2.304 -1.671 1.637 0.008 -2.424 2.175 -1.739 1.775 -1.4 -0.017 -2.554 2.467 -1.756 1.705 
32 87 -0.326 0.027 -2.245 2.389 -1.573 1.657 0.024 -2.044 2.282 -1.604 1.687 -0.327 0.028 -2.244 2.543 -1.575 1.675 
33 87 -3.137 -0.03 -2.331 2.238 -1.603 1.56 0.055 -2.129 2.421 -1.58 1.793 -3.543 -0.032 -2.516 2.389 -1.69 1.599 
34 87 -1.354 -0.021 -2.354 2.351 -1.584 1.659 0.079 -2.203 2.372 -1.531 1.781 -1.396 -0.021 -2.381 2.454 -1.627 1.718 
35 87 -0.071 -0.038 -2.234 2.401 -1.721 1.65 -0.015 -2.333 2.165 -1.754 1.636 -0.066 -0.036 -2.441 2.664 -1.812 1.723 
36 87 -0.02 0 -2.226 2.158 -1.712 1.724 -0.054 -2.42 2.187 -1.668 1.547 -0.021 0.001 -2.341 2.278 -1.762 1.751 
37 87 1.374 -0.096 -2.378 2.144 -1.683 1.464 -0.14 -2.614 1.945 -1.913 1.418 1.566 -0.103 -2.843 2.458 -1.864 1.556 
38 87 -0.41 0.037 -2.46 2.392 -1.735 1.685 -0.068 -2.463 2.386 -1.823 1.701 -0.413 0.037 -2.563 2.489 -1.795 1.701 
39 87 -0.424 -0.016 -2.314 2.429 -1.732 1.709 -0.045 -2.306 2.325 -1.743 1.568 -0.424 -0.016 -2.325 2.449 -1.737 1.695 
40 87 0.45 0.015 -2.483 2.296 -1.705 1.694 -0.106 -2.402 1.999 -1.877 1.551 0.491 0.017 -2.736 2.515 -1.784 1.788 
41 87 2.621 -0.055 -2.345 2.279 -1.814 1.778 -0.078 -2.487 2.012 -1.742 1.456 3.188 -0.053 -2.77 2.674 -2.062 2.014 
42 86 -0.356 -0.071 -2.52 2.269 -1.796 1.628 -0.034 -2.281 2.148 -1.784 1.671 -0.341 -0.074 -2.736 2.383 -1.865 1.709 
43 86 -0.243 -0.021 -2.292 2.267 -1.757 1.713 -0.12 -2.363 1.986 -1.739 1.467 -0.207 -0.021 -2.773 2.702 -2.025 1.981 
44 86 0.922 0.006 -2.305 2.368 -1.577 1.675 -0.021 -2.332 2.231 -1.69 1.723 0.92 0.005 -2.425 2.387 -1.617 1.722 
45 86 -0.27 0.015 -2.228 2.328 -1.632 1.7 0.091 -1.884 2.254 -1.436 1.629 -0.309 0.015 -2.604 2.749 -1.831 1.929 
46 85 -1.379 0.017 -2.534 2.16 -1.72 1.681 -0.068 -2.522 2.232 -1.748 1.658 -1.294 0.019 -2.716 2.302 -1.73 1.713 
47 85 1.244 0.007 -2.463 2.29 -1.662 1.623 -0.061 -2.49 2.025 -1.717 1.583 1.359 0.014 -2.657 2.561 -1.748 1.756 
48 85 -0.581 -0.01 -2.199 2.298 -1.685 1.703 0.044 -2.261 2.166 -1.646 1.644 -0.575 -0.009 -2.304 2.403 -1.701 1.727 
49 85 -1.139 0.014 -2.443 2.285 -1.704 1.619 -0.063 -2.48 2.241 -1.775 1.718 -1.076 0.015 -2.651 2.477 -1.78 1.709 
50 85 0.353 0.028 -2.726 2.555 -1.749 1.83 0 -2.192 2.129 -1.582 1.608 0.373 0.031 -2.9 2.731 -1.822 1.877 
51 85 -1.806 0.003 -2.353 2.343 -1.781 1.664 -0.02 -2.201 2.392 -1.651 1.68 -1.875 0.003 -2.422 2.393 -1.808 1.696 
52 85 2.833 -0.023 -2.256 2.463 -1.731 1.75 0 -2.384 2.129 -1.704 1.645 2.958 -0.02 -2.332 2.571 -1.702 1.795 
53 85 1.763 0.065 -2.234 2.446 -1.647 1.721 -0.061 -2.184 1.968 -1.711 1.509 1.978 0.074 -2.521 2.779 -1.796 1.888 
54 85 0.049 0.019 -2.292 2.403 -1.53 1.633 0.023 -2.129 2.187 -1.647 1.666 0.057 0.021 -2.397 2.408 -1.577 1.662 
55 84 -0.859 -0.027 -2.277 2.26 -1.688 1.73 0.111 -1.956 2.442 -1.439 1.784 -0.925 -0.028 -2.586 2.576 -1.835 1.821 
56 84 -0.431 -0.048 -2.397 2.387 -1.734 1.578 0.078 -2.194 2.317 -1.619 1.858 -0.456 -0.055 -2.648 2.657 -1.867 1.626 
57 84 0.329 0.037 -2.251 2.161 -1.677 1.629 0.007 -2.275 2.258 -1.543 1.587 0.329 0.038 -2.324 2.218 -1.726 1.653 
58 83 -2.509 -0.012 -2.223 2.404 -1.679 1.606 0.105 -1.992 2.413 -1.471 1.816 -2.937 -0.018 -2.508 2.716 -1.854 1.769 
59 82 0.488 0.012 -2.199 2.077 -1.635 1.611 -0.076 -2.415 1.896 -1.813 1.483 0.543 0.018 -2.581 2.427 -1.835 1.838 
60 82 -1.17 -0.007 -2.223 2.234 -1.584 1.688 -0.031 -2.304 2.065 -1.674 1.535 -1.13 -0.004 -2.277 2.386 -1.634 1.717 
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BOOTSTRAPPING BHAR T-STAT: Market benchmark 
I N TSTAT F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
1 87 0.222 -2.437 2.328 -1.740 1.616 0.229 -2.517 2.314 -1.803 1.637 
2 87 0.731 -2.296 2.290 -1.691 1.709 0.773 -2.443 2.509 -1.745 1.789 
3 87 0.125 -2.473 2.299 -1.615 1.659 0.146 -2.616 2.364 -1.726 1.734 
4 87 0.735 -2.313 2.377 -1.706 1.789 0.786 -2.471 2.687 -1.776 1.906 
5 87 0.645 -2.100 2.320 -1.610 1.720 0.713 -2.497 2.790 -1.803 1.996 
6 87 0.561 -2.360 2.225 -1.699 1.658 0.637 -2.871 2.758 -2.004 1.933 
7 87 0.446 -2.311 2.361 -1.827 1.784 0.503 -2.754 2.780 -2.103 2.044 
8 87 0.891 -2.627 2.087 -1.681 1.644 0.952 -2.875 2.266 -1.726 1.730 
9 87 0.683 -2.375 2.312 -1.779 1.628 0.741 -2.629 2.594 -1.920 1.720 
10 87 0.395 -2.247 2.319 -1.664 1.759 0.439 -2.530 2.634 -1.791 1.889 
11 87 0.492 -2.328 2.164 -1.764 1.584 0.558 -2.810 2.568 -2.017 1.805 
12 87 0.633 -2.355 2.194 -1.677 1.657 0.701 -2.758 2.546 -1.891 1.875 
13 87 0.092 -2.074 2.018 -1.628 1.545 0.174 -2.815 2.738 -2.117 1.985 
14 87 0.608 -2.082 2.053 -1.606 1.549 0.739 -2.768 2.741 -2.045 1.948 
15 87 0.906 -2.183 2.021 -1.627 1.602 1.118 -2.995 2.708 -2.108 2.061 
16 87 0.704 -2.091 2.316 -1.590 1.647 0.843 -2.721 3.068 -1.971 2.056 
17 87 0.791 -2.136 2.201 -1.747 1.610 0.924 -2.670 2.779 -2.080 1.920 
18 87 0.979 -2.185 2.015 -1.713 1.571 1.234 -3.060 2.775 -2.258 2.045 
19 87 1.135 -2.171 2.119 -1.620 1.705 1.445 -3.007 2.939 -2.134 2.252 
20 87 1.476 -2.039 2.204 -1.641 1.664 1.916 -2.753 3.025 -2.124 2.143 
21 87 1.150 -2.146 2.247 -1.676 1.694 1.399 -2.768 2.921 -2.053 2.086 
22 87 0.787 -2.166 2.351 -1.532 1.747 0.909 -2.637 2.921 -1.781 2.028 
23 87 0.987 -2.261 2.165 -1.599 1.596 1.166 -2.843 2.729 -1.906 1.914 
24 87 0.828 -2.426 2.394 -1.684 1.648 0.923 -2.825 2.816 -1.864 1.775 
25 87 0.810 -2.266 2.344 -1.631 1.756 0.911 -2.678 2.808 -1.773 1.933 
26 87 1.012 -2.347 2.365 -1.735 1.761 1.157 -2.781 2.857 -1.929 1.988 
27 87 1.300 -2.170 2.124 -1.714 1.691 1.636 -2.895 2.792 -2.181 2.147 
28 87 1.150 -1.977 1.890 -1.664 1.573 1.555 -2.925 2.766 -2.352 2.210 
29 87 1.133 -1.846 1.850 -1.559 1.498 1.569 -2.780 2.787 -2.243 2.149 
30 87 1.023 -2.144 1.974 -1.572 1.533 1.344 -3.168 2.850 -2.160 2.073 
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BOOTSTRAPPING BHAR T-STAT: Market benchmark(Continued) 
I N TSTAT F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
31 87 0.805 -2.201 2.039 -1.624 1.645 0.981 -2.947 2.698 -2.064 2.088 
32 87 0.793 -1.997 1.931 -1.578 1.562 1.033 -2.902 2.798 -2.177 2.159 
33 87 0.618 -1.887 1.810 -1.526 1.504 0.828 -2.826 2.682 -2.176 2.136 
34 87 0.345 -2.026 1.880 -1.656 1.539 0.469 -2.903 2.650 -2.266 2.057 
35 87 0.332 -1.820 1.832 -1.480 1.453 0.478 -2.711 2.735 -2.102 2.058 
36 87 0.378 -1.920 1.871 -1.518 1.521 0.523 -2.836 2.740 -2.115 2.129 
37 87 0.454 -1.919 1.844 -1.519 1.527 0.609 -2.799 2.663 -2.091 2.112 
38 87 0.149 -2.327 2.204 -1.674 1.741 0.232 -3.212 2.988 -2.125 2.252 
39 87 0.065 -2.170 2.060 -1.654 1.563 0.140 -2.879 2.698 -2.058 1.960 
40 87 0.147 -1.911 2.101 -1.570 1.661 0.232 -2.537 2.855 -2.014 2.142 
41 87 0.378 -2.046 2.128 -1.590 1.589 0.493 -2.844 2.991 -2.085 2.095 
42 86 0.426 -1.958 1.956 -1.622 1.536 0.562 -2.773 2.782 -2.171 2.070 
43 86 0.460 -1.990 2.043 -1.629 1.651 0.588 -2.746 2.840 -2.149 2.188 
44 86 0.666 -1.845 1.807 -1.592 1.498 0.876 -2.685 2.611 -2.232 2.088 
45 86 0.752 -1.619 1.670 -1.365 1.358 1.044 -2.456 2.554 -1.998 1.986 
46 85 0.658 -1.893 1.877 -1.500 1.541 0.861 -2.742 2.710 -2.066 2.136 
47 85 0.816 -2.215 2.108 -1.681 1.580 0.989 -2.946 2.786 -2.101 1.977 
48 85 0.760 -2.272 2.144 -1.551 1.567 0.874 -2.579 2.500 -1.773 1.769 
49 85 0.591 -2.311 2.057 -1.787 1.648 0.695 -2.894 2.547 -2.174 1.981 
50 85 0.752 -2.251 2.280 -1.717 1.738 0.892 -2.866 2.908 -2.090 2.138 
51 85 0.466 -2.229 2.042 -1.605 1.586 0.555 -2.776 2.536 -1.865 1.900 
52 85 0.643 -2.393 2.141 -1.731 1.615 0.755 -3.030 2.682 -2.051 1.903 
53 85 0.669 -2.508 2.331 -1.603 1.673 0.769 -3.107 2.840 -1.840 1.920 
54 85 0.595 -2.361 2.267 -1.617 1.666 0.652 -2.463 2.404 -1.685 1.767 
55 84 0.679 -2.201 2.189 -1.597 1.521 0.737 -2.367 2.394 -1.622 1.584 
56 84 0.683 -2.291 2.213 -1.629 1.687 0.747 -2.523 2.402 -1.689 1.778 
57 84 0.799 -2.395 2.219 -1.643 1.535 0.873 -2.478 2.419 -1.685 1.578 
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BOOTSTRAPPING BHAR T-STAT: Match firms 
I N TSTAT F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
1 87 1.599 -2.36 2.362 -1.722 1.772 1.719 -2.487 2.533 -1.818 1.807 
2 87 1.132 -2.245 2.371 -1.709 1.648 1.123 -2.59 2.721 -1.9 1.731 
3 87 0.918 -2.294 2.34 -1.605 1.75 0.954 -2.262 2.356 -1.623 1.776 
4 87 0.872 -2.266 2.291 -1.628 1.514 0.881 -2.242 2.389 -1.652 1.534 
5 87 1.658 -2.359 2.336 -1.627 1.656 1.667 -2.327 2.35 -1.626 1.676 
6 87 1.599 -2.249 2.18 -1.641 1.573 1.625 -2.348 2.247 -1.672 1.605 
7 87 0.535 -2.393 2.601 -1.682 1.726 0.544 -2.382 2.702 -1.737 1.765 
8 87 0.427 -2.316 2.509 -1.731 1.679 0.432 -2.404 2.515 -1.779 1.712 
9 87 0.292 -2.491 2.251 -1.741 1.724 0.288 -2.559 2.359 -1.795 1.737 
10 87 0.335 -2.322 2.153 -1.704 1.615 0.342 -2.415 2.25 -1.761 1.649 
11 87 0.979 -2.447 2.407 -1.788 1.571 1.036 -2.741 2.656 -1.912 1.647 
12 87 0.703 -2.277 2.382 -1.675 1.68 0.728 -2.566 2.714 -1.782 1.803 
13 87 0.512 -2.198 2.269 -1.674 1.673 0.577 -2.736 2.814 -1.959 2.012 
14 87 1.398 -2.259 2.324 -1.703 1.67 1.624 -2.804 2.901 -2.006 1.968 
15 87 1.746 -2.356 2.307 -1.662 1.73 2.085 -2.976 2.853 -1.963 2.043 
16 87 1.367 -2.44 2.327 -1.743 1.591 1.518 -2.838 2.696 -1.954 1.748 
17 87 1.67 -2.249 2.372 -1.65 1.683 1.793 -2.486 2.669 -1.736 1.787 
18 87 1.69 -2.221 2.286 -1.597 1.686 2.025 -2.768 2.793 -1.884 1.994 
19 87 1.578 -2.216 2.043 -1.777 1.57 1.935 -2.753 2.567 -2.195 1.9 
20 87 1.689 -2.081 2.118 -1.535 1.629 2.056 -2.587 2.666 -1.831 1.947 
21 87 1.357 -2.243 2.175 -1.541 1.639 1.53 -2.656 2.547 -1.679 1.823 
22 87 1.254 -2.368 2.459 -1.672 1.654 1.342 -2.482 2.754 -1.705 1.716 
23 87 1.735 -2.47 2.485 -1.647 1.652 1.837 -2.639 2.635 -1.724 1.69 
24 87 1.501 -2.404 2.281 -1.83 1.666 1.599 -2.551 2.486 -1.915 1.69 
25 87 1.732 -2.477 2.317 -1.734 1.797 1.934 -2.801 2.63 -1.865 1.943 
26 87 2.006 -2.323 2.203 -1.666 1.632 2.29 -2.636 2.508 -1.779 1.776 
27 87 2.234 -2.184 2.215 -1.694 1.669 3.031 -2.914 2.949 -2.135 2.096 
28 87 1.851 -1.888 1.92 -1.579 1.533 2.743 -2.792 2.85 -2.242 2.161 
29 87 1.78 -1.782 1.798 -1.51 1.482 2.679 -2.666 2.7 -2.164 2.13 
30 87 1.867 -1.966 1.857 -1.59 1.456 2.725 -2.892 2.687 -2.214 2.002 
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BOOTSTRAPPING BHAR T-STAT: Match firms (Continued) 
I N TSTAT F1-1% F1-99% F1-5% F1-95% Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b F1-5%b F1-95%b 
31 87 1.598 -2.182 2.018 -1.734 1.564 2.008 -2.912 2.648 -2.181 1.913 
32 87 1.078 -1.979 1.961 -1.574 1.524 1.418 -2.876 2.846 -2.173 2.088 
33 87 0.954 -1.903 1.78 -1.512 1.496 1.274 -2.841 2.609 -2.134 2.113 
34 87 0.84 -2.003 1.973 -1.554 1.55 1.054 -2.807 2.775 -2.071 2.065 
35 87 0.772 -1.839 1.86 -1.567 1.477 0.997 -2.638 2.688 -2.186 2.031 
36 87 1 -2.1 1.982 -1.566 1.537 1.3 -3.091 2.877 -2.159 2.115 
37 87 1.229 -1.946 1.868 -1.539 1.467 1.661 -2.861 2.712 -2.139 2.024 
38 87 1.514 -2.197 2.188 -1.677 1.561 1.935 -2.991 2.97 -2.158 1.978 
39 87 1.729 -2.08 2.02 -1.631 1.564 2.245 -2.751 2.686 -2.07 1.982 
40 87 1.842 -2.157 2.009 -1.642 1.59 2.474 -2.982 2.724 -2.124 2.053 
41 87 1.945 -1.897 2.036 -1.479 1.596 2.706 -2.596 2.848 -1.932 2.12 
42 86 1.473 -1.982 1.9 -1.493 1.568 2.002 -2.818 2.707 -2.021 2.143 
43 86 1.484 -2.052 1.982 -1.63 1.646 1.976 -2.82 2.763 -2.181 2.191 
44 86 1.284 -1.946 1.781 -1.533 1.444 1.764 -2.888 2.58 -2.15 1.997 
45 86 1.1 -1.696 1.766 -1.477 1.405 1.547 -2.577 2.698 -2.173 2.035 
46 85 1.067 -2.027 1.83 -1.711 1.599 1.321 -2.911 2.572 -2.368 2.182 
47 85 1.492 -2.307 2.023 -1.692 1.627 1.851 -3.016 2.664 -2.13 2.022 
48 85 1.129 -2.135 2.322 -1.613 1.775 1.136 -2.666 2.982 -1.903 2.11 
49 85 0.977 -2.335 2.266 -1.694 1.591 1.048 -3.003 2.921 -2.013 1.87 
50 85 0.916 -2.134 2.126 -1.596 1.647 0.987 -2.743 2.729 -1.943 2.022 
51 85 0.889 -2.187 2.415 -1.693 1.846 0.954 -2.806 3.187 -2.069 2.285 
52 85 1.154 -2.078 2.117 -1.627 1.562 1.196 -2.629 2.674 -1.956 1.879 
53 85 1.297 -2.167 2.296 -1.691 1.682 1.331 -2.708 2.905 -2.023 2.041 
54 85 1.313 -2.104 2.26 -1.603 1.648 1.165 -2.587 2.84 -1.918 1.97 
55 84 0.891 -2.041 2.319 -1.578 1.622 0.735 -2.683 3.122 -1.967 2.049 
56 84 0.389 -1.813 2.025 -1.512 1.574 0.274 -2.531 2.905 -2.03 2.128 
57 84 0.633 -2.186 2.14 -1.648 1.688 0.509 -2.978 2.931 -2.137 2.204 
58 83 0.327 -2.024 2.13 -1.551 1.594 0.225 -2.839 3.053 -2.07 2.132 
59 82 0.12 -1.96 2.104 -1.454 1.632 0.022 -2.81 3.091 -1.958 2.247 
60 82 0.406 -2.107 2.114 -1.616 1.574 0.318 -2.809 2.807 -2.044 1.978 
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